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ABSTRACT
MARITAL POWER, CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE 
by
Diane H. Coleman 
U n iv e r s i t y  of  New Hampshire,  May, 1985
C o n f l i c t  theory is used to ana lyze  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between m a r i t a l  power s t r u c t u r e ,  the level  of  m a r i t a l
c o n f l i c t  and the r a t e  of  v io le n c e  in a n a t i o n a l l y  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  sample o f  2,11*3 American couples.  Although  
previous authors suggest g re a te r  c o n f 1 i c t  in e g a l i t a r i a n
r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  other  research demonstrates t h a t  the re  is 
less v i  o le n c e . Given the st rong p o s i t i v e  a s s o c ia t io n
between c o n f l i c t  and v i o le n c e ,  a major quest ion addressed in 
t h i s  research concerns t h i s  apparent c o n t r a d i c t i o n .
Two exp lana t ions  of  t h i s  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  were e m p i r i c a l l y  
te s te d :  (1) I f  the  power s t r u c t u r e  is perce ived as
l e g i t i m a t e ,  the leve l  of  c o n f l i c t  and r a t e  of  v io le n c e  may 
decrease,  regard less  o f  the actual  power s t r u c t u r e .  (2) The 
n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s  used to s e t t l e  d isputes  may mediate the  
r e l a t i o n  between c o n f l i c t  and v io le n c e .
The major f in d in g s  of t h i s  research suggest th a t
unequal m a r i t a l  power s t r u c tu r e s  a re  the c r i t i c a l  f a c t o r s  in 
e x p la in in g  the level  o f  c o n f l i c t  and the r a te  of  v io le n c e .  
E g a l i t a r i a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  have the lowest l e v e ls  of  m a r i t a l
x
c o n f l i c t ,  w h i le  male dominant have the h ig h e s t .  Consensus 
over the d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  power does reduce the leve l  of  
c o n f l i c t .  However, male dominant r e l a t i o n s h i p s  continue  to  
have high le v e ls  o f  c o n f l i c t  even when consensus is high ,  
and e g a l i t a r i a n  r e la t i o n s h i p s  have the lowest l e v e ls  of  
c o n f l i c t  even when consensus is low.
The p o s i t i v e  a s s o c ia t io n  between c o n f l i c t  and v io le n c e  
is reconfirmed in t h i s  research .  When th is  r e l a t i o n s h i p  is 
examined f o r  each m a r i t a l  power type ,  the re  are  dramat ic  
d i f f e r e n c e s  in the  p r o b a b i l i t y  of  v io le n c e .  E g a l i t a r i a n  
r e la t i o n s h i p s  have the lowest r a t e  of  v io le n c e  even when 
c o n f l i c t  is h igh.  Th is  is not t r u e  fo r  the o ther  power 
s t r u c t u r e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  the male dominant.
The f in d in g s  suggest t h a t  n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s  p lay  an 
important r o l e  in the r e l a t i o n  between c o n f l i c t  and 
v io le n c e .  D e s t r u c t i v e  t a c t i c s  such as withdrawal and verbal  
aggression increase the r a t e  of  v io le n c e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  when 
c o n f l i c t  is h igh .  However, the use of  reasoning does not  
appear to  be an e f f e c t i v e  t a c t i c  to use to l i m i t  v io le n c e .  
I f  th e re  is  high c o n f l i c t ,  the re  w i l l  be more v io le n c e ,  
i r r e s p e c t iv e  o f  the use of  reasoning.  The f in d in g s  s t ro n g ly  
suggest t h a t  changing the power s t r u c t u r e  of  m a r i t a l  
r e la t i o n s h i p s  so t h a t  power is e q u i t a b ly  d i s t r i b u t e d  is the  




M a r i t a l  v io le n c e  has been the focus of c ons iderab le
s o c io lo g ic a l  debate and i n t e r e s t  s ince  the e a r l y  1970 ' s .
I n i t i a l l y  s o c io lo g ic a l  research began to  i d e n t i f y  the socia l  
co n d i t io n s  under which v io le n c e  between c o h a b i t a t in g
p a r tne rs  occurred.  Factors such as race ,  c la s s ,  community 
i n t e g r a t i o n ,  chi ldhood exper iences w i th  v io le n c e  and 
employment s ta tu s ,  to name a few, were i d e n t i f i e d  as 
a f f e c t i n g  the r a te s  of  m a r i t a l  v io le n c e  ( C a r r o l l ,  1977; 
A l le n ,  1975; Gel les  and S t ra u s ,  1975; S te inmetz ,  197D • As 
the issue of  m a r i t a l  v io le n c e  became a more p u b l ic  ra th e r  
than p r i v a t e  problem, i n d iv id u a ls  began to  quest ion  why 
women remained in abusive r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  Some research  
began to  in v e s t ig a t e  the nature  o f  m arr iage  and f a m i ly ,  and 
soc ia l  f a c t o r s  t h a t  fo rc e  women to remain in v i o l e n t  
r e la t i o n s h i p s  were i d e n t i f i e d  (Dobash and Doash,1980;
S t r a u s , 1977; S te inmetz  and S t r a u s , 1973).  The issue of 
m a r i t a l  power and women's power o u ts id e  o f  m arr iage  was 
suggested as a major e x p la n a t io n  of  m a r i t a l  v io le n c e .
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For the most p a r t ,  however, t h i s  approach i d e n t i f i e d  
p r o p e r t i e s  or c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  the in d iv id u a ls  involved in 
v io le n c e .  The research on resources,  power, and v io le n c e  is 
one example.  Other work i d e n t i f i e d  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  the  
v i c t i m  and to a lesser  e x t e n t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  the v i o l e n t  
p a r t n e r .  While  an in d iv id u a l  approach to  the e x p la n a t io n  of  
m a r i t a l  v io le n c e  is p ro d u c t iv e ,  i t  f a i l s  to recognize  
important fa c e t s  o f  marriage and fa m i ly  l i f e .  Perhaps the 
most important  aspect of  marriage and fa m i ly  t h a t  is  lo s t  
through an in d iv id u a l  approach is the p r i v a t e  world th a t  
both p a r tn e rs  c r e a te  through t h e i r  i n t e r a c t i o n  w i th  one 
another over t im e .  Th is  research  at tempts to  tap i n to  the  
p r i v a t e  world t h a t  in t im a tes  c r e a te  by focusing on 
p r o p e r t i e s  o f  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  between par tners  r a th e r  than 
p r o p e r t i e s  any one i n d iv id u a l  may possess.  Th is  research  
explores  how two major c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  the m a r i t a l  dyad -  
m a r i t a l  power and c o n f l i c t  -  promote or suppress the r a t e  of  
m a r i t a l  v io le n c e .
The power s t r u c t u r e  o f  in t im a te  r e la t i o n s h i p s  and the  
i n t e r a c t i o n  p a t te rn s  t h a t  develop are  two p r o p e r t i e s  t h a t  
place  boundaries around the  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  Who has the power 
w i t h i n  a r e l a t i o n s h i p  or how the power is d i s t r i b u t e d  are  
c r u c i a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  t h a t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  because so many 
aspects o f  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  are  determined by them. The 
i n t e r a c t i o n  p a t t e r n s ,  in t h i s  research the leve l  o f  c o n f l i c t  
and how t h a t  c o n f l i c t  is  n e g o t ia te d ,  may vary  according to  
the power s t r u c t u r e .  Both m a r i t a l  power and lev e l  of
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c o n f l i c t  a re  independently assoc iated  w i th  m a r i t a l  v io le n c e ,  
yet  as Chapter I I  i l l u s t r a t e s ,  the a s s o c ia t io n  is u n c lea r ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  when the j o i n t  e f f e c t s  o f  power and c o n f l i c t  a re  
cons i d e r e d .
One s o lu t io n  to the issue of  m a r i t a l  v io le n c e  has been 
to suggest t h a t  when women's power ins ide  and o u ts id e  of  
marriage increases ,  the re  w i l l  be less v io le n c e .  This  
s o lu t io n  is rooted in an a n a ly s is  of  the system of sexual  
i n e q u a l i t y  t h a t  oppresses women. R e la t io n s h ip s  of  e q u a l i t y ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  in t im a te  ones however, ca r ry  w i th  them the  
n e ce ss i ty  of  in d iv id u a ls  n e g o t ia t in g  how and where the power 
w i l l  be d i s t r i b u t e d .  Scanzoni (1976) and Whitehurs t  (19 7M )  
have suggested g r e a t e r  c o n f l i c t  in such r e la t i o n s h i p s  
because of t h i s  n e g o t i a t i o n  process.  I f  t h i s  is the case,  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  where one p a r tn e r  dominates the d ec is io n  
making process should have less c o n f l i c t .  Yet the research  
on m a r i t a l  v io le n c e  r a is e s  impor tant  quest ions  concerning  
these hypotheses.  Research has c o n s is t e n t ly  demonstrated  
less v io le n c e  in e g a l i t a r i a n  r e la t i o n s h i p s  and more v io le n c e  
when one par tne r  dominates the d e c is io n  making process.  
Thus the m a r i t a l  v io le n c e  research is in c o n s is te n t  w i th  the  
hypotheses regarding m a r i t a l  power and c o n f l i c t .
Th is  research examines four  power arrangements couples  
have n e g o t ia te d :  husband dominated,  w i f e  dominated,
e g a l i t a r i a n  and d iv id e d  power. In d iv id e d  power marriages  
i n d iv id u a ls  have separa te  spheres of  power over c e r t a i n  
de c is ions  t h a t  are to be made, y e t  the power remains e q u a l ly
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d i s t r i b u t e d .  In e g a l i t a r i a n  r e la t i o n s h i p s  both p a r tne rs  
p a r t i c i p a t e  e q u a l ly  in the d e c is io n  making process as each 
issue a r i s e s .
While  the l i n k  between power, c o n f l i c t ,  and v io le n c e  is
u n c le a r ,  the l i t e r a t u r e  suggests several  avenues fo r
e x p l o r a t i o n .  Scanzoni (1978) suggests t h a t  the l i n k  between
power and c o n f l i c t  may be mediated by how much consensus
couples have reached over how the power in the r e l a t i o n s h i p  
»
is d i s t r i b u t e d .  I t  may be t h a t  consensus over power norms 
and not the power s t r u c t u r e  o f  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  c o n t r ib u te s  
to the r a t e  o f  m a r i t a l  v io le n c e .  The a s s o c ia t io n  between 
leve l  of  c o n f l i c t  and v io le n c e  may be c l a r i f i e d  by examining  
the n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s  couples use to s e t t l e  c o n f l i c t .  
While  t h i s  appears to  be obv ious,  some research (S traus ,  
G e l le s ,  and S te inmetz ,  1980) has found t h a t  n e g o t ia t io n  
t a c t i c s  may not a l t e r  the p o s i t i v e  r e l a t i o n  between c o n f l i c t  
and v io le n c e .
MAJOR GOALS OF THE RESEARCH 
There are  th ree  major goals o f  t h i s  research which 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e  i t  from previous m a r i t a l  v io le n c e  research .
1. In t e g r a t  i on of  Pr i or Research
P r io r  research has examined the independent e f f e c t s  of  
m a r i t a l  power arrangements and v io le n c e ,  c o n f l i c t  and 
v io le n c e ,  and to a l i m i t e d  e x t e n t ,  n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s  and 
v io le n c e .  Because each p iece  of  research d e a l t  w i th  these  
issues independently o f  one another ,  s i g n i f i c a n t  issues were
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over looked.  These become apparent when one at tempts  to l in k  
p r io r  research in to  a basic  exp la n a to ry  model. C o n f l i c t  
theory suggests g r e a t e r  c o n f l i c t  among in t im a tes  who share
in d e c is io n  making.  Yet e g a l i t a r i a n  r e la t i o n s h i p s  have the  
lowest r a t e  of  v io le n c e .  A c o n f l i c t  p e rs p e c t ive  suggests
th a t  the use of  r a t i o n a l  d iscussion  to s e t t l e  d isputes  w i l l  
r e s u l t  in  less v io le n c e .  Findings from Straus e t .  a l . ' s
(1980) a n a ly s is  o f  a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  sample of  American 
couples r a is e s  issues regarding t h i s  hypothes is .  Others  
(K le in  and H i l l ,  1975) have suggested t h a t  problem solv ing  
behavior  cannot be examined a p a r t  from the power s t r u c t u r e  
of  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  and have po inted  out the lack of 
research th a t  considers  m a r i t a l  power s t r u c t u r e  and 
n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s .  Tal lman and Mi I l e r  (197^) have s ta ted  
t h a t  i t  is not the power arrangements th a t  a f f e c t  problem 
so lv in g  a b i l i t y  but the inconsis tency  between actua l  power 
and the power norms f o r  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  t h a t  vary  by socia l  
c la s s .  Thus t h i s  research at tempts to  c l a r i f y  the j o i n t  
a s s o c i a t i i o n  between fa c t o r s  t h a t  have been i d e n t i f i e d  as 
important  e xp la na t ions  of the r a t e  of  m a r i t a l  v io le n c e  but  
pose c o n t r a d ic t io n s  when l inked to g e th e r .
2 .  Ana 1ys i s o f  Propert  ies of  the Mar i t a 1 R e la t  ionsh i p
Th is  research focuses on c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of  the  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between p a r tn e rs  ra th e r  than c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of  
the i n d i v i d u a l .  Examining the p r o p e r t ie s  of  the m a r i t a l  
system and how those p r o p e r t ie s  a f f e c t  the r a t e  o f  m a r i t a l  
v io le n c e  is c o n s is te n t  w i th  a systems approach to the
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e x p la n a t io n  of  d ys fu n ct io n a l  behavior  (Mi nuchi n, 197*+; 
H a l e y , 1976) .  While the l i t e r a t u r e  on m a r i t a l  therapy theory  
and p r a c t i c e  from a r e l a t i o n s h i p  p e rs p e c t iv e  has increased  
enormously in the l a s t  ten years ,  few s tud ies  of m a r i t a l
v io le n c e  examine the p r o p e r t i e s  o f  the r e l a t i o n s h i p .
3. In c lu s io n  of Women1s V io lence
The a n a l y t i c  s h i f t  from an in d iv id u a l  to a r e l a t i o n s h i p  
p e rs p e c t ive  n e c e s s i ta te s  the in c lu s io n  of women's v io le n c e  
in t h i s  research .  Couple v io le n c e  has rece ived l im i t e d  
a t t e n t i o n  in the l i t e r a t u r e .  This  is p a r t i a l l y  because
v io le n c e  a g a in s t  women c a r r i e s  more ser ious  psychological  
and physica l  consequences than v io le n c e  a g a in s t  men. 
Because of the s t r u c t u r e  of  s o c ie t y ,  men have g re a t e r  
a b i l i t y  to end d e s t r u c t i v e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  Another reason 
fo r  the i n a t t e n t i o n  to  v io le n c e  by women is the b e l i e f  th a t  
acknowledgement of  women's v io le n c e  w i l l  have ser ious  
p o l i t i c a l  repercussions .  That is ,  serv ices  to b a t te re d  
women w i l l  not be provided  and the problem of woman abuse 
w i l l  not be taken s e r io u s ly  by those in d iv id u a ls  -  male more 
o f te n  than not -  who contro l  the necessary resources and 
power to p r i o r i t i z e  the  issue .  F i n a l l y ,  the acknowledgement 
t h a t  women can be and o f t e n  are  v i o l e n t  is a t  odds w i th  the  
t r a d i t i o n a l  image of women. While  f e m in is t  ideology has 
chal lenged the t r a d i t i o n a l  view of women, the conception of  
women as p o t e n t i a l l y  v i o l e n t  in d iv id u a ls  is an issue t h a t  
crea tes  much debate*. Although these c o n s idera t ions  are
important and should not be ignored,  i f  our purpose is to
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understand v io le n c e  w i t h i n  the f a m i l y ,  i t  is c r u c ia l  to  
consider  v io le n c e  by a l l  f a m i ly  members, inc lud ing  women. 
Ignor ing  the research  t h a t  in d ic a te s  women are  v i o l e n t  in 
some circumstances on ly  r e in f o r c e s  t h a t  t r a d i t i o n a l ,  
oppress ive  image of women.
Chapter I I
POWER. AUTHORITY AND C ON FL IC T
" I n  the ' r e a l  w o r l d ' ,  c o n f l i c t ,  n e g o t i a t i o n  and power are  as 
i n te r tw in e d  as bonded chemical  elements" (Scanzoni,
1978:119)
Power is  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  de f ined  as " the  a b i l i t y  to  
enforce  one's  w i l l  d e s p i t e  r e s is te n c e "  (Weber, 19A7) . Two 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  are  i m p l i c i t  in t h i s  concept o f  power: the
involvement of  a t  l e a s t  two in d iv i d u a l s  and the p o s s i b i l i t y  
of c o n f l i c t  between those persons.
Power evolves from the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of  the  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between i n d i v i d u a l s .  Weber c l e a r l y  recognized  
the r e l a t i o n a l  aspects o f  power when he suggested power is  
"a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  the r e l a t i o n  between leaders  and 
f o l lo w e r s  ra th e r  than an a t t r i b u t e  o f  the leader  alone"  
(Coser,  19711227) Thus an in d iv id u a l  may possess power only  
in r e l a t i o n  to an o th e r .  When the o ther  consents to t h a t  
power r e l a t i o n ,  the in d iv id u a l  w i th  power a lso  has 
a u t h o r i t y ,  or the r i g h t  to  use power.
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LEGITIMATION OF POWER 
While  the balance of  power involves  the r e la t i o n s h i p  
between su p ero rd in a te  and the subord inate  members, c o n f l i c t  
may a r i s e  i f  the subord inate  members are  d i s s a t i s f i e d  w i th  
t h i s  power d i s t r i b u t i o n .  Thus the possession of power 
c a r r i e s  w i th  i t  the cont inua l  s t r u g g le  to  m a in ta in  one's  
p o s i t i o n .  The p o t e n t i a l  fo r  c o n f l i c t  always e x i s t s .
One key to  the pow e r /c o n f1i c t  dilemma is to consider  
how the p o s i t io n  of  the superord ina te  is viewed by the  
s u b o rd in a te .  Weber's d iscuss ion  of l e g i t im a te d  a u t h o r i t y  
provides  the key to the p o w e r /c o n f l i c t  issue .  Weber 
suggests t h a t  as long as th e re  is consensus t h a t  the  
superord ina te  is deserv ing of  t h i s  super ior  s ta tus  his or 
her power is  l e g i t im a t e d .  The in d iv id u a l  has the r i g h t  to 
impose h is  or her w i l l  upon o th e rs .  C o n f l i c t  is minimized  
or n o n -e x is t e n t  as long as the superord ina te  p o s i t io n  is 
perce ived as l e g i t i m a t e .  C o n f l i c t  a r is e s  when the  
l e g i t im a c y  of the power is quest ioned.
A l t e r n a t i v e s  to  Submi ss ion
When t h i s  le g i t im a c y  is  quest ioned,  Blau (196*t) 
suggests four  a l t e r n a t i v e s  to submission t h a t  the  
subord inate  may use to  change the balance of  power. One can 
provide  equal s erv ice s  in r e t u r n ,  o b ta in  serv ices  e lsewhere,  
use physica l  coerc io n ,  or do w i th o u t  the s erv ice s  provided  
by the o t h e r .  Avoiding submission then,  e n t a i l s  changing 
the n a tu re  o f  the t r a n s a c t io n  between super and subord inate .
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The a l t e r n a t i v e s  t h a t  Blau suggests are  based on a 
concept ion of  so c ia l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  t h a t  endure because of  
the exchange of s erv ice s  w i t h i n  t h a t  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  He 
suggests t h a t  i n d iv id u a ls  e s t a b l i s h  power over others
because of t h e i r  access to or possession of resources valued
by a n o th e r .  The in d iv id u a l  can m a in ta in  his or her p o s i t io n  
of power because these resources a re  in demand. Blau 
focuses fo r  the most p a r t  on resources t h a t  p rov ide  a degree  
of  so c ia l  p r e s t ig e  to  o thers  but there  is a s u b je c t iv e  
q u a l i t y  to  the concept of  resources.  What is valued by one 
may not be valued by another .  The concept of  resources can 
be broad ly  in t e r p r e t e d  such th a t  physica l  a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  can 
be as much of a resource as income or e ducat ion .
Power as a p ro p er ty  o f  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  is stressed  
because i t  is an important  c lue  to understanding what i t  is 
about i n t i m a t e - r e l a t i o n s h i p s  th a t  can lead to  v io le n c e .  
Throughout the fa m i ly  l i f e  c yc le  power and contro l  are
issues t h a t  are  c o n t i n u a l l y  n e got ia ted  w i t h i n  the major
subsystems of the f a m i ly :  the spousal ,  paren ta l  and s i b l i n g .  
As Blau po in ts  ou t ,  th e re  are  a l t e r n a t i v e s  to submission.  
But when we consider the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of  m arr iage  and the 
f a m i ly  i t  is c le a r  t h a t  these a l t e r n a t i v e s  in t h i s  c on te x t ,  
are not a v a i l a b l e  to a l l  members of  the f a m i ly ,  w i th  the 
except ion  of  physical  v io le n c e .
Because of so c ia l  s t r u c t u r a l  i n e q u a l i t i e s ,  women o f ten  
can not prov ide  equal serv ices  in r e t u r n .  The t r a d i t i o n a l  
r o le  o f  women has been t h a t  o f  housewife and mother,  ro les
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which r e s t r i c t  women from f u l l  t ime p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in the  
labor fo r c e .  Although women who have paid employment a lso  
have g re a te r  m a r i t a l  power (Brown, 1980) d is c r im in a t o r y  
employment p ra c t ic e s  have produced a segmented labor market  
where women are  concentra ted  in those occupations w i t h  the  
l e a s t  s ta t u s ,  income and job  s e c u r i t y  (S o k o lo f f ,  1981 ; 
Stevenson, 1975; Oppenheimer, 1973)•  Thus on the average,  
women can not prov ide  the same s erv ices  in terms of wages 
and so c ia l  p r e s t ig e  th a t  a man may p rov ide .  The s erv ices  
t r a d i t i o n a l l y  provided by women are  not h ig h ly  va lued .
Blau suggests t h a t  "any committment to a socia l  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  e n t a i l s  a degree of  dependence by exc luding  
a l t e r n a t i v e s "  (196-1*: 1 19) This  is e s p e c i a l l y  t ru e  when one 
considers  the exc lus iveness  of  m arr iage  and suggests th a t  
the second a l t e r n a t i v e  to  submission,  o b ta in in g  serv ices  
elsewhere ,  is c o n t ra ry  to va lues  regard ing  marr iage  and 
f a m i l y .  While  some s e rv ic e s  can be l e g i t i m a t e l y  accepted  
from extended k in ,  such as c h i ld  care  or f i n a n c i a l  a id  
dur ing  a c r i s i s ,  k in  a re  under no o b l i g a t i o n  to  prov ide  
them. In f a c t ,  the independence of the nuclear  fa m i ly  is 
expected and the c o n t r i b u t i o n  of  s erv ices  by extended k in  
depends on emotional  bonds ra th e r  than o b l i g a t i o n .  Thus i t  
would be d i f f i c u l t  f o r  a p a r tn e r  to o b ta in  serv ices  normally  
provided by the spouse from o th e rs .  In f a c t ,  socia l  w e l f a r e  
programs such as AFDC r e q u i r e  the documented absence of a 
spouse be fore  a id  is g iven .
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The t h i r d  a l t e r n a t i v e  to submission,  to do w i th o u t  the  
serv ices  provided by o th e r ,  is u n r e a l i s t i c  in the c ontext  of  
marriage and the f a m i l y .  I t  is u n r e a l i s t i c  because i t  is in 
oppos i t ion  to the meaning of m arr iage  and the f a m i ly .
The one a l t e r n a t i v e  which remains is physical  f o r c e .  
Since power and c o n f l i c t  a re  viewed as r e c u r r in g  issues 
w i t h i n  the fa m i ly  system, v io le n c e  remains a means of  
m ain ta in in g  or ga in in g  a p o s i t io n  of  power. I t  is one 
a l t e r n a t i v e  to  submission t h a t  every  fa m i ly  member can use,  
although not a l l  can use i t  w i th  egual success.
This  chapter begins w i th  a quote from John Scanzoni 
concerning the r e l a t i o n  between power, c o n f l i c t  and 
n e g o t i a t i o n .  I t  is o f  p a r t i c u l a r  re levance  in the context  
of m a r i t a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  because such r e la t i o n s h i p s  develop  
a h is t o r y  and content  t h a t  sets them a p ar t  from other  more 
t r a n s i t o r y  small groups. I t  is those c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of  
married l i f e  t h a t  magnify the need to  n e g o t ia te  issues of  
power and c o n f l i c t .
THE CONCEPT OF MARITAL POWER
The c o n c e p tu a l i z a t io n  and measurement of  power 
r e l a t i o n s  between husband and w i f e  and w i t h i n  the la rg er  
fa m i ly  system in genera l  has been the focus of debate fo r  
several  decades.  Chaper I I I  addresses the methodological  
issues ra ised  by the use of  Blood and Wolfe type in d ic a to rs  
of  m a r i t a l  power. This  s ec t io n  reviews the la rg e r  
t h e o r e t i c a l  issues involved in the c o n c e p tu a l i z a t io n  of  
m a r i t a l  power and i t s  use in the  fa m i ly  socio logy
1 i t e r a t u r e .
One of the  problems t h a t  has plagued m a r i t a l  power 
research is conceptual  c l a r i t y  regarding d e f i n i t i o n s  of  
power and a u t h o r i t y  ( S a f i 1 io s -R o th s c h i Id ,  1970; R o l l i n s  and 
Bahr, 1976; McDonald, 1?80) Whi le  d i s t i n c t i o n s  in t h i s  
research are  made between concepts such as power and 
a u t h o r i t y ,  t h a t  has not been the case in much of the m a r i t a l  
power l i t e r a t u r e , .  The terms fa m i ly  power, power s t r u c t u r e ,  
d e c is ion  making,  fa m i ly  a u t h o r i t y  and in f lu e n c e  have been 
used in terchangeably  ( S a f i 1 i o s -R o th s c h i1d, 1970)
However, much of the debate over em pir ica l  research  
t h a t  examines the issue of  m a r i t a l  power stems from the use 
o f  a measure o f  power o r i g i n a l l y  developed by Blood and 
Wolfe ( I960) and modif ied  by o thers  to e xp lo re  the resource  
theory of  m a r i t a l  power. The o r i g i n a l  measure t h a t  Blood 
and Wolfe developed asked the respondent who had the f i n a l  
say on dec is ions  such as what car to purchase,  how much 
money to spend on food, and what job  the husband should 
ta k e .  A l i k e r t  a d d i t i v e  index was constructed from the  
quest ions to  r e f l e c t  husband dominant, w i f e  dominant and 
e g a l i t a r i a n  power s t r u c t u r e s .  Although S a f i 1 io s -R o th s c h i1d 
( 1970) in d ic a te s  the major problems w i th  t h i s  type of  
measure are  methodolog ica l ,  several  important  po ints  
regard ing the concept o f  m a r i t a l  power are  ra ise d  in her 
review of the l i t e r a t u r e .  She po in ts  out t h a t  Blood and 
Wolfe measures of  power on ly  measure one aspect o f  power, 
t h a t  of  d e c is io n  making,  but t h a t  d ec is io n  making has been
discussed as i f  i t  encompasses a l l  aspects o f  power. She 
suggests t h a t  d ec is io n  making is a process and t h a t  i t  is 
the process t h a t  is s i g n i f i c a n t  because of the in f lu e n c e  and 
a u t h o r i t y  one may use ra th e r  than who makes the f i n a l  
d e c is io n .  A person who de lega tes  the power to make decisons  
to  another is by no means power less,  y e t  'who decides who 
decides '  is not n e c e s s a r i ly  captured by a Blood and Wolfe  
measure. Cromwell and Olson (1975) i d e n t i f y  th re e  domains 
of power: process power, outcome power and power bases.
They suggest,  co n s is te n t  w i th  S a f i 1 io s -R o th s c h i Id  (1970),  
t h a t  the m a jo r i t y  of  research has focused on power outcomes 
ra th e r  than process power or power bases.  Sprey (19 72 ) ,  in 
f a c t ,  quest ions the t h e o r e t i c a l  usefu lness  of  even knowing 
who w ie ld s  the power in the f a m i ly  and introduces the  
concept o f  'p o w e r in g ' ,  suggesting a dynamic model th a t  
focuses on the o r g a n iz a t io n a l  p r i n c i p l e s  t h a t  under ly  
n e g o t ia t io n  process in m ar r iag e .  In a l a t e r  a r t i c l e ,  
S a f i 1 io s -R o th s c h i Id  (1976:339) discusses two types o f  power: 
o r c h e s t r a t io n  power and implementation power. O rc h e s t ra t io n  
power r e f e r s  to " th e  power of  i n d iv id u a ls  to make on ly  the  
important  and in f re q u e n t  dec is ions  t h a t  do not i n f r i n g e  on 
t h e i r  t ime but t h a t  de termine the fa m i ly  l i f e  s t y l e  and the  
major c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  and f e a t u r e s  of  t h e i r  f a m i ly " .  
Implementation power is power d e r iv e d  from c a r r y in g  out  
those dec is io n s  and is l i m i t e d  by the dec is ions  made by the  
more powerful  1 spouse. Johnson, (1976) develops a theory  of  
sex r o l e  s te re o ty p in g  and power use.  She suggests th a t
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because women have less access to  concre te  resources and 
competence, the use of  i n d i r e c t ,  personal and h e lp le s s  modes 
of in f lu en ce  are  necessary.
Although S a f i 1 io s -R o th s c h i1d,  Cromwell and Olson, and 
Sprey r a is e  important po in ts  concerning the use of  the  
concept of  m a r i t a l  power, Da ir  G i l l e s p i e ' s  (1971) a r t i c l e  
forces us to reconsider  the in d iv id u a l  leve l  o f  a n a ly s is  
i m p l i c i t  in t h e i r  work.  She i d e n t i f i e s  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  the  
socia l  s t r u c t u r e  t h a t  sys tem m at ica l ly  block women as a c lass  
from ga in ing  power in marriage  t h a t  is equal to t h a t  of  
t h e i r  husband's and suggests t h a t  the e g a l i t a r i a n  fa m i ly  as 
a norm, is a myth.
McDonald (1980:8A2) , in h is  decade review of  the fa m i ly  
power l i t e r a t u r e  l i s t s  several  areas where th e re  appears to  
be consensus: 1. power is the a b i l i t y  to achieve des i red  
goals or outcomes, 2.  power is a system p ro p e r ty  ra th e r  
than the personal a t t r i b u t e  of  an in d iv id u a l  3* power is 
dynamic ra th e r  than s t a t i c ,  and involves  re c ip ro c a l  
caus a t ion ,  1». power always involves asymmetrical  r e l a t i o n s  
although i t  may appear to be e g a l i t a r i a n  when a l l  i n t e r e s t  
spheres are  considered,  5* power is both a perceptua l  and 
behav iora l  phenomenon and, 6 .  power is mul t id im ensiona l  
inc lud ing  s o c i o - s t r u c t u r a l , i n t e r a c t i o n a l  and outcome 
components.
The model t h i s  research proposes views power r e l a t i o n s  
beetween in t im a tes  as the p o in t  from which a n a ly s is  of  
c o n f l i c t  and v io le n c e  proceeds.  Power and c o n f l i c t  are
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conceptu a l ized  as inheren t  in any socia l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  and 
e s p e c i a l l y  those t h a t  have a h is t o r y  such as the f a m i ly .  
This  v iew d i f f e r s  from t h a t  o f  R o l l in s  and Bahr (1976:621)  
who argue th a t  "power and contro l  are  re le v a n t  constructs  in 
marr iage  only when c o n f l i c t  e x is ts  between marriage
p a r t n e r s " .  They take t h i s  p o s i t io n  because they suggest  
t h a t  " the  power o f  one person as a basis  o f  contro l  over  
another is meaningless i f  the o ther  person would have 
behaved in the same manner i f  the power was absent"  
(1 9 7 6 :6 2 1 ) .  Our p o s i t io n  d i f f e r s  from t h e i r s  because 
in t im a te  r e la t i o n s  are  analyzed from a c o n f l i c t  p e rs p e c t iv e .  
Power r e l a t i o n s  can fu n c t io n  to  suppress c o n f l i c t  (Foss,  
1980),  shape the fa m i ly  system (McDonald, 1980) determine  
i n t e r a c t i o n  p a t te rn s  (Kramarae, 19 8 1) and provide  
d e f i n i t i o n s  of  s i t u a t i o n s  fo r  f a m i ly  members (Sprey,  1972) 
There is a d i s t i c t i o n  between m a r i t a l  power and m a r i t a l  
a u t h o r i t y  th a t  is recognized in th is  re sea rch .  While  
m a r i t a l  power r e f e r s  to the a b i l i t y  to change the behavior  
o f  a p a r t n e r ,  m a r i t a l  a u t h o r i t y  r e fe rs  to  the norms 
regard ing power, or who should have the r i g h t  to in f lue nce  
b e h a v io r .  In t h i s  research both actual  power and normative  
power are  measured by d e c is io n  making outcome and are  
included in the a n a ly s is  because they are viewed as d i s t i n c t  
concepts t h a t  are  r e l a t e d  to c o n f l i c t  and v io le n c e .
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THE CONCEPT OF MARITAL CONFLICT 
Although the c o n c e p tu a l i z a t io n  and measurement of  
m a r i t a l  power has created  much debate w i t h i n  the d i s c i p l i n e ,  
the c o n c e p tu a l i z a t io n  and measurement o f  m a r i t a l  c o n f l i c t  
appears to be less p ro b 1emmatic. There are  c o n t r a d ic t o r y  
views on the quest ion  o f  whether c o n f l i c t  is "good" or "bad" 
w i t h i n  marr iage and the fa m i ly  t h a t  depend on ones 
t h e o r e t i c a l  p e rs p e c t iv e .
C o n f l i c t  t h e o r i s t s  (Simmel, 1908; Coser, 1956; 
Dahrendor f ,  1959; Sprey, 1969; Scanzoni,  1972) hold th a t  
c o n f l i c t  is an i n e v i t a b l e  p a r t  of  a l l  soc ia l  r e la t i o n s h i p s  
and t h a t  w i th o u t  the changes t h a t  c o n f l i c t  can lead to ,  any 
soc ia l  u n i t  is a t  r i s k  o f  co l la p s e  or s ta g n a t io n .  The 
expression of c o n f l i c t  is viewed as increasing  group 
s o l i d a r i t y  because i t  r e s u l t s  in less accumulated h o s t i l i t y .  
The suppression of c o n f l i c t  r e s u l t s  in a f a i l u r e  to adapt to  
changed c ircumstances.
When marriage and the fa m i ly  a re  considered,  the  
i n e v i t a b i l i t y  of  c o n f l i c t  is c l e a r .  Simmel (1908) fo r  
example,  discusses the unstab le  na ture  of  the dyad. He 
views i t  as unstab le  because i t  takes  the e f f o r t s  o f  both 
p a r t i e s  to  main ta in  i t ,  but the dyad i t s e l f  can be ended by 
the withdrawal o f  only  one of  the p a r t i e s .  A t r i a d ,  on the  
other  hand, has a b u i l t  in c o n f l i c t  genera t ing  p roper ty  
because of the a b i l i t y  to form c o a l i t i o n s  of  two p a r t i e s  
ag a in s t  the t h i r d .  Although the propens i ty  fo r  c o n f l i c t  is 
g r e a t e r ,  the t r i a d  is  more s t a b le  because c o a l i t i o n s  can
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s h i f t  among the th re e  p a r t i e s  (Caplow, 1968).
Other c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of  in t im a te  groups t h a t  increase  
the p r o b a b i l i t y  of  c o n f l i c t  are  the high frequency of  
i n t e r a c t i o n  and t o t a l  p e r s o n a l i t y  involvement o f  group 
members (Coser,  1956; Foss, 1980),  the g re a te r  number of  
o p p o r tu n i t ie s  fo r  c o n f l i c t  th a t  a r i s e  because of  the wide 
range of  a c t i v i t i e s  and in t e r e s t s  of  the members, the power 
s t r u c t u r e ,  or presumed r i g h t  of  fa m i ly  members to in f lue nce  
other  fa m i ly  members, age and sex d i f f e r e n c e s  t h a t  lead to 
d i f f e r e n t  i n t e r e s t s ,  the assignment o f  fa m i ly  ro les  and 
tasks based on sex and age ra th e r  than competence and 
i n t e r e s t  and the in v o lu n ta ry  nature  of  fa m i ly  l i f e  (Straus  
and G e l le s ,  1977)•
The d e f i n i t i o n  of  m a r i t a l  c o n f l i c t  found most o f t e n  in 
the l i t e r a t u r e  and used in t h i s  research ,  fo l lo w s  t h a t  of 
Coser1s (1956) d i s t i n c t i o n  between " c o n f l i c t  o f  i n t e r e s t "  or 
" c o n f l i c t  s i t u a t i o n "  and " c o n f l i c t " .  A c o n f l i c t  s i t u a t i o n  
or c o n f l i c t  of  i n t e r e s t  r e f e r s  to a s i t u a t i o n  in which the  
i n t e r e s t s  o f  the p a r t i e s  are  o b j e c t i v e l y  a t  odds because of  
d i f f e r i n g  values and goa ls .  " C o n f l i c t " ,  on the o ther  hand, 
r e f e r s  to  a kind of  a c t io n  or behav iora l  s t r a t e g y .
In t h i s  research ,  the measure o f  m a r i t a l  c o n f l i c t  is 
synonomous w i th  c o n f l i c t  of  i n t e r e s t  and is der ived  from the  
c o n f l i c t  of  i n t e r e s t s  de f ined  by Coser, or those s i t u a t i o n s  
t h a t  i n e v i t a b l y  a r i s e  in small groups where in d iv id u a ls  
d i f f e r  in t h e i r  va lues  and opin ions  on a range of issues.  
These could be how the fa m i ly  income is used or how
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a f f e c t i o n  and sexual  r e l a t i o n s  are  managed. The measure of  
the Index of  M a r i t a l  C o n f l i c t  is descr ibed in Chapter I I I .
C o n f l i c t ,  according to Coser ( 1956) .  Straus ,  ( 1979) .  
and Foss, (1980 ) ,  r e f e r s  to the means used to reso lve  a 
c o n f l i c t  o f  i n t e r e s t  or c o n f l i c t  s i t u a t i o n .  I t  r e f e r s  to  
the s p e c i f i c  n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s  or ac t ion s  taken when a 
c o n f l i c t  o f  i n t e r e s t  a r i s e s .  In t h i s  research ,  t h i s  concept  
is termed n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c .  Measures of  th ree  types of  
n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s ,  reasoning,  w ithdrawal and verba l  
aggression a re  developed in Chapter I I I  t h a t  represent  
p ro g re s s iv e ly  less c o n s t r u c t iv e  means of s e t t l i n g  d is p u te s .  
They are  the o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s  of  the means, act ions  or 
behav iora l  s t r a t e g i e s  used when th e re  is c o n f l i c t  of  
i n t e r e s t .
MARITAL POWER, CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE
Explanations of  m a r i t a l  v io le n c e  f r e q u e n t ly  focus on 
the  balance of  power w i t h i n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  In g e nera l ,  
research has f a i r l y  c o n s is t e n t l y  demonstrated t h a t  in 
marriages where one par tne r  dominates the d e c is io n  making 
process,  the l i k e l ih o o d  of v io le n c e  increases .  The highest  
r a t e  o f  m a r i t a l  v io le n c e  occurs in r e la t i o n s h i p s  th a t  are  
husband dominant.  The le a s t  amount of  v io le n c e  occurs in 
r e la t i o n s h i p s  w i th  a more e g a l i t a r i a n  d e c is io n  making 
process,  whether i t  is shared or e q u a l ly  d iv id e d .  These 
f in d in g s  a re  used to  support  demands fo r  a change in the  
i n e q u i t a b le  systems of sexual s t r a t i f i c a t i o n  t h a t  oppress 
women. I t  has been suggested t h a t  the r a t e  of  w i f e  abuse
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w i l l  decrease when women gain  more power w i t h i n  marr iage  and 
more a l t e r n a t i v e s  to  marriage (Schuyler ,  1976; Pogrebin,
197*0 •
However, changing the socia l  r e l a t i o n s  between men and 
women may increase the frequency of  abuse, a t  l e a s t  in the  
short  run (S traus,  1976) .  One reason suggested fo r  the  
l i k e l ih o o d  of g r e a t e r  abuse is t h a t  men are  not ready to  
give  up or share t h e i r  power and thus may respond to  t h e i r  
w i f e ' s  increased independence w i th  v io le n c e .  W hi tehurs t  
097*0  argues t h a t  most o f  the gains women have achieved in 
terms of education and employment o p p o r t u n i t i e s ,  equal  
wages, g r e a t e r  legal  r i g h t s ,  e t c .  are  perce ived by men as 
reducing t h e i r  a b i l i t y  to con tro l  t h e i r  w ives.  He suggests  
t h a t  men have no c u l t u r a l l y  approved way of  coping w i th  t h i s
loss of  con tro l  and may r e s o r t  to v io le n c e  to rega in
c o n t r o l .  Toby (197*0 suggests a 'compulsive m a s c u l in i t y '  
hypothesis  to account fo r  the use of  v io le n c e  when
"symbolic" masculine power is l a c k in g .  He hypothesizes  
g r e a t e r  v io le n c e  by men when they are  prevented from 
e x e r c is in g  the t r a d i t i o n a l  symbols of  male power. Y l l o
(1980:1*10 po in ts  out t h a t  "as the t r a d i t i o n a l  symbols of  
m a s c u l in i t y  d im in ish  and the s ta tus  of  women increases ,  
males may turn  to v io le n c e  to assure themselves and o thers  
of  t h e i r  m a s c u l i n i t y " .
There are  a lso  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  marriage  and the  
fa m i ly  t h a t  may lead to more c o n f l i c t  and v io le n c e .  
Scanzoni (1976) has suggested t h a t  e g a l i t a r i a n  r e la t i o n s h i p s
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may have g re a te r  c o n f l i c t  because in d iv id u a ls  must n e g o t ia te  
the power d i s t r i b u t i o n  ra th e r  than f o l l o w  a p a t te r n  t h a t  is 
norm a t ive ly  imposed. Blood and Wolfe (1060) found t h a t  
m a r i t a l  int imacy increases when more decis ions  a re  shared by 
the couple ,  yet  we a lso  know t h a t  the more in t im a te  soc ia l  
r e l a t i o n s  a re ,  the more l i k e l y  they are to lead to c o n f l i c t  
(Coser,  1956; Sprey,  1972) Brown concludes t h a t  " m a r i t a l
c o n f l i c t  can be expected to  increase  when m a r i t a l  p a r tne rs
share more aspects of  l i f e "  (1 9 8 0 :1 8 3 ) .  The work by Blood 
and Wolfe ( i 960) and Brown ( 1980) suggest th a t  e g a l i t a r i a n  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i l l  have g r e a t e r  int imacy because of the  
increased sharing of  dec is ions  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  When 
the hypotheses of  c o n f l i c t  theory  are  considered,  the  
process of  deduct ive  reasoning leads to the hypothesis  th a t  
e g a l i t a r i a n  r e la t i o n s h i p s  w i l l  have g re a te r  c o n f l i c t  because 
of the  g re a te r  in t im acy .  P a r a d o x ic a l ly  then,  the re  may be 
g r e a t e r  c o n f l i c t  in e g a l i t a r i a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  w h i le  the
research in d ica te s  the l e a s t  amount of  v io le n c e  in such
marr i ages .
Foss's ( 1980) a r t i c l e  extending the work of  Coser to 
inc lude  an a n a ly s is  of  c o n f l i c t  w i t h i n  the fa m i ly  makes the  
important  p o in t  t h a t  w h i le  the s t r u c t u r e  of  the f a m i ly  may 
increase the l i k e l ih o o d  of c o n f l i c t ,  e q u a l ly  impor tant  
mechanisms are  a t  work to suppress h o s t i l i t y .  She p o in t  out  
t h a t  in a d d i t io n  to a f f e c t i v e  investment,  f a m i ly  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a lso  inc lude  instrumental  dependencies t h a t  
may increase  members' f e a r  of  d is s o l u t i o n  and thus lead to
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the suppression of h o s t i l i t y .  H o s t i l i t y ,  however, d i f f e r s  
from both c o n f l i c t  o f  i n t e r e s t ,  the o b j e c t i v e  c o n d i t io n ,  and 
c o n f l i c t ,  the means or t a c t i c s  used when a c o n f l i c t  of  
i n t e r e s t  a r i s e s .  H o s t i l i t y  r e f e r s  to  an a f f e c t i v e  s t a t e  
t h a t  i f  expressed is done so through means or t a c t i c s .  
Foss's  conception of  instrumental  dependency is  based on a 
more macro- leve l  a n a ly s is  of the fa m i ly  as a group where 
membership is in v o lu n ta ry  and where the s t r u c t u r e  o f  s o c ie ty  
prov ides  no p o s i t i v e l y  valued a l t e r n a t i v e s  to m a rr ia g e .  She 
recognizes ,  too,  t h a t  fe a r  of  d i s s o l u t i o n  may be based in 
p a r t  on p r a c t i c a l  c o n s ide ra t ions  such as the a b i l i t y  of  
s in g le  women w i th  small c h i ld r e n  to  prov ide  adequate  
f i n a n c i a l  support .  I m p l i c i t  in her a n a ly s is  then is the  
l i n k  between the power s t r u c t u r e  of  the m a r i t a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
and the expression of  c o n f l i c t .
Kalmuss and Straus  (1982) focus more d i r e c t l y  on the  
concept o f  instrumental  dependency and i t s  l i n k  w i th  m a r i t a l  
v io le n c e .  They found g re a te r  v io le n c e  in r e la t i o n s h i p s  
where women were more dependent on t h e i r  p a r t n e r .  They 
conclude t h a t  women who are  economical ly  dependent on t h e i r  
husbands a re  more l i k e l y  to  t o l e r a t e  severe abuse because 
th e re  are  no a l t e r n a t i v e s  a v a i l a b l e  to them.
I t  is e v id e n t  t h a t  the l in k  between the power s t r u c t u r e  
of in t im a te  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  the leve l  of  c o n f l i c t  and the 
r a t e  o f  v io le n c e  is not c l e a r l y  understood. A l fo r d  (1982) 
s ta te s  t h a t  the r e l a t i o n  between int imacy and c o n f l i c t  is 
v i r t u a l l y  untested so i t  is not c le a r  t h a t  e g a l i t a r i a n
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r e la t i o n s h i p s  have more c o n f l i c t  than marriages w i th  o ther  
power s t r u c t u r e s .  However, the research a lso  in d ic a te s  a 
strong p o s i t i v e  a s s o c ia t io n  between c o n f l i c t  and v io le n c e  
(S traus ,  Gel les  and S te inmetz ,  1980) There are  several  
p o ss ib le  e x p la na t ions  f o r  these c o n t r a d ic to ry  f i n d i n g s .  
There may be less v io le n c e  in e g a l i t a r i a n  r e la t io n s h ip s
because there  is less c o n f l i c t ,  which would suggest t h a t  the  
r e l a t i o n  between int imacy and c o n f l i c t  is not as
hypothes ized.  I f  int imacy and c o n f l i c t  are  r e la t e d  as
hypothesized,  i t  would suggest t h a t  the low ra te s  of
v io le n c e  in e g a l i t a r i a n  marriages need e xp la n a t io n ,  given  
the p o s i t i v e  a s s o c ia t io n  between c o n f l i c t  and v io le n c e .  One 
e xp la n a t io n  of  the r e l a t i o n  between c o n f l i c t  and v io le n c e  is 
to examine the n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s  couples use to s e t t l e  
d i s p u te s .
Mar ? t a 1 Power and Neqot i a t  i on
Few s tudies  have examined how power d i f fe r e n c e s  between 
men and women and between men and women in the fa m i ly  in 
p a r t i c u l a r ,  a f f e c t  the types of  n e g o t ia t io n  and 
communication p a t te r n s  each use to  s e t t l e  c o n f l i c t  
(Kramarae, 19 8 1 ) .  The anecdotal  and popular l i t e r a t u r e  
however, presents a c le a r  p i c t u r e  o f  gender d i f f e r e n c e s  in 
what Steinem (1983) terms t a 1k - p o l i t i c s . Men are  presented  
as cool and r a t i o n a l  speakers,  women as emotional  
m an ip u la to rs .  I t  is  only  r e c e n t l y  t h a t  t r a d i t i o n a l  
scho la rs h ip  has begun to look a t  c onversat iona l  s t y le s  as 
fu n c t io n s  of  power and environment and even then the focus
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is r a r e l y  on m a r i t a l  i n t e r a c t i o n  in p a r t  because i t  is not 
considered t h e o r e t i c a l l y  i n t e r e s t i n g  (Kramarae, 19 8 1) .  Some 
evidence suggests t h a t  because of  t h e i r  g r e a t e r  socia l  
power, men i n t e r r u p t  women more o f t e n  than women in t e r r u p t  
men, and g e n e r a l l y  determine the a p p ro p r ia t e  top ics  of 
conversat ion  (Steinem, 1983 ) Fishman 0977« 1978) did
ana lyze  general  conversat ions  between middle c lass  married  
couples and found d i f f e r e n c e s  in speech s t y l e s .  She found 
t h a t  men c o n t r o l l e d  conversat ions  p a r t l y  through s i l e n c e ,  by 
not responding to top ic s  introduced by the woman, t h a t  women 
tended to  use more p re fa c in g  remarks in d ic a t in g  a request  
fo r  permission to speak such as "Do you know what?" .  Rausch 
e t .  a l .  ( 197^) used a la b o ra to ry  s e t t i n g  to  study couples  
dur ing a s imulated c o n f l i c t .  They found no sex d i f fe r e n c e s  
between the responses of husband and w i f e  and concluded th a t  
they respond in the same way to each o t h e r 's  a c t .
Research has f r e q u e n t ly  focused on the resources  
i n d iv id u a ls  b r ing  to a r e l a t i o n s h i p  as determinants  of  t h e i r  
power and thus a b i l i t y  to reso lve  c o n f l i c t  in t h e i r  own 
i n t e r e s t .  While  the concept of  resources is not u t i l i z e d  as 
a d i r e c t  i n d ic a to r  o f  n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s ,  the im p l ic a t io n  
is c le a r  t h a t  in d iv id u a ls  w i th  the g r e a t e s t  resources w i l l  
use those resources as a means to s e t t l e  c o n f l i c t .
The U l t im a te  Resource Theory o f  V io lence  (URT) s ta te s  
t h a t  v io le n c e  w i l l  be used when i n d iv id u a ls  lack other  
resources to l e g i t i m a t e  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n .  A l le n  and Straus  
( I 98O) te s te d  the URT and found evidence to support i t
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w i t h i n  working c lass  f a m i l i e s  but not w i t h i n  middle  c lass  
f a m i l i e s .  Thus resources may play  some r o le  in the  
n e g o t ia t io n  procedures couples use to reso lve  c o n f l i c t  but  
other  fa c t o r s  are  c l e a r l y  im por tant .
The importance of  the power s t r u c t u r e  of  a r e l a t i o n s h i p  
as a key v a r i a b l e  in e x p la in in g  fa m i ly  problem so lv ing  
behavior  is found in the work of  Tal lman and M i l l e r  (1971*) • 
They suggest t h a t  the consistency between power s t r u c t u r e  
norms and actual  power s t r u c t u r e  in f lu e n c e  problem s o lv ing  
e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  They p re d ic te d  t h a t  in w h i te  c o l l a r  f a m i l i e s  
e g a l i t a r i a n  actual  power would increase  problem so lv ing  
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  whereas in b lue  c o l l a r  f a m i l i e s ,  husband 
dominant actua l  power was p re d ic te d  to  increase  
e f f e c t  i veness.
T u r n e r 's  (1970) d e c is ion  making theory examines how the  
competence of  those p a r t i c i p a t i n g  in problem s o lv in g  is 
e v a lu a ted .  He does no t ,  however, recognize  t h a t  age and 
gender a f f e c t  the e v a lu a t io n  of  competence, leading K le in  
and H i l l  (1975) to suggest t h a t  r o l e  s egrega t ion  and 
c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  of  f a m i ly  power s t r u c t u r e  need to  be included  
in any examinat ion of  problem so lv in g  e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  The 
work of  both suggest t h a t  power s t r u c t u r e  and norms 
regard ing power s t r u c t u r e  a f f e c t  the a b i l i t y  to n e g o t ia te  
c o n f l i c t .  K le in  and H i l l  s t a t e  " I t  is tempting to conclude  
t h a t  a l l  p ro p o s i t io n s  regard ing  verba l  c a p a c i ty  or 
communication have l i t t l e  or no m e r i t  in a theory  of  f a m i ly  
problem s o lv in g  e f fe c t i v e n e s s  and t h a t  power and e s p e c i a l l y
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conformity  to norms about power play  a more important r o l e " .
Mar i t a l  Conf1 i c t ,  Neqot i a t  ion and V io len ce
The means by which couples a t tempt  to  s e t t l e  d isputes  
may e x p la in  the r e l a t i o n  between leve l  of  c o n f l i c t  and 
v io le n c e ,  and e x p la in  why v io le n c e  ra te s  a re  low in 
e g a l i t a r i a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  According to c o n f l i c t  theory ,  
c o n f l i c t  is b e n e f i c i a l  i f  c o n s t r u c t iv e  means are  used to  
s e t t l e  d is p u te s .  Thus i t  is p l a u s i b l e  to  suggest t h a t  even 
in r e la t i o n s h i p s  w i th  a high leve l  of  c o n f l i c t s  the v io le n c e  
r a t e  w i l l  be low i f  c o n s t r u c t iv e  means are  used to  s e t t l e  
the c o n f l i c t .  This makes good sense i n t u i t i v e l y  and is 
c o n s is te n t  w i th  the p r i n c i p l e s  o f  c o n f l i c t  th e o ry .  However,  
some research does not support i t .  The g r e a t e r  the use of  
reasoning to s e t t l e  c o n f l i c t ,  the g r e a t e r  the r a t e  of  
v io le n c e ,  even when the amount of  c o n f l i c t  is c o n t r o l l e d  
(S traus,  1 98 0 :165 ) .  V io lence  is a lso  high in those  
r e la t i o n s h i p s  where verba l  aggression is used to s e t t l e  
c o n f l i c t .  Thus th e r e  is some evidence to suggest t h a t  
n e g o t ia t io n  procedures are  i r r e l e v a n t  to  the r e l a t i o n  
between c o n f l i c t  and v io le n c e :  t h a t  regard less  o f  how
couples t r y  to manage c o n f l i c t ,  i f  the re  is f req u en t  
c o n f l i c t ,  v io le n c e  w i l l  a lso occur more o f t e n .
One reason fo r  these confusing f in d in g s  may be t h a t  
Straus does not consider the power s t r u c t u r e  o f  the  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  or whether there  is consensus over the balance  
of power. T h e i r  a n a ly s is  may be too s i m p l i s t i c  given the  
complex i ty  of  in t im a te  r e l a t i o n s .  As Weber suggested,  i t  is
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n e c e s s a r y  t o  c o n s i d e r  w h e t h e r  t h o s e  i n  s u b o r d i n a t e  p o s i t i o n s  
p e r c e i v e  t h e  p o w e r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  a s  l e g i t i m a t e .  F a m i l y  
v i o l e n c e  r e s e a r c h  o f t e n  c i t e s  v i o l e n c e  r a t e s  w h i c h  a r e  
h i g h e s t  i n  o n e - p e r s o n  d o m i n a n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  T h e  
e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  t h i s  f i n d i n g  i s  u s u a l l y  t h e  U l t i m a t e  R e s o u r c e  
T h e o r y ,  o r  how  h u s b a n d s  u s e  v i o l e n c e  t o  m a i n t a i n  t h e i r  
p o s i t i o n  o f  s u p e r i o r i t y .  B u t ,  i f  we  c o n s i d e r  w h e t h e r  t h i s  
p o w e r  i n  h u s b a n d  d o m i n a n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  i s  l e g i t i m i z e d  b y  
t h e  w i f e ,  t h e  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  v i o l e n c e  a s  t h e  u l t i m a t e  
r e s o u r c e  may n o t  h o l d  u p .  I t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  e x a m i n e  
n e g o t i a t i o n  t a c t i c s ,  l e v e l s  o f  c o n f l i c t  a n d  r a t e s  o f  
v i o l e n c e  w i t h i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  t h e  p o w e r  s t r u c t u r e  a n d  
w h e t h e r  t h a t  s t r u c t u r e  i s  p e r c e i v e d  a s  l e g i t i m a t e .
HYPOTHESES AND MODEL 
T w o  f a c t o r s  may  b e  i m p o r t a n t  i n  t h e  r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  
p o w e r ,  c o n f l i c t  a n d  v i o l e n c e .  F i r s t ,  we  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  
l i n k  b e t w e e n  t h e  p o w e r  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  a n d  t h e  
l e v e l  o f  c o n f l i c t  i s  c o n t i n g e n t  u p o n  w h e t h e r  t h e  p o w e r  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  i s  l e g i t i m i z e d  b y  b o t h  p a r t n e r s .  I t  w i l l  b e  
p o s s i b l e  t o  e x a m i n e  t h e  i d e a  o f  c o n s e n s u s  w i t h i n  f o u r  t y p e s  
o f  p o w e r  s t r u c t u r e s ,  h u s b a n d  d o m i n a n t ,  w i f e  d o m i n a n t ,  
e g a l i t a r i a n  a n d  d i v i d e d  p o w e r  a n d  a n a l y z e  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  
c o n s e n s u s  o n  t h e  p o w e r  a n d  c o n f l i c t  a s s o c i a t i o n .  I t  w i l l  b e  
p o s s i b l e  t o  t e s t  t h e  h y p o t h e s i s  r e g a r d i n g  i n t i m a c y  a n d  
c o n f l i c t  a n d  d e t e r m i n e  i f  e g a l i t a r i a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  d o  i n  
f a c t  h a v e  g r e a t e r  c o n f l i c t .  We may  f i n d  n o  d i f f e r e n c e  
b e t w e e n  p o w e r  t y p e s :  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  h i g h  l e v e l s  o f  c o n f l i c t
Page 28
in r e l a t i o n s h i p s  where consensus over the d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  
power is low. Second, i t  is suggested t h a t  the r e l a t i o n  
between c o n f l i c t  and v io le n c e  needs f u r t h e r  a n a l y s is .  The 
n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s  couples use to  s e t t l e  c o n f l i c t  is  
hypothesized as an important  f a c t o r  in understand ing the  
c o n f l i c t  -  v io le n c e  r e l a t i o n .  Although S t ra u s 's  study c i t e d  
p re v io u s ly  suggests t h a t  reasoning is  not u s e f u l ,  h is  
f in d in g s  are  inconc lus ive  f o r  several  reasons. I t  is 
important to compare n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s  such as reasoning,
withdrawal and verba l  aggression across va ry in g  le v e ls  of
c o n f l i c t  to determine i f  c o n s t r u c t iv e  means of s e t t l i n g  
c o n f l i c t  reduce the r a t e  o f  v io le n c e .  I f  c o n f l i c t  is 
b e n e f i c i a l ,  as the theory suggests,  the use of reasoning  
should r e s u l t  in lower v io le n c e  ra te s  when compared to  
verba l  aggression.  F i n a l l y ,  i t  is suggested t h a t  the r a t e  
of v io le n c e  is a fu n c t io n  of  the j o i n t  e f f e c t s  of  the power
s t r u c t u r e  o f  the r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  consensus over t h is
s t r u c t u r e ,  level  of  c o n f l i c t  and the n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s  
couples use.  The fo l lo w in g  model is proposed.
Power Norm 
Consensus
Negot i a t  i on 
Tact ics
Power S t r u c tu r e  ^  Level of  
of  R e la t io n s h ip  ------—  ^ C o n f l i c t
Rate of  
V io lence
Chapter I I I
METHODOLOGY
This  chapter  descr ibes the source of  the data  fo r  th is  
research ,  how the major v a r i a b l e s  o f  i n t e r e s t  a re  measured,  
and the approach t h a t  is taken to exp lo re  the r e la t i o n s h i p s  
between the v a r i a b l e s .  The methodological  issues r a is e d  by 
the use of  s e l f - r e p o r t  data and the constuct ion  of  L i k e r t  
a d d i t i v e  ind ices  to  measure m a r i t a l  power are  addressed.  
M a r i t a l  volence was measured in t h i s  research by the  
C o n f l i c t  T a c t ic s  Scale  developed by Straus (1979)*
SOURCE OF THE DATA 
This  research analyzes data  o r i g i n a l l y  c o l l e c t e d  to 
study physica l  v io le n c e  in American f a m i l i e s ,  as p a r t  of  a 
p r o j e c t  funded by NIMH and conducted by the UNH Family 
Research Lab. A n a t io n a l  area  p r o b a b i l i t y  sample was 
designed by Response Analys is  Corporation of  P r in ce ton ,  
N . J . ,  who c a r r i e d  out the in te rv ie w in g  of 21^3 respondents.  
S p e c i f i c s  o f  the sampling procedure are  described in d e t a i l  
in S t ra us ,  G e l le s ,  and Ste inmetz  (1980 ) .  B r i e f l y ,  the  
procedures included p r io r  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  of  l o c a t io n ,  
household and the in d iv id u a l  to  be in te rv iew ed .
Page 30
To be included in the sample,  respondents had to  be 
l i v i n g  w i th  a member o f  the oppos i te  sex but not n e c e s s a r i ly  
marr ied  to  them. A random h a l f  of  the respondents are  male 
and h a l f  a re  female .  In te rv iew s  w i th  the respondents las ted  
approximate ly  one hour and anonymity was assured.  The 
complet ion r a t e  was 65%. Since one h a l f  of  the respondents  
were men and one h a l f  were women, the data  in t h i s  research  
involves  women re p o r t in g  on t h e i r  own behavior and t h a t  of  
t h e i r  p a r tn e r  in one h a l f  of the sample, and men r e p o r t in g  
on t h e i r  own behavior and t h a t  o f  t h e i r  pa r tne r  in the o ther  
h a l f  o f  the sample.
There are  severa l  major advantages of  using th is  data  
s et  to exp lo re  m a r i t a l  power, c o n f l i c t ,  and v io le n c e  in 
i n t im a te  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  I t  is  a n a t io n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  
sample of  American m arr iages ,  a l lo w in g  the g e n e r a l i z a t io n  of  
f in d in g s  to the t o t a l  p o p u la t io n .  I t  includes in te rv ie w s  
w ith  960 men and 1183 women and avoids the l i m i t a t i o n s  of  
previous s tu d ies  t h a t  only  in t e r v ie w  women. The f in d in g s  
from t h i s  research are  c l e a r l y  not an example of  w ives '  
f a m i ly  soc io logy ( S a f i 1 io s -R o th s c h i Id ,  1969)-  Because the  
data  comes from a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  sample, the measures of  
m a r i t a l  v io le n c e  a re  s i g n i f i c a n t  improvements over the ra te s  
a v a i l a b l e  from o f f i c i a l  sources.  Abuse ra te s  t h a t  come from 
o f f i c i a l  sources are  l i m i t e d  in t h e i r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  because 
they r e l y  upon repor ted  cases of  abuse.  There a re ,  however,  
c e r t a i n  l i m i t a t i o n s .  I t  is p oss ib le  t h a t  the ra te s  of  
v io le n c e  are  underestimates o f  the t ru e  r a t e  fo r  several
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reasons. The CTS, from which the ra te s  o f  v io le n c e  are  
e st im a te d ,  has been c r i t i c i z e d  because i t  asks respondents  
about a l i m i t e d  number of  v i o l e n t  acts  t h a t  may have 
occurred over the p r i o r  year and frames the quest ion  about  
the use o f  v io le n c e  in the c ontext  of  a c o n f l i c t  between 
spouses ( S t r a u s , 1981) .  In a d d i t i o n ,  the methodology 
req u ired  s e l f - r e p o r t  data  on v io le n c e ,  and respondents may 
not have revea led  a l l  acts  t h a t  a c t u a l l y  occurred .  Despite  
the p o s s i b i l i t y  of  u n d e r re p o r t in g  acts  of  v io le n c e ,  these  
est im ates  remain super io r  to o th e r s .
MARITAL POWER 
Measurement of  the Concept
M a r i t a l  power is measured in t h i s  research through a
modif ied  v e rs io n  of  the index developed by Blood and
W o l fe (1 9 6 0 ) .  I t  involves asking the respondent who has the  
f i n a l  say in d e c is io n  making on a number of  issues th a t  
a r i s e  in in t im a te  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  They are:  buying a c a r ,
having c h i ld r e n ,  what house or apartment to ta k e ,  what jo b  
e i t h e r  p a r tn e r  should take ,  whether a p a r tn e r  should go to  
work or q u i t  work, and how much money to  spend each week on 
food. The respondent is asked to  s t a t e  to what degree each
p a r tn e r  has the f i n a l  say on each issue .  The range of
p o ss ib le  reponses fo r  each issue is husband o n ly ,  husband 
more than w i f e ,  husband and w i f e  the same, w i f e  more than 
husband, w i f e  o n ly .
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Cr i t  ique of  Blood and Wolfe In d ic a to rs
The Blood and Wolfe Index o f  M a r i t a l  Power has rece ived  
co n s id era b le  c r i t i c i s m .  As p re v io u s ly  suggested,  both  
t h e o r e t i c a l  and methodological  issues have been r a is e d .  The 
major methodologica l  c o n t ro v ers ies  concern the r e l i a b i l i t y  
and v a l i d i t y  o f  th is  type of  index to measure the concept of  
m a r i t a l  power • ( S a f i 1i o s - R o t h s c h i I d , 1970; G i 1l e s p i e , 1971; 
Cromwell and O ls o n ,1975)*  The c r i t i c i s m s  have been examined 
in a number o f  e m p ir ic a l  s tu d ies  to be reviewed in in t h i s  
c h a p t e r .
S a f i 1 io s -R o th s c h i1d (1970) i d e n t i f i e s  p o t e n t i a l  
l i m i t a t i o n s  of  the measure: the number and content  of  the  
items v a r i e s  across s tu d ie s ,  the s p e c i f i c i t y  of  the items 
v a r i e s  across s t u d ie s ,  and the equal  weight ing  of  the items 
in index c o n s t ru c t io n  suggests t h a t  a l l  dec is ions  are  of  
equal importance.  In a d d i t i o n ,  she po in ts  out the  
s e n s i t i v i t y  of  an average index score  to  the e f f e c t s  of  
o u t l i e r s ,  and t h a t  the r e l i a n c e  on the w i fe  as respondent  
may r e f l e c t  only  her pe rcep t io n  of  the m a r i t a l  power 
di s t r i b u t i o n .
The l a rg e r  issue of  the appropr ia teness  of  using s e l f  
r e p o r t  q u e s t io n a i re s  ra th e r  than o bserva t ion  to study power 
is a lso  explored by S a f i 1io s -R o th s c h i Id  and others  
(Bahr ,1972; Olson and Cromwel1 ,1 9 7 5 ) •  Olson and 
Cromwel1 (1975) desc r ibe  the problems encountered when a 
respondent is re q u i re d  to decide  who exerc ises  power in the  
f a m i l y .  They suggest t h a t  the  m a r i t a l  i n t e r a c t i o n  t h a t
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precedes de c is io n  making i n t e r f e r e s  w i th  the a b i l i t y  to  
r e c a l l  who made the f i n a l  d e c is io n .  Respondents may know 
what was decided,  but not who decided i t .  They underscore  
the need to  study the power process ra th e r  than power 
outcomes. S e l f - r e p o r t  q u e s t io n n a i re s  g e n e r a l l y  re q u i re  a 
respondent to r e c a l l  past events ,  and acc ura te  r e c a l l  can be 
p ro b lem at ic .  In a d d i t i o n ,  Olson and Cromwell suggest t h a t  
socia l  d e s i r a b i l i t y  is an important f a c t o r  when quest ions  
concern m a r i t a l  power because o f  the normat ive  expec ta t ions  
regarding e g a l i t a r i a n  d e c is io n  making in m a rr iage .  They 
descr ibe  s tu d ies  where an unusually  high percentage of  
couples r e p o r t  an e g a l i t a r i a n  power s t r u c t u r e  and suggest  
t h a t  so c ia l  d e s i r a b i l i t y  f a c t o r s  produce such r e s u l t s .  
01son(1969) .  however, found so c ia l  d e s i r a b i l i t y  fa c t o r s  led 
husbands to  over e s t im a te  t h e i r  power w h i le  wives under 
est im ate  t h e i r  power.
Apart  from the quest ion  of  what methodologies are  
a p p ro p r ia te  to use in the study of  m a r i t a l  power, the  
l i t e r a t u r e  suggests i t  is the equal w e ight ing  of  items in 
the o r i g i n a l  Blood and Wolfe index t h a t  has generated the  
most d is cus s ion .  S a f i 1io s -R o th s c h i Id  (1970) and
G e l le s p ie  (1971) fo r  example,  p o in t  out t h a t  some of the  
decis ions  in the Blood and Wolfe s ca le  are  more important,  
but made less f r e q u e n t l y ;  w h i le  o ther  dec is ions  are  less  
important but are  made more o f t e n .  Thus they suggest  
d i f f e r e n t  weights fo r  each d e c is io n .  A second approach 
(Bahr, Bowerman and Gicas,  197^) is to weight items by the
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a m o u n t  o f  c o n f l i c t  g e n e r a t e d  i n  t h e  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s .  
T h e  i s s u e  o f  w h o  d e c i d e s  h o w  t o  w e i g h t  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  i s  a l s o  
r a i s e d  a n d  i t  i s  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  r e s p o n d e n t  s h o u l d  m a k e  t h e  
d e c i s i o n  b y  r a t i n g  t h e i r  i m p o r t a n c e .
The methodological  issues ra is e d  by S a f i 1io s -R o th s c h i Id  
have been e m p i r i c a l l y  examined in a number of  s tud ies  w i th  
f a i r l y  mixed r e s u l t s .  They a re  reviewed by McDonald (1980) 
in h is  assessment o f  the research publ ished on fa m i ly  power 
dur ing  the 197 0 's .  He l i s t s  f i v e  areas of  concern r e f l e c t e d  
in the l i t e r a t u r e  dur ing  t h a t  p e r io d :  1) the c o m p a ra b i l i t y  
of  d i f f e r e n t  measures of  power and decis ion-making;  2) the  
need to develop in d ic a t o r s  fo r  a wider range of power 
dynamics than dec is ion-making outcomes; 3) the degree of  
s i m i l a r i t y  of  husband-wife  responses; 4) the development of  
ob s e rv a t io n a l  measures of  f a m i ly  power dynamics; and 5) the  
problems w i th  e x i s t i n g  Blood and Wolfe type decis ion-m aking  
outcome measures (McDonald,1980:845) •
The quest ion of  how r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  items are  th a t
c o m p r i s e  t h e  B l o o d  a n d  W o l f e  t y p e  i n d i c e s ,  a n d  t h u s  may  b i a s
the r e s u l t s  in the favor  of  one spouse over the o t h e r ,  is
a d d r e s s e d  i n  s e v e r a l  s t u d i e s .  C e n t e r s ,  R ow en  a n d
Rodrigues (1971) increased the number of  items in the index
so t h a t  i t  was more r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  the norm at ive ly
p r e s c r i b e d  d e c i s i o n  a r e a s  f o r  b o t h  s p o u s e s .  T h e i r  i n d e x
>
r e l i a b i l i t y  w a s  n o t  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  t h e  
o r i g i n a l  B l o o d  a n d  W o l f e  i n d e x .  H o w e v e r ,  s i n c e  t h e y  a d d e d  
d e c i s i o n  a r e a s  g e n e r a l l y  p r e s c r i b e d  t o  t h e  w i f e ,  w i v e s
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tended to score h ig h e r ,  and thus had more power than 
previous  measures i n d i c a t e .  Bahr (1973) te s ted  the i n t e r n a l
consistency of  the Blood and Wolfe index and concluded t h a t
i t  is a r e l i a b l e  measure o f  dec is ion -m aking ,  however his  
f i n d in g s  are  chal lenged by Cromwell and W e i t i n g (1975)•  
Price-Bonham (1976) examined the e f f e c t  of  weighted and
unweighted scores and concluded t h a t  the re  is l i t t l e
d i f f e r e n c e  between spouses unweighted f i n a l  say scores and a 
small d i f f e r e n c e  when items are  weighted by importance.
Benson (1976) does not agree,  and in f a c t  her research
demonstrated reverse  e f f e c t s .  A l l e n  and Straus ( 1985)
designed a study to  t e s t  the r e l i a b i l i t y  of  f i n a l  say
measures using both e x te rn a l  c r i t e r i o n  v a l i d a t i o n  and
a n a ly s is  of  i tem removed alpha c o e f f i c i e n t s  (SPSS, 19 8 1).  
They examined c o n f l i c t  weighted,  i tem importance weighted,
and unweighted items across f i v e  samples gathered in the
U.S.  and I n d ia .  T h e i r  research is thus an improvement over  
past s tu d ie s  because of the a d d i t i o n  of  e x te rn a l  c r i t e r i o n  
a n a ly s is  and c r o s s - c u l t u r a l  v a l i d a t i o n .  The major f in d in g  
from t h i s  study demonstrate t h a t  the f i n a l  say measure has 
c r o s s - c u l t u r a l  v a l i d i t y ,  t h a t  the r e l i a b i l i t y  o f  the measure 
is not increased when items are  weighted by the leve l  of  
c o n f l i c t  generated,  or by importance,  and t h a t  husbands' and 
w ives '  responses have e q u iv a le n t  v a l i d i t y .
In t h i s  research ,  a Blood and Wolfe type in d ic a t o r  was 
used to  i n i t i a l l y  measure m a r i t a l  power and then to d e r iv e  
the four  power types —  male dominant,  female dominant,
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e g a l i t a r i a n  and d iv id e d  power. The d ec is io n  to  use t h i s  
method to measure m a r i t a l  power is made fo r  the f o l lo w in g  
reasons:
1. Despite  the  methodological  and t h e o r e t i c a l  
c o n t ro v e rs ie s  over t h i s  measure, i t s  use by 
f a m i ly  s o c io l o g i s t s  continues (McDonald,1980 ) .  
Because of the controversy  over i t s  use,  the  
streng ths  and weaknesses of  the measure are  w e l 1 
known and thus research using such a method can 
be more c l e a r l y  eva luated  w i t h i n  the d i s c i p l i n e .
2. The s p e c i f i c  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of  the Blood 
and Wolfe index used in t h i s  research and w i th  
t h i s  sample of  respondents have been examined by 
A l le n  and Straus  ( 1985) •  T h e i r  f in d in g s  show i t  
to  be a r e l i a b l e  and v a l i d  measure of  m a r i t a l  
power. The alpha  c o e f f i c i e n t  o f  r e l i a b i l i t y ,  a 
measure of  i n t e r n a l  consistency of  an index,  is  
.Al .
3 . In t h i s  sample,  socia l  d e s i r a b i l i t y  does not  
appear to  have as la rge  an impact on s e l f - r e p o r t  
measures of  m a r i t a l  power as Olson and 
Cromwel1 (1975) p r e d i c t .  When the four power 
types are  developed from the Blood and Wolfe  
measure, no la rg e  percentages of  e g a l i t a r i a n  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  are  found. In f a c t ,  the  
e g a l i t a r i a n  power group represents  only  2 8 . 7% of  
the t o t a l  sample.
A. The use of  t h i s  index prov ides a means to  
examine the l e g i t i m a t i o n  of  the power s t r u c t u r e  
t h a t  is hypothesized as an important  in te rv e n in g  
v a r i a b l e  in the  r e l a t i o n  between m a r i t a l  power 
and c o n f l i c t .  The p a r a l l e l  set  o f  quest ions  
t h a t  ask who should have the f i n a l  say prov ide  
the means to assess the l e g i t i m a t i o n  of  power.
The c e n t r a l  issue of  concern in t h i s  research is to  
examine how var ious  power arrangements e f f e c t  the leve l  of  
c o n f l i c t  and the amount of  v io le n c e .  M a r i t a l  power in t h i s  
research is thus an independent v a r i a b l e  and the s t a r t i n g  
p o in t  from which our a n a ly s is  of  in t im a te  r e la t i o n s h i p s
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p r o c e e d s .  T h e  B l o o d  a n d  W o l f e  i n d e x  p r o v i d e d  t h e  
d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  f o u r  t y p e s  o f  p o w e r  a r r a n g e m e n t s  t h a t  
c a p t u r e ,  a t  l e a s t  a t  o n e  p o i n t  i n  t i m e ,  s t r i k i n g l y  d i f f e r e n t  
p a t t e r n s  o f  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .
I n d e x  C o n s t r u c t i o n
The measures of  husband-dominant,  w i f e  dominant,  
e g a l i t a r i a n  and d iv id e d  power r e la t i o n s h i p s  began by 
c o nstuc t ing  an index t h a t  measures the  percent of  dec is ions  
shared by the pa r tn e rs  and an index t h a t  measures who has 
the balance of  power. The power typ o lo g ies  are  i d e n t i f i e d  
by combining the Percent of  Shared Power Index and the  
Balance of  Power Index.
To measure percent o f  dec is ions  t h a t  a re  shared e q u a l ly  
by the couple ,each response of "husband and w i f e  the same" 
was given a score o f  one.  The r e s u l t i n g  index has a range 
of 0 -  6. The second index,  the Balance of  Power Index,
used the same set o f  quest ions and is a L i k e r t  a d d i t i v e  
index.  Points  are  assigned to each response category and 
summed. Low scores on the Balance of  Power Index in d ic a te  
the w i f e  is dominant in dec is ion-m aking ,  w h i le  high scores  
i n d i c a t e  the  husband is  dominant in dec is ion-m aking .
Couples t h a t  earned a t  l e a s t  67% on the Shared Power 
Index are  de f in ed  as having an e g a l i t a r i a n  power s t r u c t u r e .  
Couples who earned less than 65% on the Shared Power Index 
and less than 33% on the Balance of  Power Index a re  def ined  
as having a w i f e  dominant r e l a t i o n s h i p  w h i le  couples th a t  
earned less than 65% on the Shared Power Index and more than
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66% on the Balance of  Power Index are  de f ined  as husband 
dominant.  Couples t h a t  scored less than 65% on the Shared 
Power Index but between 3^~65% on the  Balance of  Power Index 
are  d e f in e d  as having an d iv id e d  power r e l a t i o n s h i p .
POWER NORM CONSENSUS 
The importance of  l e g i t im a t e d  power s t r u c tu r e s  was 
c l e a r l y  recognized by Weber(19^7) as a f a c t o r  c r i t i c a l  to 
the  development of  c o n f l i c t .  According to Weber, c o n f l i c t  
would be less l i k e l y  to  appear in r e l a t i o n s h i p s  where the  
subord inate  confered the  r i g h t  to make decis ions  on the  
s u p e ro rd in a te .  The concept of  l e g i t i m a t i o n  incorporated  
i n t o  the proposed model o f  t h i s  research is an important  
in te rv e n in g  v a r i a b l e  in the r e l a t i o n  between power and 
c o n f 1 i c t .
M e a s u r e m e n t  o f  t h e  C o n c e p t
To measure the agreement couples have reached over the  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  power, the p a r a l l e l  set  of  response 
c a t e g o r ie s  were used from the Blood and Wolfe index of  
m a r i t a l  power t h a t  asks the respondent who should make the  
de c is io n s  about a s p e c i f i c  issue and asks the respondents  
how t h e i r  pa r tn e rs  would respond to the same q u e s t io n .  Of 
i n t e r e s t  in t h i s  research  was the development o f  an index of  
consensus over how the power is d i s t r i b u t e d  so t h a t  i t  be 
compared to the M a r i t a l  Power Index o f  how power is a c t u a l l y  
d i s t r i b u t e d .
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Index Construction
The simple assignment o f  p o in ts  to the responses to  
each of s ix  q uest ions ,  a b as ic  L i k e r t  indexing methodology,  
posed a d i f f i c u l t y  because we were in t e r e s t e d  in a measure 
t h a t  would r e f l e c t  the magnitude of  the d i f f e r e n c e s  between 
the responses.  That i s ,  we needed a measure t h a t  would 
r e f l e c t  the magnitude of  the d i f f e r e n c e  between whom the  
respondent b e l ie v ed  should make the dec is ions  and how the  
respondent be l ie v ed  h is  or her p a r tn e r  would respond to the  
same q u e s t io n .  I f  we merely  assigned p o in ts  to  the response 
c a teg o r ie s  fo r  each quest ion  t h a t  comprised the index and 
subtrac ted  the husband's responses from the w i f e ' s  
responses, the r e s u l t  is  both p o s i t i v e  and ne gat ive  
i n te g e rs .  Since the next step to c r e a t in g  the index is to  
sum those in tegers  f o r  each q u e s t io n ,  the p o s i t i v e  and 
n egat ive  in te g e rs  cancel  each o ther  o u t .  To avoid  t h i s  
problem we took the ab so lu te  v a lu e  of  the d i f f e r e n c e  between 
husband and w i f e  response to each quest ion  and summed those  
scores to  c r e a te  the o v e r a l l  index of  power norm consensus.  
The problem of missing va lue s  fo r  each quest ion  was a ls o  of  
concern to  the o v e r a l l  index c o n s t ru c t io n  process.  We chose 
to  s u b s t i t u t e  the mean of  the score f o r  each quest ion .  
However, when the index was c r e a te d ,  the missing v a lue  
s u b s t i t u t i o n  process was only  used i f  th e re  was only  one 
quest ion  t h a t  had a miss ing v a lu e  s u b s t i t u t i o n .
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The Index of  Power Norm Concensus has a t h e o r e t i c a l  
range o f  0 to  2k,  but the ac tua l  index ranges from 8 , the  
le a s t  amount o f  consensus to  2k or  complete consensus. With  
a mean o f  21 .8  and a standard d e v i a t i o n  (SD) of  2 .3  i t  is an 
extremely  skewed d i s t r i b u t i o n .
Index R e l i a b i 1 i ty
Confidence in the r e l i a b i l i t y  of  an index is an 
impor tant  methodological  concern in any research .  There are  
several  necessary steps to e v a lu a te  the r e l i a b i l i t y  o f  an 
index.  The procedure to e v a lu a te  the Index o f  Power Norm 
Consensus is a lso  used in the e v a lu a t io n  of  subsequent 
ind ices  developed fo r  t h i s  s tudy .  The basic  ru les  are  
o u t l in e d  here .
The i tem to  i tem c o r r e l a t i o n  m a t r i x  provides  em pir ica l  
in fo rm at ion  on how wel l  the items are  r e la t e d  to one another  
and on the d i r e c t i o n  of  the r e l a t i o n s h i p .  I f  any 
c o r r e l a t i o n s  are  too low i t  suggests t h a t  d e l e t i o n  of  t h a t  
item from the index should be considered .  The c o r r e l a t i o n  
m a tr ix  f o r  the Index of  Power Norm Consensus re vea ls  f a i r l y  
low o v e r a l l  i tem to  i tem c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  th a t  range 
from .16  to  .31 w i th  a mean of  . 2 1 .  In g e n e ra l ,  one might  
consider d e l e t i n g  items w i th  a c o r r e l a t i o n  of  less than .20 
however t h i s  a lso  depends on the number o f  items in the  
index t h a t  one could s a c r i f i c e .  A l l  items t h a t  comprise the  
Index of  Power Norm Consensus are  inc luded because,  d e s p i te  
low c o r r e l a t i o n s ,  in general  they are  c o n s is t e n t .  That i s ,  
one i tem is not c o r r e l a t e d  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  lower than any
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o th e r s .  Thus one c r i t e r i o n  fo r  r e l i a b l e  indexing,  t h a t  the  
items se le c ted  on a t h e o r e t i c a l  basis  as a measure of  a 
concept a lso  c o r r e l a t e  on an em p ir ica l  basis  is met.  A 
second c o n s id e ra t io n  are  the i tem to index c o r r e l a t i o n  
c o e f f i c i e n t s  t h a t  prov ide  a d d i t io n a l  g u id e l in e s  fo r  
e v a lu a t in g  whether to inc lude an item in the index.  The 
s iz e  o f  correc ted  item to t o t a l  c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  fo r  
the Index of  Power Norm Consensus range from .32 to .42 
which f a l l  we l l  w i t h i n  an acceptab le  range.
The t h i r d  c o n s id e ra t io n  is the s i z e  of  the alpha  
c o e f f i c i e n t ,  an o v e r a l l  measure o f  the in te rn a l  consistency  
r e l i a b i l i t y  of  the index,  and a lso  the corresponding change 
in alpha i f  any items are  d e le te d  from the index.  The index 
of Power Norm Consensus c o e f f i c i e n t  of  r e l i a b i l i t y  is .61 ,  
and i t  decreases when items are  d e l e t e d .  Thus the Index of 
Power Norm Consensus meets each of the e m pir ic a l  c r i t e r i a  
f o r  e v a lu a t in g  the r e l i a b i l i t y  o f  an index and provides  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  suggest ing t h a t  i t  is a r e l i a b l e  measure 
of consensus over how the power is d i s t r i b u t e d  in a 
r e l a t i o n s h i p .
Use of  the Index i n Data Analys i s
Although the Index of  Power Norm Consensus is an 
o rd in a l  v a r i a b l e ,  f o r  purposes of t h i s  research i t  was 
t r ic h o to m ize d  in to  low, medium and high groupings.
There are  two g u id e l in e s  one can use to  decide  how to  
t r ic h o to m iz e  an o rd in a l  v a r i a b l e :  the Edwards twenty -seventh  
p e r c e n t i l e  c r i t e r i a ,  or by examinat ion of  the frequency
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d i s t r i b u t i o n  fo r  the  p a r t i c u l a r  v a r i a b l e  and i d e n t i f y i n g  
s u b s t a n t i a l  break ing po in ts  in the d i s t r i b u t i o n .  
Examination of  the cumulat ive  percentage  of  the frequency  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  fo r  t h i s  index revea led  major break ing po in ts  
in the d i s t r i b u t i o n  which d id  not c o inc ide  w i th  the  
p e r c e n t i l e  c r i t e r i a .  I t  was decided to base the  
t r i c h o t o m i2a t io n  on the breaks in the d i s t r i b u t i o n .  Couples 
who earned 8-20  t o t a l  po in ts  on t h i s  index (24.2% of the  
sample) a re  grouped in to  the low consensus group. Couples 
who scored 21-23  po in ts  (39*8% of the sample) a re  grouped 
in to  the medium consensus group. Couples who scored 24 
p o in ts  ( 33 - 7% of the sample) a re  grouped in to  the t o t a l  
consensus group. The basic  r a t i o n a l e  behind the s e l e c t i o n  
of  these c u t t i n g  p o i n t ,  in a d d i t io n  to the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
o f  the frequency d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  involved c o n s id e ra t io n  of  how 
couples earned the scores f o r  t h i s  index.  I f  we use a 
couple who earned 20 po in ts  on the index as an example,  
th e re  a re  several  ways they could have responded to gain  
those 20 p o in t s .  They may agree complete ly  on f i v e  out the  
s ix  issues asked, but would have to d is agree  complete ly  on 
one issue.  That represents  16% disagreement on a l l  
d ec is ions  couples make (as measured by t h i s  index) and t h a t  
is a f a i r l y  la rge  p e rce n t .  The more l i k e l y  scenar io  is th a t  
they lo s t  the four  p o in ts  t h a t  would mean t o t a l  consensus by 
d is ag re e in g  to  some degree on four  q u e s t io n s .  Disagreement  
on 6 6 . 6% of the quest ions asked can be i n t e r p r e t e d  as a low 
degree o f  consensus on how the power should be d i s t r i b u t e d .
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MARITAL CONFLICT
Measurement of  the Concept
The Index of  M a r i t a l  C o n f l i c t  used in t h i s  research was 
constructed from the responses to  a se t  of  f i v e  quest ions  
concerning issues t h a t  couples may have agreed or d isagreed  
on dur ing  the p r i o r  y e a r .  The quest ions  asked the  
respondent how o f t e n  dur ing the past  year s /he  agreed on: 
managing the money, cooking,  c lean ing  or r e p a i r i n g  the  
house; so c ia l  a c t i v i t i e s ;  a f f e c t i o n  and sexual r e l a t i o n s ;  
and th ings  about the c h i l d r e n .  There were f i v e  poss ib le  
response c a te g o r ie s  t h a t  range from always to never .
Index Construct ion
Poin ts  ranging from one to  f i v e  were assigned to  each 
response ca teg o ry .  For example,  couples who never disagreed  
on a s p e c i f i c  quest ion  were given one p o in t  and couples th a t  
always d isagreed on t h a t  quest ion  were assigned f i v e  p o in ts .  
The index was then c rea ted  by summing the scores fo r  the  
f i v e  qu e s t io n s .  The problem of missing values  fo r  each 
quest ion was solved in the same manner as the Index of  Power 
Norm Consensus by s u b s t i t u t i n g  the mean fo r  each quest io n .
The Index of  M a r i t a l  C o n f l i c t  has a t h e o r e t i c a l  range 
of 5 to 25 but an a c tu a l  range of 5 to  2A, i n d i c a t i n g  th a t  
few couples in the sample t o t a l l y  disagreed on every  issue.  
For c l a r i t y  i t  should be pointed out t h a t  w h i le  high scores 
on the Index of  Power Norm Consensus i n d ic a t e  high  
consensus, high scores on the Index of  M a r i t a l  C o n f l i c t
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i n d ic a t e  high c o n f 1i c t . The M a r i t a l  C o n f l i c t  Index has a
mean of  10.0  and a SD of 3*^*
1ndex Re l i  a b i I i  ty
As w i th  the Index of  Power Norm Consensus, th ree
f a c t o r s  prov ide  in fo rm at ion  suggest ing t h a t  the Index of  
M a r i t a l  C o n f l i c t  is a r e l i a b l e  measure.  The c o r r e l a t i o n  
m a tr ix  of  a l l  items suggests t h a t  the  quest ions chosen fo r  
in c lu s io n  in the index are  p o s i t i v e l y  c o r r e l a t e d  w i th  each 
o t h e r .  C o e f f i c i e n t s  ranged from a low of .32 to  a high of  
. 4 6 .  The c orrec te d  item to t o t a l  c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  
are  a lso  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  s im i l a r  to  one another and f a l l  
w i t h i n  an acceptab le  range of around .5  suggesting t h a t  no 
items should be d e le te d  from the  index.  The alpha
r e l i a b i l i t y  c o e f f i c i e n t  f o r  the Index of  M a r i t a l  C o n f l i c t  is  
•77 and the d e l e t i o n  of  any i tem from the index does not  
increase  the r e l i a b i l i t y  c o e f f i c i e n t .
Tr ichotom izat ion  of  the Index of  Mar i t a l  Conf1 i c t
One of  the major r e la t i o n s h i p s  t h i s  research examines 
is between the d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  m a r i t a l  power and the leve l  
of m a r i t a l  c o n f l i c t .  As pointed out p r e v io u s ly ,  m a r i t a l  
power as measured in t h i s  study is a nominal v a r i a b l e ,  and 
the same data a n a ly s is  l i m i t a t i o n s  t h a t  were discussed in 
r e l a t i o n  to the Index of  Power Norm Consensus apply  here as 
w e l l .  The Index of  M a r i t a l  C o n f l i c t  is s i m i l a r l y  
t r ich o to m ized  in to  low, medium, and high c o n f l i c t  groups.
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The s e l e c t i o n  of  c u t t i n g  p o in ts  from a frequency
d i s t r i b u t i o n  so t h a t  data  is grouped in a way t h a t  is 
t h e o r e t i c a l l y  and e m p i r i c a l l y  meaningful  can be a d i f f i c u l t  
d e c is io n .  The r a t i o n a l e  behind the grouping of data  in the  
Index of  M a r i t a l  C o n f l i c t  was based on the n a t u r a l l y
o c curr ing  break p o in ts  in the cumulat ive  frequency
d i s t r i b u t i o n  and the measures of  c e n t r a l  tendency.  Couples 
t h a t  scored 5“ 8 po in ts  (2A.4%) on the index are  grouped in to
\T
the low c o n f l i c t  group; couples t h a t  scored S~] 2  on the
index ( 4 4 . 1%) are  grouped in to  the medium c o n f l i c t  group;  
and those t h a t  scored 13 or more po in ts  (3 0 . 0%) are in the
high c o n f l i c t  group.
NEGOTIATION TACTICS
The em p ir ic a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between m a r i t a l  c o n f l i c t  and 
v io le n c e  is examined by S t ra us ,  G e l l e s ,  and Ste inmetz  (1980) 
and c l e a r l y  demonstrates a strong p o s i t i v e  a s s o c ia t io n  
between the two v a r i a b l e s :  the g r e a t e r  the c o n f l i c t ,  the
g r e a t e r  the p r o b a b i l i t y  of  v io le n c e .
Straus  e t .  a l . (1980) f u r t h e r  examine the
c o n f I i c t - v i o l e n c e  connect ion in r e l a t i o n  to  the assumptions  
of c o n f l i c t  theory by suggesting t h a t  i f  c o n f l i c t  is 
ne g o t ia te d  through the use of  reasoning,  the r a t e  of
v io le n c e  should decrease.  How c o n f l i c t  is n egot ia ted  
becomes a major in te rv e n in g  v a r i a b l e  in the r e l a t i o n  between 
c o n f l i c t  and v io le n c e .  Straus compares how the use of
reasoning e f f e c t s  the a s s o c ia t io n  between c o n f l i c t  and 
v io le n c e ,  and f in d s  a r e l a t i o n s h i p  t h a t  is unexpected:
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couples t h a t  have high le v e ls  o f  c o n f l i c t  and whose use of  
reasoning is h igh ,  have the h ig h es t  r a te s  o f  v i o le n c e .  The 
o ppos i te  is a lso  t ru e :  couples who have low le v e ls  o f
c o n f l i c t  and use reasoning the le a s t  o f t e n ,  have the lowest  
ra te s  o f  v io le n c e  ( S t r a u s , 19 80 : 165) •  The r e s u l t s  of  his  
a n a ly s is  suggest t h a t  i t  might be m is lead ing  to  s t a t e  t h a t  
c o n f l i c t  is b e n e f i c i a l  to  in t im a te  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  when
c o n s t r u c t iv e  means are  used to  re s o lv e  t h a t  c o n f l i c t ,  a
*
major assumption of c o n f l i c t  th e o ry .
The data  a lso  suggest t h a t  the re  is l i t t l e  hope of  
avo id ing  m a r i t a l  v io le n c e  when th e re  is c o n f l i c t :  a
conclus ion t h a t  would wreak havoc on those whose business is  
m a r i t a l  th e ra p y .  C l e a r l y ,  the l i n k  between c o n f l i c t ,
v io le n c e ,  and n e g o t ia t io n  needs f u r t h e r  a n a l y s is .  I t  could  
be t h a t  when reasoning is compared to o ther  less
c o n s t r u c t iv e  n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s ,  such as wi thdrawal  and 
verba l  aggress ion,  even higher  r a te s  of  v io le n c e  r e s u l t ;  or 
t h a t  v io le n c e  is used as a ‘ l a s t  r e s o r t '  when c o n s t r u c t iv e  
means of s e t t l i n g  d isputes  have a p p a re n t ly  f a i l e d .
Measurement o f  the Concept
The C o n f l i c t  T a c t ic s  Scale  (CTS) is a w e l l  known and 
f r e q u e n t ly  u t i l i 2ed measure t h a t  asks respondents to r e p o r t  
how o f t e n  in the past year s /he  and t h e i r  p a r tn e r  used 
var ious  means to  reso lve  d i f f e r e n c e s .  I t  is composed of  18 
types of  t a c t i c s  t h a t  may have been used and range from 
r a t i o n a l  forms of c o n f l i c t  r e s o lu t io n  such as use of
reasoning to the use of  physical  v io le n c e .  Although the CTS
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was o r i g i n a l l y  developed to  get a t  the issue of  physica l  
v io le n c e  in  in t im a te  r e la t i o n s h i p s  ( S t r a u s , 1978) i t  provides  
v a lu a b le  in fo rm at ion  on other  types of  n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s  
too .  Of p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r e s t  is how the use of  less  
c o n s t r u c t iv e  means of s e t t l i n g  d is p u te s ,  such as s u lk in g  or 
c ry in g  or i n s u l t in g  the p a r tn e r  e f f e c t s  the 
c o n f 1 i c t - v i o l e n c e  a s s o c ia t io n .  Th is  research develops three  
ind ices  of n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s  from the CTS.
There were several  issues t h a t  had to  be addressed when 
the th re e  ind ices  were c o nst ruc ted .  Because we are  
i n t e r e s t e d  in how m a r i t a l  power r e l a t i o n s  a f f e c t  n e g o t ia t io n  
t a c t i c s ,  we wanted to  r e t a i n  some in form at ion  on how each 
p a r tn e r  used n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s  w i t h i n  the four  power 
types .  We were cur io us  to  see i f ,  f o r  example,  men in male 
dominant r e la t i o n s h i p s  negot ia ted  c o n f l i c t  d i f f e r e n t l y  than 
men in e g a l i t a r i a n  r e la t i o n s h i p s ,  or what t a c t i c s  women in 
female  dominant r e la t i o n s h i p s  used. But of  equal concern 
was the development o f  a measure of  n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s  th a t  
r e f l e c t e d  the m a r i t a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  ra th e r  than any one 
person in t h a t  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  Thus the re  are th re e  vers ions  
of  the Reasoning Index,  the Withdrawal Index,  and the Verbal  
Aggression Index: one fo r  husbands, one fo r  wives,  and one
f o r  the couple.
The Reasoninq Index is constructed  from items t h a t
>
measure how o f t e n  the respondent and the pa r tne r  discussed  
the issue ca lmly ,  got in form at ion  to  support t h e i r  s id e  of  
the d iscuss ion ,  and brought in or t r i e d  to b r in g  in another
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person to  help s e t t l e  a d is p u te .  The Wi thdrawal Index uses 
the items t h a t  measure the frequency of s u lk ing  or r e fu s in g  
to  t a l k  about the issue ,  stomping out of  the room, and 
c r y in g .  The Verbal  Aggression Index includes i n s u l t i n g  or 
swearing a t  the p a r t n e r ,  and doing or saying something to  
s p i t e  the o t h e r .
An under ly ing  assumption concerning n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s  
is t h a t  the re  is an e s c a la t io n  process th a t  may precede the  
use o f  v io le n c e  which includes a continuum of p ro g re s s iv e ly  
less c o n s t r u c t iv e  means of s e t t l i n g  d is p u te s .  A l f o r d ' s  
( 1982) a r t i c l e  on int imacy and d is p u t in g  s ty le s  s i m i l a r l y  
supports the assumption of  a continuum. Conceptua l ly ,  the  
th re e  indices  r e f l e c t  t h a t  assumption,  w i th  the reasoning  
index tapping the most c o n s t r u c t iv e  dimension and the verbal  
aggression index tapping the l e a s t  c o n s t r u c t iv e  dimension of  
n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s .  V io le nce ,  then,  is not s p e c i f i c a l l y  
included as a n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c  in t h i s  research ,  r a t h e r  i t  
is  conceptu a l ized  as a r e s u l t  o f  many fa c to r s  t h a t  th is  
study examines,  one of  which is the use of  n e g o t ia t io n  to  
mediate the r e l a t i o n  between c o n f l i c t  and v io le n c e .
Index Construct  ion
There are  seven p o ss ib le  response c a teg o r ies  fo r  each 
of the items t h a t  a re  used to c o n s t ru c t  the indices  and they  
range from 0 (never) to  6 (more than 21 t im e s ) .  In p r io r  
research ,  these items were recoded to more a c c u r a te ly  
r e f l e c t  the frequency w i th  which each t a c t i c  is used and the  
midpoints  o f  the response c a teg o r ie s  are  used. The f i r s t
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step in t h i s  research was to sum the scores fo r  the items 
included in each index and d i v i d e  by the number o f  items in 
each index.  The ind ices  f o r  wives and husbands use of  
reason, w i th d ra w a l ,  and verba l  aggression have a range of 0 
to 25 w h i le  the couple measure o f  the same t a c t i c s  has a 
range of  0 to 5 0 .
Examination of  the husband, w i f e ,  and couple frequency  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  fo r  each t a c t i c  suggests th e re  a re  few 
d i f f e r e n c e s  in how o f t e n  t a c t i c s  are  used by each p a r t n e r .  
S im i la r  measures o f  c e n t r a l  tendency and d is p e rs io n  are  
reported  fo r  the husband and w i f e  Reasoning ind ices  and the  
husband and w i f e  Verbal  Aggression in d ice s .  The Wives'  
Reasoning Index has a mean of 5 -8  and a SD of  A .8; fo r
Husbands' Reasoning Index the*mean is 5*2  and the SD is A .8.
The Wives' Verbal Aggression Index has a mean of 3.1 and a 
SD of 5 . 2 ;  fo r  Husbands' Verbal  Aggression Index the mean is 
2 .9  and the SD is 5 * 2 .  When the Withdrawal indices fo r  
husband and w i f e  a re  compared, however, some important
gender d i f f e r e n c e s  a re  app aren t .  The Wives' Withdrawal
Index has a mean of  3-1 and a SD of 4 . 5 ;  fo r
Husbands1Withdrawal Index the mean is 1.8 and the SD is 3 . 2 .
The data  from th is  index suggests t h a t  wives use withdrawal
as a n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c  more o f t e n  than t h e i r  p a r t n e r .
The Couple Ind ices  are  a d d i t i v e  responses from what the  
women in the sample r e p o r t  about themselves and t h e i r  
par tners  and what the  men in the sample re p o r t  about
themselves and t h e i r  p a r t n e r .  The mean and SD fo r  the
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Couple Reasoning Index are  10.6 and 9 . 1 .  The mean and SD 
fo r  the Couple Withdrawal Index a re  A . 9 and 6 . 8 .  The mean 
and SD f o r  the Couple Verbal  Aggression Index are  5*9  and 
9 . 6 .
Index Re l i  ab?1i ty
The s iz e  o f  the i n t e r - i t e m  c o r r e l a t i o n s  fo r  the  
quest ions  used to co n s t ru c t  the d i f f e r e n t  indices  are  more 
d is p a r a t e  than has been encountered in the  c o n s t ru c t io n  of  
other  ind ices  developed in t h i s  re sea rch .  Th is  p a t t e r n  
holds fo r  each of the in d iv id u a l  ind ices  t h a t  measure 
husbands' n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s  and wives '  n e g o t ia t io n  
t a c t i c s .  The couples '  indices  w i l l  be considered below.
The i n t e r - i t e m  c o r r e l a t i o n s  of  the items used in the  
Reasoning Index suggest t h a t  o f  the th re e  i tems, d iscussing
the issue calmly  and b r in g in g  in o thers  to help  s e t t l e  an
argument are  not h ig h ly  c o r r e l a t e d  ( .0 9  fo r  husbands; .08  
fo r  w iv e s ) ,  al though the c o r r e l a t i o n s  are  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  
s i g n i f i c a n t .  The s i z e  o f  the c o r r e l a t i o n s  between the o ther  
items are  p o s i t i v e  and r e l a t i v e l y  h igh .
When the i n t e r - i t e m  c o r r e l a t i o n s  fo r  the Withdrawal  
Index are  examined a c le a r  sex d i f f e r e n c e  in t a c t i c s  is 
apparent .  The quest ion  t h a t  measures use of  c ry in g  as a 
t a c t i c  is not as h ig h ly  c o r r e l a t e d  w i th  the o ther  items used
in the husbands' Withdrawal Index as i t  is in the wives '
Withdrawal Index.  The c o r r e l a t i o n  between c ry ing  and 
su lk in g  is .13  fo r  husbands and .39  f o r  w ives .
Page 51
These low c o r r e l a t i o n s  w i t h i n  the two ind ices  suggest  
t h a t  d e l e t i o n  of  those items should be considered.  However,  
th e re  are  only  th re e  items t h a t  comprise the Reasoning Index 
and the  Withdrawal Index.  The i tem pool is not la rge  enough 
to d e l e t e  an item w i th o u t  compromising the concept of  
i ndexi ng.
The f o l lo w in g  alpha c o e f f i c i e n t s  are  reported  fo r  the  
husband and w i f e  v ers ions  o f  the ind ice s :
Husband's Reasoning Index . A8
W i f e 's  Reasoning Index .k~l
Husband's Withdrawal Index .51
W i f e 's  Withdrawal Index .67
Husband's Verbal Aggression Index .7**
W i f e 's  Verbal  Aggression Index .71
The Couples ' N e q o t ia t io n  T a c t ic s  Indices
In a d d i t io n  to  the procedure descr ibed above,
computation of  the couples '  ind ices  requ ired  examining the  
c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  between husbands' and w ives '  use of  
each t a c t i c .  Th is  set  o f  c o r r e l a t i o n s  was examined to  
prov ide  e m p ir ic a l  support  f o r  an index t h a t  is a measure of  
a r e l a t i o n s h i p  between in t im a tes  ra th e r  than an in d iv id u a l  
leve l  measure such as the husbands' Reasoning Index.  The 
husbands' and w ives '  c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  fo r  the  
couples '  Reasoning Index a re  high w i th  a range of .65  to  
. 8A. The couples '  Verbal  Aggression c o r r e l a t i o n
c o e f f i c i e n t s  are  a lso  s i z a b l e  ( . 6A ) . The lowest
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Table  3 - 1 -  Sample Percentages f o r  T r ich o tom ized  N e g o t ia t io n  
T a c t ic s  Indexes
Negot i a t  ion
T a c t ic s  Husbands Wives Couples
A. Reasoning Index
Low 34-3 32 .8 41.7
Med i um 28.7 2 8 . 1 26.3
High 35.0 37-1 29-1
N 2102 2099 2080
Withdrawal Index
None A7-6 31-3 25-7
hed  i um 36.1* 1*0.6 1*1*.2
High 14.8 26 .8 28.0
N 2118 2115 2099
Verbal  Aggression Index
None i*i*.8 * 5 .1 37-8
Med i um 3 0 . A 29-2 27-7
High 23-7 21*. 8 33-0
N 2120 2121* 2113
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c o r r e l a t i o n s  between husbands' and wives '  t a c t i c s  a re  from
the items t h a t  comprise the Withdrawal Index.  These
c o e f f i c i e n t s  ranged from .22 to  . 3 8 . One e x p la n a t io n  of  the
s iz e  is t h a t  they are  r e f l e c t i v e  o f  gender d i f f e r e n c e s  in
the expression of e m o t i o n a l i t y .
The alpha r e l i a b i l i t y  c o e f f i c i e n t s  fo r  the couples'
indices  are  q u i t e  c o n s is ta n t  w i th  the alphas fo r  the
husbands' and w ives '  in d ic e s .  They a re :
Couples'  Reasoning Index .US
Couples'  Withdrawal Index .73
Couples'  Verbal Aggression Index .76
Tr ichotomi z a t i o n  of  the Neqoti  a t i o n  T a c t i  cs Indi  ces
Each type o f  the N e g o t ia t io n  T a c t ic s  Index is
t r ic h o to m ize d  in to  low, medium and high groups using s im i l a r  
procedure to  those used in the t r i c h o t o m i z t i o n  o f  the
consensus and c o n f l i c t  in d ic e s .  Tab le  3-1 shows the percent  
of the sample in each group by t a c t i c .
MARITAL VIOLENCE 
Measurement o f  the Concept
V io le nce  is de f ined  as "an act  c a r r i e d  out w i th  the  
i n t e n t i o n  o f ,  or perce ived i n t e n t i o n  o f ,  p h y s i c a l l y  h u r t in g  
another person" (Ge l les  and S t r a u s , 1979)♦ V io le n c e  is 
measures in t h i s  research  by those items o f  the C o n f l i c t  
T a c t ic s  Scale t h a t  involve  the use of  physica l  fo r c e  to  
s e t t l e  c o n f l i c t .  The CTS is described by Straus (1979) and
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is re ev a lu a te d  in l i g h t  of  a number of  c r i t i c i s m s  in
S t r a u s (1981) .
Use of  the CTS a l lows the  development o f  several  
ind ices  to  measure i n t r a - f a m i l y  v io le n c e  t h a t  take in to  
account the sex of  the v ic t i m  and the s e v e r i t y  of the  
v io le n c e .  This research is l i m i t e d  to those items t h a t  
measure Minor V io le n c e .  The Minor V io lenc e  Index measures 
acts, of  physical  fo rc e  th a t  inc lude  pushing,  s lapping and 
throwing o b je c t s .
The measures of  husband to w i f e  and w i fe  to  husband 
minor v io le n c e  are  n o t ,  however, m u tu a l ly  e x c lu s iv e  measures 
of m a r i t a l  v io le n c e .  They do not measure those inc iden ts  
where on!y the husband or only  the w i f e  is v i o l e n t .  The 
index r e f l e c t s  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  where th e re  is ,  fo r  example,  
husband to w i f e  v io le n c e  (N=>246) , but includes t imes where 
only the husband is v i o l e n t  and times where the husband is
v i o l e n t  and the w i f e  may have responded w i th  v i o l e n t  acts  of  
her own. Th is  is a ls o  t ru e  of  the  measure of  w i f e  to  
husband v io le n c e  (N=231) .
The measure of  minor couple v io le n c e  (N=326) used in
t h i s  research is not r e s t r i c t e d  to r e la t i o n s h i p s  where both  
p a r tn e rs  are  v i o l e n t .  i t  is an a d d i t i v e  measure o f  the  
number o f  times in the  l a s t  year t h a t  e i t h e r  the husband was
v i o l e n t ,  the w i f e  was v i o l e n t  or both were v i o l e n t .
The use of  m u tu a l ly  e x c lu s iv e  measures of  minor 
v io le n c e  was explored because such measures provide  fo r  
b e t t e r  conceptual  c l a r i t y .  Four d i s t i n c t  typ o lo g ies  of
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m a r i t a l  v io le n c e  could be developed using t h i s  approach:  
couples where the re  is no reported  v io le n c e  (N=1768);  where 
only  the husband was v i o l e n t  (N=95) ; where only  the w i f e  was 
v i o l e n t  (N=80) and where both p a r tn e rs  were v i o l e n t  (N=151) • 
The cost o f  conceptual  c l a r i t y ,  however,  is the c r e a t i o n  of  
such ser ious  methodological  problems because of  the small  
sample s iz e  t h a t  preclude the a n a ly s is  of  the r e la t i o n s h i p  
o f j n t e r e s t  in t h i s  research .  These problems are  discussed  
in the  fo l lo w in g  s e c t io n .
The d e c is io n  to  l i m i t  the a n a ly s is  to acts  of  minor
v io le n c e  was made fo r  both t h e o r e t i c a l  and p r a c t i c a l
reasons. The major focus of t h i s  research is to  examine the  
r e l a t i o n  between the m a r i t a l  power s t r u c t u r e ,  c o n f l i c t  and 
v io le n c e  in l i g h t  o f  several  p r e d i c t i o n  from c o n f l i c t  
th e o ry .  E g a l i t a r i a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  are  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  
i n t e r e s t  because of the c o n t r a d ic t io n s  in theory  and 
rese arch .  A focus on the ra te s  o f  minor v io le n c e  ra th e r  
than the more severe forms t h a t  v io le n c e  may ta k e ,  such as 
w i f e  or husband b e a t in g ,  provides a more accura te  p i c t u r e  of  
how power and c o n f l i c t  a re  r e la t e d  to  phenomena t h a t  occur 
r e l a t i v e l y  f r e q u e n t l y  in m a rr ia ge .
I t  is important to  recognize  the meaning t h a t  even 
minor v io le n c e  has in an in t im a te  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  I t  implies  
t h a t  physica l  fo rc e  w i l l  be used when i t  is perce ived as 
'n e c e s s a r y ' .  Although i t  is minor in the sense t h a t  there
is less chance of physical  harm, what is learned by the
v i c t i m  is t h a t  they are  a t  r i s k  i f  they do not acquiesce to
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the p a r t n e r s '  demands. There is a lso  no quarantee  t h a t  
minor acts  o f  v io lence'  w i l l  remain minor .  Minor v io le n c e  is  
o f t e n  a pre lude  to  more severe v io le n c e .
f t  is a lso  impor tant  to remember t h a t  c h i ld r e n  learn  
a p p r o p r ia t e  behavior  by observing the a c t io n s  o f  t h e i r  
p a ren ts .  Seeing parents  engaged in the use of  even minor  
v io le n c e  is a powerful  lesson in how one is to behave in 
in t im a te  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .
I t  is suggested t h a t  examinat ion of  m a r i t a l  power and 
c o n f l i c t  and how each e x p la in  the occurrence of  minor  
v io le n c e  is a s u f f i c i e n t  t e s t  o f  the p r e d ic t io n s  of  c o n f l i c t  
theory  because they w i l l  he lp  e x p la in  f a i r l y  ty p ic a l  m a r i t a l  
be h av io r .  In c lu s io n  of  the more severe forms of v io le n c e  
would have prov ided a d d i t io n a l  in fo rm a t ion  but would a lso  
have r e s u l te d  in an excessive  number of  t a b l e s ,  
approximate ly  81 in Chapter V, when the r e l a t i o n  between 
c o n f l i c t ,  n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s  and v io le n c e  is examined. The 
Minor V io le n c e  Index is computed to  measure husband-w ife ,  
wife -husband,  and couple v io le n c e .
METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS 
The c e n t r a l  focus of t h i s  research is to t e s t  a number 
of  hypotheses d er iv ed  from c o n f l i c t  theory  concerning the  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between m a r i t a l  power, c o n f l i c t ,  and v io le n c e .  
E g a l i t a r i a n  r e la t i o n s h i p s  are  of  p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r e s t  because 
the e m p ir ic a l  f in d in g s  from past research are  a t  odds w i th  
what is expected from a c o n f l i c t  framework.  The major  
concern t h a t  guides the a n a ly s is  o f  the data  is a comparison
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o f  e g a l i t a r i a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i t h  m a l e  d o m i n a n t ,  f e m a l e  
d o m i n a n t ,  a n d  d i v i d e d  p o w e r  s t r u c t u r e s  o n  t h e  i s s u e s  o f  
c o n f l i c t  a n d  v i o l e n c e .  W h i l e  c o m p a r i s o n  o f  t h e  p o w e r  t y p e s  
t h r o u g h o u t  t h i s  s t u d y  i s  c e n t r a l ,  i t  c r e a t e s  i t s  own  s e t  o f  
l i m i t a t i o n s  o n  t h e  s t a t i s t i c a l  p r o c e d u r e s  m o s t  a p p r o p r i a t e  
t o  a n a l y z e  t h e  d a t a .
M a r i t a l  p o w e r ,  a s  u s e d  i n  t h i s  r e s e a r c h ,  i s  a n o m i n a l  
l e v e l  v a r i a b l e .  P o w e r  n o r m  c o n s e n s u s ,  m a r i t a l  c o n f l i c t  a n d  
n e g o t i a t i o n  t a c t i c s  a r e  o r d i n a l  i n  t h e i r  o r i g i n a l  f o r m ,  a n d  
t r i c h o t o m i z e d  f o r  m a j o r  a n a l y s e s .  T h e  d e c i s i o n  t o  
t r i c h o t o m i z e  t h e s e  i n d i c e s  w a s  m ade b e c a u s e  t h e  f o c u s  o f  t h e  
r e s e a r c h  i s  o n  c o m p a r i n g  g r o u p s  t h a t  h a v e  h i g h  l e v e l s  o f  
c o n f l i c t ,  c o n s e n s u s ,  a n d  u s e  o f  n e g o t i a t i o n  t a c t i c s .  
T r i c h o t o m i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  i n d i c e s  p e r m i t s  c o m p a r i n g  t h e  
v i o l e n c e  r a t e s  f o r  e a c h  o f  t h e  g r o u p s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  r a t e s  
r e s u l t i n g  f r o m  t h e  c r o s s  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e s e  i n d e p e n d e n t  
v a r  i a b l e s .
G i v e n  t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  t h e s e  v a r i a b l e s ,  some 
s t a t i s t i c a l  t e c h n i q u e s  a r e  r u l e d  o u t .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h e  
m e a s u r e  o f  m a r i t a l  v i o l e n c e  i s  e x t r e m e l y  s k e w e d ,  m a k i n g  t h e  
u s e  o f  m u l t i p l e  r e g r e s s i o n  i n a p p r o p r i a t e .  I n  l i g h t  o f  t h e s e  
l i m i t a t i o n s ,  c r o s s - t a b u l a r  a n a l y s i s  a n d  c h i  s q u a r e  w e r e  
s e l e c t e d  a s  t h e  s t a t i s t i c a l  t o o l s  t h a t  w o u l d  p r o v i d e  t h e  
m o s t  i n f o r m a t i v e  r e s u l t s  w h e n  t h e  r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  m a r i t a l  
p o w e r ,  c o n s e n s u s  a n d  c o n f l i c t  i s  e x a m i n e d .
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T h e  a p p r o a c h  t a k e n  t o  a n a l y z e  t h e  d a t a  i s  t o  f i r s t  
e x a m i n e  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  m a r i t a l  p o w e r ,  p o w e r  n o r m  
c o n c e n s u s  a n d  m a r i t a l  c o n f l i c t .  T h e  l e v e l  o f  c o n f l i c t  
r e p o r t e d  f o r  e a c h  m a r i t a l  p o w e r  t y p e  i s  e x a m i n e d ,  a n d  how  
t h a t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  m e d i a t e d  b y  t h e  c o n s e n s u s  o v e r  t h e  
p o w e r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  i s  t h e n  e x a m i n e d .  C h a p t e r  IV  p r e s e n t s  
t h e  f i n d i n g s  o n  h o w  e g a l i t a r i a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  c o m p a r e  t o  t h e  
o t h e r  t y p e s  a n d  t h u s  e x a m i n e s  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  p o w e r  
a n d  c o n f l i c t  t h a t  i s  p r e d i c t e d  b y  a c o n f l i c t  p e r s p e c t i v e .
How c o n f l i c t  a n d  v i o l e n c e  a r e  r e l a t e d  i s  a s e c o n d  i s s u e  
o f  t h i s  r e s e a r c h .  A g a i n ,  f r o m  a c o n f l i c t  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  how  
c o u p l e s  g o  a b o u t  s e t t l i n g  d i s p u t e s  s h o u l d  p l a y  a r o l e  i n  t h e  
r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  c o n f l i c t  a n d  v i o l e n c e .  C h a p t e r  V p r e s e n t s  
t h e  f i n d i n g s  o n  t h e  r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  c o n f l i c t  a n d  v i o l e n c e  
a n d  h o w  t h a t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  m e d i a t e d  b y  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n  
t a c t i c s  c o u p l e s  u s e  —  r e a s o n i n g ,  w i t h d r a w a l  a n d  v e r b a l  
a g g r e s s i o n .  T h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  ho w  t h e  m a r i t a l  p o w e r  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  e f f e c t s  t h e  r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  c o n f l i c t ,  
n e g o t i a t i o n  t a c t i c s  a n d  v i o l e n c e  i s  a l s o  e x a m i n e d .
T h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  d a t a  t h a t  c o n s i d e r s  t h e  r e l a t i o n  
b e t w e e n  c o n f l i c t ,  n e g o t i a t i o n  t a c t i c s  a n d  v i o l e n c e  u t i l i z e s  
o n e - w a y  a n a l y s i s  o f  v a r i a n c e  f r o m  t h e  SCSS B r e a k d o w n  
p r o c e d u r e .  O n e - w a y  ANOVA s t a t i s t i c a l l y  t e s t s  w h e t h e r  t h e  
m e a n s  o f  t h e  s u b s a m p l e  d i f f e r  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  f r o m  o n e  a n o t h e r  
b y  c o m p u t i n g  t h e  F r a t i o ,  t h e  b e t w e e n  g r o u p s  m e a n  s q u a r e  
d i v i d e d  b y  t h e  w i t h i n  g r o u p s  mean s q u a r e .  O n e - w a y  ANOVA 
a l s o  p r o v i d e s  t h e  e t a  s q u a r e d  c o e f f i c i e n t ,  a d e s c r i p t i v e
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s t a t i s t i c  t h a t  i s  a m e a s u r e  o f  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  v a r i a n c e  
e x p l a i n e d  i n  t h e  d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  b y  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  
v a r  i a b l e .
T h e  d e c i s i o n  t o  u s e  o n e - w a y  ANOVA w a s  m a d e  b e c a u s e  t h e  
e t a  s q u a r e d  s t a t i s t i c  p r o v i d e s  a m e a n s  t o  c o m p a r e  how  m uch  
o f  t h e  v a r i a n c e  i n  t h e  d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  —  t h e  r a t e  o f  
m i n o r  v i o l e n c e  —  i s  e x p l a i n e d  b y  e a c h  o f  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  
v a r i a b l e s  —  c o n f l i c t  a n d  n e g o t i a t i o n  t a c t i c s .
T o  e x p l o r e  i f  t h e  m a r i t a l  p o w e r  s t r u c t u r e  c h a n g e s  t h e  
r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  c o n f l i c t ,  n e g o t i a t i o n  a n d  v i o l e n c e ,  t h e  
/ s e l e c t  o p t i o n  i n  SCSS w a s  u s e d  t o  s e l e c t  e a c h  m a r i t a l  p o w e r  
t y p e .  T h e  r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  c o n f l c i t ,  n e g o t i a t i o n  a n d  
v i o l e n c e  w a s  t h e n  e x a m i n e d  a s  b e f o r e ,  b u t  w i t h i n  e a c h  
m a r i t a l  p o w e r  s t r u c t u r e  u s i n g  o n e - w a y  ANOVA.
T h e  r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  c o n f l i c t ,  n e g o t i a t i o n  a n d  v i o l e n c e  
w a s  a l s o  e x a m i n e d  u s i n g  t h e  m u t u a l l y  e x c l u s i v e  m e a s u r e s  o f  
m a r i t a l  v i o l e n c e .  I t  w a s  q u i t e  r e a s o n a b l e  t o  e x p e c t  t h a t  
o p e r a t i o n a l i z i n g  t h e  c o n c e p t s  o f  m a r i t a l  v i o l e n c e  s o  t h a t  
t h e  m e a s u r e s  w e r e  m u t u a l l y  e x c l u s i v e  m e a s u r e s  o f  v i o l e n c e  
w o u l d  s h o w  d i f f e r e n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  b e t w e e n  t h e  v a r i a b l e s .
A l l  a n a l y s e s  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  c o n f l i c t ,  
n e g o t i a t i o n  a n d  v i o l e n c e  p r e s e n t e d  i n  C h a p t e r  V w e r e  r u n  
u s i n g  t h e  m u t u a l l y  e x c l u s i v e  m e a s u r e s .  T h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  
r u n s  s h o w e d  t h a t  t h e  u s e  o f  e i t h e r  m e a s u r e  —  t h e  m u t u a l l y  
e x c l u s i v e  o r  t h e  n o n  m u t u a l l y  e x c l u s i v e  —  p r o d u c e d  
g e n e r a l l y  p a r a l l e l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  b e t w e e n  c o n f l i c t ,  
n e g o t i a t i o n  a n d  v i o l e n c e ,  e x c e p t  t h a t  u s i n g  m u t u a l l y
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e x c lu s iv e  measures led to :
1. c e l l  s ize s  t h a t  were d r a s t i c a l l y  reduced
2 .  smal le r  and less o f t e n  s i g n i f i c a n t  etas
3- a number of  instances of  c e l l s  w i th o u t  any cases,  
which precluded the t e s t i n g  of hypotheses.
4 .  some instances in which the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  the  
data  more s t ro n g ly  supported the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  made w i th  
the non m utua l ly  e x c lu s iv e  measures and, as w i th  the  
o r i g i n a l  measures,  a few instances which produced 
u n in t e r p r e t a b le  r e s u l t s .
In view of the above,  one can have more confidence in 
the  a n a ly s is  using the more adequate sample s i z e  ( i . e .  the  
a n a ly s is  based on the non m u tu a l ly  e x c lu s iv e  measures) and 
t h a t  is  what is presented in t h i s  d i s s e r t a t i o n .  However, to  
i l l u s t r a t e  the p a r a l l e l  f i n d i n g s ,  and because the r e s u l t s  
are  i n t r i n s i c a l l y  i n t e r e s t i n g ,  f in d in g s  using the m utua l ly  
e x c lu s iv e  o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s  of  couple v io le n c e  are  
descr ibed where a p p r o p r ia t e  in the t e x t ,  and the a c tua l  data  
is  presented in Appendix A.
C hapte r IV
POWER. CONSENSUS. AND CONFLICT
M a r i t a l  power is a concept t h a t  c o n s is t e n t l y  appears in 
the f a m i ly  soc io logy l i t e r a t u r e  and is o f  c e n t ra l  importance  
in t h i s  rese arch .  Sprey 's  (1975575).  review of the fa m i ly  
power and fa m i ly  process l i t e r a t u r e  noted th a t  as o f t e n  as 
power is  used as the focus of fa m i ly  research ,  i t s  use as 
such is not e xp la in e d .  The basic  assumption is t h a t  the  
importance of  power to the e x p la n a t io n  of  f a m i ly  behavior  is 
both s e l f  exp lana tory  and obv ious.  He suggests t h a t
knowledge of the fa m i ly  power s t r u c t u r e  would be more useful
i f  i t s  impact on fa m i ly  process were i d e n t i f i e d .
This  c r i t i c i s m  is due, in p a r t ,  to his  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  
w i th  the power research a t  the t ime,  which i d e n t i f i e d  the
resources i n d iv id u a ls  possessed and measured t h e i r  
corresponding lev e l  o f  power in the f a m i ly .  Power was 
t r e a t e d  as a dependent v a r i a b l e ,  and thus the impact of  
power r e l a t i o n s  on fa m i ly  process was not examined.
Th is  research begins w i th  an a n a ly s is  of  the m a r i t a l  
power s t r u c t u r e  because power is seen as an e s s e n t ia l  p a r t
o f  the t h e o r e t i c a l  e x p la n a t io n  of  fa m i ly  process.  The 
fo l lo w in g  chapter examines the impact o f  the m a r i t a l  power
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s t r u c t u r e  on two aspects of  m a r i t a l  process: consensus over  
how the power is  d i s t r i b u t e d  and the leve l  of  m a r i t a l  
c o n f 1 i c t .
THE POWER STRUCTURE OF MARITAL RELATIONSHIPS
How power is d i s t r i b u t e d  w i t h i n  the m a r i t a l  system is
an issue t h a t  couples f r e q u e n t ly  address w i th o u t  f u l l
r e a l i z a t i o n  of  the issue or i t s  i m p l i c a t i o n .  I t  is an
ongoing aspect o f  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s h i p  long be fo re  the
r e l a t i o n s h i p  is s o c i a l l y  recognized by a m arr iage  ceremony.
T r a d i t i o n a l l y ,  men have had more power than women and
e s p e c i a l l y  in m a r i t a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  As G i l l e s p i e  (1971)
po in ts  o u t ,  power is l inked w i th  one 's  degree of  involvement
in the economic o p p o r tu n i ty  system. Since women's
involvement in t h i s  system has been l i m i t e d ,  so has t h e i r
m a r i t a l  power. On the o ther  hand, the predominant v a lue
regard ing  m a r i t a l  power is t h a t  i t  should be e g a l i t a r i a n :
women should have a g r e a t e r  vo ice  in d ec is ion  making than
they have had in the p as t .  Blood and Wolfe (1960) fo r
example,  begin t h e i r  chapter on m a r i t a l  power b y . s t a t i n g :
No change in the American f a m i ly  is mentioned 
more o f t e n  than the s h i f t  from one-s ided male 
a u t h o r i t y  to  the shar ing of  power by husband and 
wi f e  ( I9 60 :  1 1 ) .
The data  from t h i s  research i n d ic a t e  t h a t  in g e n e ra l ,  
r e la t i o n s h i p s  are  less o f t e n  dominated by one p a r t n e r ,  but  
perhaps not as e g a l i t a r i a n  as one might expec t .
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P i  s t r  i b u t  i o n  o f  M a r  i t a l  P o w e r  T y p e s
A l i t t l e  over o n e -h a l f  (53-5%) of  the couples had a 
s t r i c t  d i v i s i o n  of  d e c is ion  making and were c l a s s i f i e d  as 
d iv id e d  power r e l a t i o n s h i p .  He has h is  area of  power and 
she has her area o f  power, but they do not share in d ec is io n  
making. This  w i l l  be c a l l e d  a " d iv id e d  power" r e l a t i o n s h i p  
or power s t r u c t u r e .  in some sense a d iv id e d  power s t r u c t u r e  
resembles a t r a d i t i o n a l  power s t r u c t u r e  where the man and 
woman had a u t h o r i t y  over s p e c i f i c  areas of  d e c is io n  making,  
but where the male had granted the female a u t h o r i t y  to  make 
c e r t a i n  d e c is io n s .  There is a d i f f e r e n c e  then between these  
couples ,  who on the sur face  appear to be e g a l i t a r i a n  because 
each p a r tn e r  makes the same number of  d e c is io n s ,  and those  
who share in each de c is io n  who is to  be made. These 
e q a l i t a r i a n  couples ,  in the sense of  couples who share in a t  
le a s t  two t h i r d s  or more of  the d e c is io n s ,  comprise 2 8 . 7% of  
the sample. We expected to f i n d  some r e l a t i o n s h i p s  where 
one p a r tn e r  dominates the d e c is io n  making process.  What is 
s u r p r is in g  is t h a t  the re  are  almost as many female  dominant  
r e la t i o n s h i p s  as th e re  are  male dominant.  Female dominant  
r e la t i o n s h i p s  make up 7*5% of the couples,  w h i le  male 
dominant make up 9.3%*
I n  t o t a l ,  t h e  d a t a  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  s e v e r a l  w a y s  
i n  w h i c h  t h e  p o w e r  i s  d i s t r i b u t e d  i n  i n t i m a t e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
a n d  t h a t  e g a l i t a r i a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  o c c u r  f a r  l e s s  f r e q u e n t l y  
t h a n  t h o s e  i n  w h i c h  t h e r e  i s  a c l e a r  d i v i s i o n  o f  l a b o r .  
A l t h o u g h  s i m p l e  p e r c e n t a g e s  g i v e  u s  a p i c t u r e  o f  how  p o w e r
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is d i s t r i b u t e d  in the U.S.  p o p u la t io n ,  o ther  f a c t o r s  such 
as soc ia l  c la s s ,  stage of  the fa m i ly  l i f e  c y c le ,  and w ives '  
employment s ta tus  may e f f e c t  the balance of  power in 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s .
Social  C1 ass D? f fe re n c es  i n Mar i t a l  Power
Scanzoni (1970) ,  Komarovsky (1962) and Blood and Wolfe  
( I 960) have suggested t h a t  th e re  are  s o c ia l  c lass  
d i f f e r e n c e s  in m a r i t a l  power. Blood and Wolfe ( i 960) found 
t h a t ,  in g e n e ra l ,  husband's power increases w i th  soc ia l  
s t a t u s .  But th is  did not hold fo r  the lowest s ta tus  
husbands, who tended to have g r e a t e r  power than higher  
s ta tu s  b lue  c o l l a r  husbands. They account fo r  t h i s  by 
suggesting th a t  lower c lass  blue c o l l a r  males have s tronger  
p a t r i a r c h a l  a t t i t u d e s  than higher s ta tu s  b lue c o l l a r  males.  
As s o c ia l  c lass increases and wives have more educa t ion ,  
they expect  to  p a r t i c i p a t e  in m a r i t a l  de c is io n  making.  
Komarovsky (1962) found e s s e n t i a l y  the same r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between soc ia l  c lass and power: t h a t  w i t h i n  b lue  c o l l a r
marriages the lower s ta tu s  men held more power. Scanzoni  
( 1970) suggests t h a t  i t  is  an over s i m p l i f i c a t i o n  to  s t a t e  
t h a t  husbands' power increases w i th  soc ia l  s t a t u s .  T h e i r  
research ind ica ted  t h a t  lower c lass  men exerc ised  g r e a t e r  
power than d id  upper c lass  men, but they extend the a n a ly s is  
of power and c lass by a lso  measuring husbands' and w ives '  
a t t i t u d e s  about who should have the " f i n a l  say" in d e c is io n  
making. They f in d  cons ide ra b le  c lass  d i f f e r e n c e s .  Th is  is 
important when we consider consensus concerning power norms.
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T a b l e  4 . 1 .  M a r i t a l  P o w e r  S t r u c t u r e  b y  S o c i a l  C l a s s
M a r i t a l  P o w e r  S o c i a l  C l a s s
S t r u c t u r e  -----------------------------------------------------------------
Blue C o l la r Wh i te  Col 1ar
Female Dominant 7 .0 8.1
Div ided 52 .4 55 .7
Egal i  t a r  i an 29.1 29.1
Male Dominant 11.5 7 . 1 *
N 1129 935
*  X**—11 . 3 d . f .=1  P< . 0 0 0 8
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One problem w i th  the Scanzoni study,  however, is t h a t  only  
f a m i l i e s  where the husband provides the major or on ly  source 
o f  income are  considered.  This  is an important  problem 
since  m a r i t a l  power is c lo s e ly  l in ked  to  the economic 
o p p o r tu n i ty  system.
I t  may be important  to know t h a t  husbands' power 
increases w i th  s ta tus  r e l a t i v e  to other  husbands, but i t  
seems more important to know how c lass  a f f e c t s  the husband's 
power in r e l a t i o n  to  his  w i f e ' s  power. Scanzoni 's  research  
t e l l s  us only  how husband's power v a r i e s  w i th  s ta tu s  when
the w i f e  does not work.
The data  in Table  4.1 in d ic a te  t h a t  the on ly  c lass
d i f f e r e n c e s  are  in male dominant r e la t i o n s h i p s  and t h a t  they  
occur more o f t e n  in b lue  c o l l a r  m arr iages .  There do not 
appear to be any so c ia l  c lass  d i f f e r e n c e s  in  female  
dominant, e g a l i t a r i a n ,  or d iv id e d  power r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  I t  
is e s p e c i a l l y  i n t e r e s t i n g  t h a t  no c lass  d i f f e r e n c e s  in 
e g a l i t a r i a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  were found s ince  p r i o r  research  
has in d ica te d  they occur more o f t e n  as s ta tus  increases  
(Scanzoni,1976) .
Stage of  the Fami1y Li f e  Cycle
A second f a c t o r  hypothesized as a f f e c t i n g  the balance  
of m a r i t a l  power is the stage of  the fa m i ly  l i f e  c y c l e .  The 
number of  years a couple has been married was d iv id e d  in to  
th ree  c a teg o r ie s  t h a t  r e f l e c t  th re e  major stages in fa m i ly  
development: the f i r s t  two years of  m a rr ia ge ,  the
c h i ld b e a r in g  years ,  and the post p a r e n t a l .  While the f i r s t
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Table  4 . 2 . M a r i t a l  Power S t r u c tu r e  by Stage of  Family L i f e  Cycle
M a r i t a l  Power 
S t r u c tu r e
Years
0 -2









d . f .
Female Dominant 8.1 7 .2 7-9 . ko 2
D iv ided 5 1 . 3 5 3 . 9 55-0 •9 2
Egali  t a r  i an 30. 5 2 8 . 8 2 8 . 8 .2 2
Male Dominant 10.2 10.1 8 . 3 2 . 0 2
N 197 1 ii»g 773
*  no r e la t i o n s h i p s  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t
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t w o  y e a r s  o f  m a r r i a g e  a r e  w h e n  p o w e r  i s s u e s  a r e  i n i t i a l l y  
a d d r e s s e d ,  b o t h  p a r t n e r s  f r e q u e n t l y  h o l d  o u t s i d e  e m p l o y m e n t ,  
w h i c h  s h o u l d  a f f e c t  t h e  w i f e ' s  l e v e l  o f  p o w e r  i n  p a r t i c u l a r .  
T h e  s e c o n d  g r o u p ,  t h o s e  m a r r i e d  3 t o  21 y e a r s  r e f l e c t s  t h e  
n o r m  c o n c e r n i n g  b i r t h  o f  t h e  f i r s t  c h i l d ,  w h i c h  g e n e r a l l y  
o c c u r s ,  a t  t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  s e c o n d  y e a r .  B l o o d  a n d  W o l f e ( 1 9 6 0 )  
s u g g e s t  t h a t  w i v e s '  p o w e r  d e c r e a s e s  w i t h  t h e  a d d i t i o n  o f  
c h i l d r e n  t o  t h e  f a m i l y  b e c a u s e  h a v i n g  a y o u n g  c h i l d  c r e a t e s  
n e e d s  f o r  t h e  w i f e  w h i c h  l e a d  h e r  t o  d e p e n d  o n  h e r  h u s b a n d  
f o r  h e l p ,  f i n a n c i a l  s u p p o r t ,  a n d  d e c i s i o n  m a k i n g .  I t  i s  
m o r e  l i k e l y  t h a t  w i v e s '  p o w e r  d e c r e a s e s  w i t h  y o u n g  c h i l d r e n  
i n  t h e  home b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  s h e  e n c o u n t e r s  i n  
c o n t i n u i n g  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t h e  e c o n o m i c  o p p o r t u n i t y  
s y s t e m .  T h e s e  i n c l u d e  t h e  l a c k  o f  a d e q u a t e  d a y  c a r e ,  t h e  
p r o h i b i t i v e  c o s t  o f  d a y  c a r e  w h e n  a v a i l a b l e ,  t h e  
responsib; o f  household d u t i e s  d e s p i t e  f u l l  t i m e
e m p l o y m e n t ,  a n d  t h e  n o r m s  r e g a r d i n g  " w o r k i n g  m o t h e r s " .  
Women t h a t  c o m b i n e  c a r e e r  a n d  p a r e n t h o o d  p l a y  a d o u b l e  r o l e  
w i t h  f u l l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  e a c h .  I t  i s  n o t  s u r p r i s i n g  
t h a t  w o m e n ' s  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e  l a b o r  m a r k e t  i s  e r r a t i c  
a n d  i n t e r m i t t e n t .  T h e  t h i r d  c a t e g o r y ,  m a r r i e d  m o r e  t h a n  22 
y e a r s ,  r e f l e c t s  t h e  e n d  o f  c h i l d  r e a r i n g  y e a r s  f o r  wome n a n d  
t h e i r  p o t e n t i a l  r e t u r n  t o  t h e  l a b o r  m a r k e t ,  t h u s  i n c r e a s i n g  
t h e i r  m a r i t a l  p o w e r .
T a b l e  k . 2  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  n o  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  
m a r i t a l  p o w e r  a t  a n y  s t a g e  o f  t h e  f a m i l y  l i f e  c y c l e .  I f  we 
a s s u m e  t h a t  t h e s e  d a t a ,  t h o u g h  c r o s s  s e c t i o n a l ,  c a n  b e
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T a b l e  k . 3 . M a r i t a l  P o w e r  S t r u c t u r e  b y  H u s b a n d ' s  P e r c e n t a g e  o f  
F a m i l y  I n c o m e .
P e r c e n t  o f  H u s b a n d ' s  C o n t r i b u t i o n
M a r i t a l  P o w e r  
S t r u c t u r e 0 1-1+0 1+1-60 61-99 100
F e m a l e  D o m i n a n t 13.0 10.8 8 .6 7 .9 6 .5
D i v i d e d 5^-3 52 .9 5 1 .8 57-3 53.1
E g a l i  t a r  i a n 15.2 30.4 33-3 29-9 2 7 .8
M a l e  D o m i n a n t 17.2 5 -9 6 .3 1+.8 12.6
N 1+6 102 255 518 971
*  Xfe= l + 1 . 1 2  d . f  . =  12 P< . 0 0 0 0
in t e r p r e t e d  as l o n g i t u d i n a l ,  i t  suggests t h a t  once the power 
s t r u c t u r e  o f  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  is determined in the e a r l y  
years of  m arr iage ,  i t  remains s t a b le  over t ime.
Wi f e  E m p l o y m e n t  a n d  M a r  i t a l  P o w e r
Ta b le  4 .3  examines the r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the percent  
of the fa m i ly  income earned by the husband and the power 
s t r u c t u r e  o f  the r e l a t i o n s h i p .  While  so c ia l  c lass  and 
fa m i ly  l i f e  c yc le  stage showed l i t t l e  i f  any r e l a t i o n  to 
m a r i t a l  power, the amount of  money the spouses c o n t r ib u t e  to 
the f a m i ly  income i l l u s t r a t e s  how c lo s e l y  toge ther  power and 
money a re  t i e d .
The percentage of  husband's c o n t r i b u t i o n  to  the fa m i ly  
income is  grouped i n to  5 c a t e g o r ie s :  0%, 1-40%, 41-60%,  
6l~99% and 100%. These c a teg o r ie s  were se le c ted  fo r  several  
reasons. F i r s t ,  the frequency d i s t r i b u t i o n  was extremely  
skewed, w i th  980 or 45% of  the husbands c o n t r i b u t i n g  100% to 
the f a m i ly  income. However, a t  the o th e r  extreme were 48 or 
2.1% of  the  husbands who c o n t r ib u te d  0% to  the fa m i ly  
income. These two c a t e g o r ie s ,  0% and 100%, represent  
i n t e r e s t i n g  groups fo r  comparison purposes,  s ince  money, 
s ta tu s  and power a re  so interwoven.  The o ther  c a t e g o r ie s ,  
1-40%, 41-60%, and 6l~99%« were a lso  chosen because of the  
frequency d i s t r i b u t i o n  groupings and to  a l lo w  fo r  
examinat ion of  those r e la t i o n s h i p s  where spouses c o n t r ib u t e  
about equal  amounts of  money to the fa m i ly  income.
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The data  in Tab le  4 .3  in d ic a te  a s t a t i s t i c a l l y  
s i g n i f i c a n t  r e l a t i o n  between husband's c o n t r i b u t i o n  to  the  
f a m i ly  income and m a r i t a l  power. i t  suggests t h a t  power and 
money are  assoc iated  in d i f f e r e n t  ways depending upon the  
type o f  power s t r u c t u r e  under c o n s id e r a t io n .  I t  appears  
t h a t  female dominant r e la t i o n s h i p s  are more f re q u e n t  when 
the w i fe  c o n t r ib u te s  a s i g n i f i c a n t  p o r t io n  of  the fa m i ly  
income. The percentage of  female dominant r e la t i o n s h i p s  
decreases as husband's c o n t r ib u t io n  to the f a m i ly  income 
increases .  While w ives '  earnings appear to be of  p a r t i c u l a r  
importance in female dominant r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  male dominant
marriages do not appear to be r e la t e d  to earn in g s .  The
percentage  of  male dominant r e la t i o n s h i p s  is h ighest  where
the male c o n t r ib u te s  no money and where he c o n t r ib u te s  100% 
of the income. When husband and w i fe  share e q u a l l y  in the  
c o n t r i b u t i o n  to the fa m i ly  income, the data  i n d ic a t e  they  
a ls o  more o f ten  share e q u a l ly  in d e c is ion  making.
However, the data  in Table  4 .3  suggest t h a t  women's 
employment does not a u to m a t ic a l l y  guarantee an increase in 
m a r i t a l  power. The data  on husband dominant r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
and d iv id e d  power r e l a t i o n s h i p s  appear to suggest t h a t  money 
and power can ope ra te  independently  of  one another .  
E a r l i e r ,  i t  was suggested t h a t  d iv id e d  power r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
may be s im i l a r  to t r a d i t i o n a l  power s t ru c tu re s  where the  
male granted the female a u t h o r i t y  over a c e r t a i n  s e t  of
d e c is io n s .  The data  on husband's c o n t r i b u t i o n  to the fa m i ly  
income may prov ide  some a d d i t io n a l  evidence of  t h i s ,  s ince
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no matter  how l i t t l e  or how much she c o n t r ib u t e s ,  the  
percentage of  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i th  t h i s  power s t r u c t u r e  
remains f a i r l y  s t a b l e .  What the data  c l e a r l y  in d ic a te  is 
t h a t  in those r e la t i o n s h i p s  where the woman exerc ises  any 
degree of  power — in e g a l i t a r i a n  and female dominant — i t  
is in p a r t  t i e d  to t h e i r  a b i l i t y  to c o n t r ib u t e  to  the fa m i ly  
i ncome.
The e f f e c t s  of  socia l  c la s s ,  f a m i ly  l i f e  cyc le  s tage,  
and w i f e ' s  employment on the ba lance of  m a r i t a l  power were 
examined because each f a c t o r  may g ive  us a more complete  
understanding of m a r i t a l  power. We found t h a t  the re  are  
c lass  d i f fe r e n c e s  in male dominant r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  th a t  the  
power s t r u c t u r e  appears to be determined in the e a r l y  years  
of the r e la t i o n s h i p  and remains s t a b le  over t ime, and th a t  
wives '  c o n t r ib u t io n  to fa m i ly  income increases her power 
only  in female dominant and e g a l i t a r i a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .
MARITAL POWER AND CONFLICT
A major quest ion t h i s  d i s s e r t a t i o n  addresses is the  
l i n k  between m a r i t a l  power and m a r i t a l  c o n f l i c t .  In a 
previous chapter ,  the paradox of e g a l i t a r i a n  r e la t i o n s h i p s  
was i d e n t i f i e d .  An a n a ly s is  o f  marr iage from a c o n f l i c t  
pe rsp e c t ive  leads to the e x p e c ta t io n  t h a t  e g a l i t a r i a n  
r e la t io n s h ip s  w i l l  have g r e a t e r  m a r i t a l  c o n f l i c t .  Such 
r e la t io n s h ip s  are  expected to have g r e a t e r  c o n f l i c t  because 
o f  g re a te r  int imacy (Coser, 1969; Sprey, 1 9 7 0 .  the  
n ecess i ty  to  n e g o t ia te  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  power 
(Scanzoni,1975;  Verho f f  and F i e l d s ,  1970),  g r e a t e r  "arousal
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of  women's power goals" (Verhof f  and F i e l d s ,  1970:33^)*  and 
less dependence (Foss, 1980).  The paradox of e g a l i t a r i a n  
r e la t i o n s h i p s  is t h a t  w h i le  they may have g r e a t e r  c o n f l i c t ,  
e m pir ic a l  research has demonstrated t h a t  less v io le n c e  
occurs .
One f a c t o r  which appears in the l i t e r a t u r e ,  but which  
is r a r e l y  e m p i r i c a l l y  te s t e d ,  is t h a t  of  consensus over how 
the power is  d i s t r i b u t e d .  Scanzoni (19 75 ) .  Sprey (1971 ) .  
Verhof f  and F ie ld s  (1970) and Brown (1980) each suggest t h a t  
consensus over how the power is d i s t r i b u t e d  is an important  
f a c t o r  in decreasing the p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  m a r i t a l  c o n f l i c t .  
Scanzoni and Scanzoni (1976) measured both actual  power and 
norms concerning who should have the power. They found t h a t  
as soc ia l  c lass  increases ,  wives b e l i e v e  t h e i r  husbands 
should be the head of  the house. At the lower s ta tu s  
l e v e l s ,  wives were less l j k e l y  to accept p a t r i a r c h a l  
b e l i e f s .  On the o ther  hand, men a t  a l l  so c ia l  s ta tus  le v e ls  
b e l ie v e d  they should have the f i n a l  say,  however upper 
sta tus  men were more l i k e l y  to  s o l i c i t  t h e i r  w ives '  op in ions  
during d e c is io n  making.  Scanzoni and Scanzoni a t t r i b u t e  
these f in d in g s  to the  resources men a t  d i f f e r e n t  s ta tu s  
l e v e ls  have a v a i l a b l e  to  them and the corresponding  
l e g i t im a c y  to make dec is io n s  th a t  t h e i r  spouses a t t r i b u t e  to  
them because of  these resources.  However, as p re v io u s ly  
noted,  these f in d in g s  come from research where the husband 
is the pr imary  or on ly  bread winner and thus does not  
consider how employed women view norms about m a r i t a l  power.
I t  does po in t  out the d i f f e r e n c e  in men's and women's 
percep t ions  of  who should have the power.
Brown (1980) d i r e c t l y  addresses the issue of  power 
norms in e g a l i t a r i a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  He suggests employment 
of the w i f e  leads to  increased resources of  the w i f e  and 
increased power. Th is  leads to  c o n f l i c t  between the w i f e ' s  
e g a l i t a r i a n  a u t h o r i t y  e xp ec ta t io n s  and the husband's male 
s u p e r i o r i t y  norms. I f  the husband accepts the e g a l i t a r i a n  
a u t h o r i t y  s t r u c t u r e  i t  w i l l  increase the int imacy in the  
m a r i t a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  and th e r e f o r e  increase c o n f l i c t  because 
more aspects of  l i f e  are  shared.  Thus c o n f l i c t  in 
e g a l i t a r i a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  can occur over both the d i f f e r e n c e  
in power norm e x p e c ta t io n s  and, even i f  husbands accept  the  
n e g o t ia te d  s t r u c t u r e ,  due to g r e a t e r  in t im acy .  Sprey 
( 1971) .  s ta te s  th e re  w i l l  be less c o n f l i c t  i f  spouses accept  
the p r e s c r i p t i v e  power norms associated  w i th  m a r i t a l  r o l e s .
The l i t e r a t u r e  t h a t  considers marr iage from a c o n f l i c t  
p e rs p e c t iv e  very c l e a r l y  in d ica te s  t h a t  more c o n f l i c t  w i l l  
be found in e g a l i t a r i a n  r e la t i o n s h i p s  because of the need to  
n e g o t ia t e  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  power and because o f  increased  
in t imacy and s h ar in g .  We should expect then t h a t  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  dominated by one person, p a r t i c u l a r l y  male 
dominant ones w i l l  have less c o n f l i c t .  Less c o n f l i c t  is  
p re d ic te d  fo r  husband dominant r e la t i o n s h i p s  because they  
are  c o n s is te n t  w i th  the soc ia l  norms t h a t  support  male 
dominance in the f a m i l y .  D iv ided power r e l a t i o n s h i p s  should 
have less c o n f l i c t  than e g a l i t a r i a n ,  but more than husband
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Table  k . k .  M a r i t a l Conf1 i c t  by M a r i t a l  Power S t r u c t u r e (*)
M a r i t a l  Power 
S t ru c tu re
N
Level  of  
Low
Mar i t a 1 Conf1i c t  
Medium High
Female Dominant 160 23-6 *♦3-3 33-1
Div ided 1146 2 0 .5 J»5-7 33-8
Egali  t a r  ian 616 32 .5 4 7 .0 20 .5
Male Dominant 200 2 k . J 36.1 39-2
^ = 5 ^ - 0 3  d . f . = 6  P< . 0 0 0 0
Page 76
Table  4 .5 *  Power Norm Consensus by M a r i t a l  Power S t r u c t u r e  (%)
M a r i t a l  Power Level  of  Consensus
S t r u c t u r e  -----------------------------------------------------------------
N Low Med i um High
Female Dominant 160 35-7 } 8 .2 26.1
Div ided 1146 2 4 .9 44 .4 30 .7
Ega1i t a r  i an 6 l6 15-2 37-0 4 7 .8
Male Dominant 200 4 3 .7 34.2 22.1
X ^ l  1 2 . 7 0  d . f  . = 6  P< . 0 0 0 0
d o m i n a n t  b e c a u s e  t h e  h u s b a n d  i s  a s k e d  t o  s h a r e  s o m e ,  b u t  n o t  
a l l ,  o f  h i s  p o w e r .  I t  a l s o  s e e m s  r e a s o n a b l e  t o  e x p e c t  t h a t  
f e m a l e  d o m i n a n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i l l  h a v e  a h i g h  l e v e l  o f  
c o n f l i c t  b e c a u s e  t h e y  a r e  a t  o d d s  w i t h  t h e  n o r m s  f o r  m a l e  
s u p e r i o r i t y  i n  t h e  f a m i l y .
We h a v e  b e e n  l e d  t o  e x p e c t  n o t  o n l y  g r e a t e r  c o n f l i c t  i n  
e g a l i t a r i a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  b u t  a l s o  t o  e x p e c t  t h a t  o n e  s o u r c e  
o f  c o n f l i c t  i s  c o n s e n s u s  o v e r  how t h e  p o w e r  i s  d i s t r i b u t e d .
T h e  d a t a  i n  T a b l e  k . h  s h o w  t h e  a s s o c i a t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  
p o w e r  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  a n d  t h e  l e v e l  o f  
c o n f l i c t .  E x a m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  d a t a  f r o m  t h e  ' h i g h  c o n f l i c t 1 
c o l u m n  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  e g a l i t a r i a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  h a v e  t h e  
l e a s t  a m o u n t  o f  c o n f l i c t  a n d  t h a t  h u s b a n d  d o m i n a n t  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  h a v e  t h e  g r e a t e s t  a m o u n t  o f  c o n f l i c t .  D i v i d e d  
p o w e r  a n d  f e m a l e  d o m i n a n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  h a v e  a b o u t  t h e  same 
a m o u n t  o f  c o n f l i c t  a n d  f a l l  b e t w e e n  t h e  t w o  g r o u p s .  I t  i s  
a l s o  i m p o r t a n t  t o  n o t e  t h a t  m a l e  d o m i n a n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a r e  
a l m o s t  t w i c e  a s  l i k e l y  t o  h a v e  h i g h  c o n f l i c t  a s  c o m p a r e d  t o  
e g a l i t a r i a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  3 9 * 2 %  o f  t h e  m a l e  d o m i n a n t  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  f a l l  i n t o  t h e  h i g h  c o n f l i c t  c a t e g o r y  w h i l e  
o n l y  20.5% o f  t h e  e g a l i t a r i a n  c o u p l e s  a r e  r e p r e s e n t e d .  T h i s  
s u g g e s t s  t h a t  m a r i t a l  e q u a l i t y  a n d  s h a r i n g  o f  d e c i s i o n  
m a k i n g  d o e s  n o t  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  l e a d  t o  g r e a t e r  c o n f l i c t .
M a r  i t a i  P o w e r  a n d  P o w e r  N o rm  C o n s e n s u s
T h e  d a t a  i n  T a b l e  k . S  s h o w  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  t h e  
p o w e r  s t r u c t u r e  a n d  t h e  l e v e l  o f  p o w e r  n o r m  c o n s e n s u s .  I t  
a p p e a r s  t o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  e g a l i t a r i a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  h a v e  t h e
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Tab le  1*.6. M a r i t a l  C o n f l i c t  by M a r i t a l  Power S t ru c tu re  
C o n t r o l l i n g  fo r  Norm Consensus
M a r i t a l  Power
N
Level of  M a r i t a l  C o n f l i c t
Low Med i urn H i gh
A. Low Power Norm Consensus
Female Dominant 55 16.4 1*3 • 6 1*0 .0
Divided 280 21.1 1*2.1 36 .8
Ega1i t a r  i an 88 2 8 . 1* 1*1*. 3 27.3
Male Dominant 81 9 .9 35 .8 51*. 3
X"=17.1 d . f . =6 P < .009
B. Medium Power Norm Consensus
Female Dominant 60 21.7 1*3.3 35 .0
Div ided 1*97 16.5 1*6 .7 36.8
Egali  t a r  i an 191* 26 .8 50.1* 22 .8
Male Dominant 62 25 .8 1*1.9 32 .3
2.
X =19.7  d . f . =6 P < .003
C. High Power Norm Consensus
Female Dominant AO 37-5 1*5 .0 17.5
Div ided 3^2 25.1 1*8.2 2 6 .6
Egali  t a r  i an 282 39.0 41*.3 16.7
Male Dominant A2 5 0 .0 28 .6 21.1*
X ^ l t . l  d . f . =6 P c .0005
h i g h e s t  l e v e l  o f  c o n s e n s u s  o v e r  how  t h e  p o w e r  i s  d i s t r i b u t e d  
a n d  m a l e  d o m i n a n t  h a v e  t h e  l e a s t  c o n s e n s u s .  I t  i s  a l s o  
i m p o r t a n t  t o  n o t e  t h a t  t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  e g a l i t a r i a n  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  t h a t  h a v e  h i g h  c o n s e n s u s  ( l *7 -8 % )  i s  
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  l a r g e r  t h a n  t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  f o r  a n y  o f  t h e  
o t h e r  p o w e r  s t r u c t u r e  t y p e s  a n d  e s p e c i a l l y  h i g h e r  t h a n  t h e  
m a l e  d o m i n a n t  ( 2 2 . 1 % ) .
M A R IT AL  POWER, C O N FL IC T  AND POWER NORM CONSENSUS
T h e  d a t a  f r o m  t h e  b i v a r i a t e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  p o w e r  
s t r u c t u r e  a n d  l e v e l  o f  c o n f l i c t  a n d  p o w e r  s t r u c t u r e  a n d  
l e v e l  o f  c o n s e n s u s  d o  n o t  s u p p o r t  a  c o n f l i c t  a n a l y s i s  o f  
e g a l i t a r i a n  m a r r i a g e .  T h e  d a t a  r e v e a l  t h e  o p p o s i t e  o f  w h a t  
i s  p r e d i c t e d ,  h o w e v e r  i t  i s  a l s o  n e c e s s a r y  t o  e x a m i n e  how 
c o n s e n s u s  o v e r  t h e  p o w e r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  i s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  
r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  p o w e r  a n d  c o n f l i c t .
The data  in Tab le  A .6 in d ic a te  t h a t  consensus over how 
the power is d i s t r i b u t e d  in a r e l a t i o n s h i p  is assoc iated  
w ith  the leve l  of  c o n f l i c t .  I f  we compare the high lev e l  of  
c o n f l i c t  data  where consensus is  low w i th  the high lev e l  of  
c o n f l i c t  da ta  where consensus is h igh ,  s u b s ta n t ia l  decreases  
in c o n f l i c t  are  e v id e n t  fo r  a l l  power typ.es. Comparison of  
the same data in d ica te s  th a t  agree ing on how the power is 
d i s t r i b u t e d  is e s p e c i a l l y  important to decreasing  c o n f l i c t  
in male dominant m ar r iag e s .  There is almost a 33% decrease  
in the leve l  o f  c o n f l i c t  in male dominant r e l a t i o n s h i p s  when 
consensus is h igh.  However, e g a l i t a r i a n  r e la t i o n s h i p s  have 
the lowest l e v e ls  of  m a r i t a l  c o n f l i c t  regard less  of  t h e i r
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Table  k . l .  Power Norm Consensus by Socia l  Class
Consensus Over Social  Class
Power Norms ------------------------------------------------------
Blue C o l la r Wh i te  Col 1ar
Low 26.7 22.  i»
Med i urn 36.8 **5-3
High 36.5 3 2 . A
N 1108 930
X ^ 1 5 -1 8 d . f . =2 P< .0005  
r=  -O.Olt P<.035
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T a b l e  A . 8 .  M a r i t a l  C o n f l i c t  b y  S o c i a l  C l a s s
L e v e l  o f  S o c i a l  C l a s s
M a r  i t a l  C o n f 1 i c t  -----------------------------------------------------------------
B l u e  C o l l a r  W h i t e  C o l l a r
Low 27.1 22.1
Med i urn A3 * 3 A6.8
H i g h 29-6 31.1
N 111A 938
X^=7-01
r =  0 . 0 0 A
d . f . - A
P<.023
P< .03
T a b l e  A . 9- M a r i t a l  C o n f l i c t  b y  S t a g e  o f  F a m i l y  
L i f e  C y c l e
s s s B S S B B S B B S B C s s s s s e s s r s s s r s s s a s e s s s s s s s n s a s s B s s s s
L e v e l  o f  Y e a r s  M a r r i e d  o r  T o g e t h e r
I'lCU 1 L d  1 U U I I  1 1 1 U  L
0-2 3-21 22-55
Low 26.5 20 .7 30.  A
Med i urn A5.0 A5.3 A3 .9
H i g h 28 .5 3A.0 25.7
N 200 11A8 759
. A d . f . = A  P< . 0 0 0 0
>
level  of  consensus.
Factors  Assoc i ated wi th Conf1 i c t  and Power Norm Consensus
The fa c t o r s  p re v io u s ly  assoc ia ted  w i th  the balance of  
power —  so c ia l  c la s s ,  stage in the fa m i ly  l i f e  c y c l e ,  and 
employment by the w i f e  —  may s i m i l a r l y  a f f e c t  the lev e l  of  
consensus and of c o n f l i c t .
Soci a 1 Cl ass
The data  in Tab le  k.~] t h a t  shows the r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between soc ia l  c lass  and leve l  of  consensus are
inco n c lu s ive .  Tab le  A . 7 re ve a ls  th a t  b lue  c o l l a r  
r e la t i o n s h i p s  have both lower (26.7%) and higher (36.5%)
consensus over power norms as compared to w h i te  c o l l a r
r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  The c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t  (-.OA) suggests  
there  is more consensus in b lue  c o l l a r  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,
however the s i z e  of  the c o e f f i c i e n t  is very  s m a l l .  The data  
in Table  A .8 ,  the r e l a t i o n  between so c ia l  c lass  and leve l  of  
c o n f l i c t ,  suggest g re a te r  c o n f l i c t  in w h i te  c o l l a r
r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  which supports our h e s i t a n t  conclus ion t h a t  
there  is less consensus in w h i te  c o l l a r  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .
Again,  however, the  c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t  f o r  the  
a s s o c ia t io n  between soc ia l  c lass  and leve l  of  c o n f l i c t  is 
very low but s t a t i s t i c s a 11y s i g n i f i c a n t .
Wi fe  Employment
The percent o f  earnings c o n t r ib u te d  to the fa m i ly
income by the woman is not r e l a t e d  to  consensus over the  
balance o f  power or to  the leve l  o f  c o n f l i c t .
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Tab le  4 . 1 0 .  M a r i t a l  Power S t r u c tu r e  by M a r i t a l  C o n f l i c t
C o n t r o l l in g  Power Norm Consensus and Socia l  Class
M a r i t a l  Power Level  of  Mar i t a l  Conf1 i c t
S t r u c tu r e  Low Medium High
Cl ass Class Cl ass
BC WC BC WC BC WC
A. Low Power Norm Consensus
Female Dominant 18.5 14.8 44 .4 44 .4 37 .0 40.7
Divided 24.8 16.8 46 .0 36.3 2 9 .0 46 .9
Egali  t a r  i an 25 .6 32 .5 41 .9 47.5 32.6 20.0
Male Dominant 7 .7 14.8 34 .9 37.0 57 .7 48.1
BC: X^=16.2 d. f . = 6  P< .01 WC: xfc- n .26  d. f  .=6 P<.08
B. Medium Power Norm Consensus
Female Dominant 30.8 12.5 42 .3 43.8 26 .9 43 .8
Divided 17.2 15.4 4 6 .0 47 .9 36.7 36.7
Egali  t a r  i an 29.2 23.2 47 .5 53 .9 23 .3 23.2
Male Dominant 26.2 27.8 4 2 .9 38.9 31.0 33-3
BC: X ^ I O . 8  d. f . = 6  P<.09 WC: X^=9. 9 d . f . =6 P< .12
C. High Power Norm Consensus •
Female Dominant 43 .5 31 .3 34 .8 56 .3 21.7 12.5
Div ided 26 .0 23.7 45-9 5 2 .6 28.1 23-7
Egali  t a r  i an 4 4 .6 3 1 .8 39-9 49 .6 15.5 18.6
Male Dominant 5 0 .0 5 0 .0 25 .0 33-3 25.0 16.7
BC: X2^ 18-9 d . f . =6 P<.004 WC: X2^ 7 .2  d . f . =6 P<.3
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Stage of the Fami1y L i f e  Cycle
The stage of  the fa m i ly  l i f e  cyc le  is not r e l a t e d  to
consensus, but i t  is r e la t e d  to c o n f l i c t .  The data  in Table
4 .9  in d ic a te  th a t  the re  is more c o n f l i c t  in the e a r l y  years  
of the r e l a t i o n s h i p .  An a l t e r n a t i v e  e x p la n a t io n  of  the  
r e l a t i o n  between c o n f l i c t  and fa m i ly  l i f e  c yc le  stage is 
t h a t  those couples w i th  high c o n f l i c t  tend to  get divorced  
more o f t e n  than those w i th  less c o n f l i c t ,  and thus are  not  
represented in the sample.
CLASS DIFFERENCES IN POWER, CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS
Socia l  c lass  is the only  f a c t o r  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  r e la t e d  
to each v a r i a b l e  in the model which suggests th e re  may be 
important c lass  d i f f e r e n c e s  in the r e l a t i o n  between power, 
consensus, and c o n f l i c t .  Tab le  4 .1 0 ,  shows the r e l a t i o n
between power, consensus and c o n f l i c t  fo r  b lue  c o l l a r  and
w h i te  c o l l a r  m arr iages .  However, because of the number of 
v a r i a b l e s  in t h i s  model, c e l l  s i z e  is reduced in some 
instances t h a t  make i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  u n r e l i a b l e .  I f  we can 
assume the c e l l  percentages are  r e l i a b l e ,  the data  reconf irm  
our i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  Table  4 . 6 ,  where i t  is suggested th a t  
consensus over the power ba lance decreases the leve l  of  
c o n f l i c t .  Table  4 . 6  a lso  in d ic a te s  t h a t  consensus is 
e s p e c i a l l y  important in decreasing m a r i t a l  c o n f l i c t  in male 
dominant m arr iages.  The data  in Tab le  4 .1 0  in d ic a te  t h i s  is 
t r u e  fo r  both b lue c o l l a r  and w h i te  c o l l a r  m arr iages .
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Inc lud ing  so c ia l  c lass  in the a n a ly s is  o f  the r e l a t i o n  
between power, c o n f l i c t  and power norm consensus does 
prov ide  a d d i t io n a l  i n s ig h t .  The da ta  suggest t h a t  in 
g e n e ra l ,  i t  is w h i te  c o l l a r  r e la t i o n s h i p s  t h a t  b e n e f i t  the  
most from agreement over the d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  power. When 
consensus over the power d i s t r i b u t i o n  is high ,  c o n f l i c t  
decreases s u b s t a n t i a l l y  in w hi te  c o l l a r  marriages as 
compared to b lue c o l l a r .  E g a l i t a r i a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  
however, have low l e v e ls  o f  c o n f l i c t  even when the re  was 
disagreement over how the power should be d i s t r i b u t e d .  For 
e g a l i t a r i a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  power norm consensus has the  
g r e a t e s t  e f f e c t  on reducing c o n f l i c t  in b lue  c o l l a r  
marr i ages .
E a r l i e r ,  we t r i e d  to  determine i f  socia l  c lass  was 
r e la t e d  to the lev e l  o f  consensus or to the leve l  of  
c o n f l i c t .  The data  fo r  those analyses were ambiguous. 
Table  10 appears to c le a r  up th a t  confusion to some degree .  
I t  appears to i n d ic a t e  t h a t  the re  are  important c lass  
d i f f e r e n c e s  in c o n f l i c t  when the lev e l  o f  consensus v a r i e s  
but t h a t  they are on ly  apparent when the m a r i t a l  power 
s t r u c t u r e  is included in the a n a ly s is .
SUMMARY
This  chapter examined the f i r s t  th re e  v a r i a b l e s  in the  
model t h a t  explores the l in k  between the power s t r u c t u r e  of  
the r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  the leve l  of  c o n f l i c t ,  and the r a t e  of 
m a r i t a l  v io le n c e .  We focused upon the balance of  m a r i t a l  
power, the  leve l  of  c o n f l i c t ,  and how the leve l  of  c o n f l i c t
i s  m e d i a t e d  b y  c o n s e n s u s  o v e r  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  p o w e r .
T h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  a n a l y s i s  t h a t  c o n s i d e r s  t h e  l e v e l  o f  
c o n f l i c t  i n  d i f f e r e n t  p o w e r  s t r u c t u r e s  a r e  n o t  a s  p r e d i c t e d  
f r o m  a c o n f l i c t  p e r s p e c t i v e .  E g a l i t a r i a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a r e  
b y  f a r  l e s s  c o n f l i c t u a l  t h a n  o t h e r  p o w e r  a r r a n g e m e n t s  a n d  
h a v e  g r e a t e r  c o n s e n s u s  o v e r  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  p o w e r ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  w h e n  c o m p a r e d  t o  h u s b a n d  d o m i n a n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  e g a l i t a r i a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  h a v e  t h e  l o w e s t  
l e v e l s  o f  c o n f l i c t  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  t h e  a m o u n t  o f  c o n s e n s u s  
o v e r  how  t h e  p o w e r  s h o u l d  b e  d i s t r i b u t e d .
C o n s e n s u s  o v e r  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  p o w e r  d o e s  p l a y  a 
m a j o r  r o l e  i n  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  o f  m a r i t a l  c o n f l i c t .  A g r e e m e n t  
o v e r  w h o  s h o u l d  m a k e  t h e  f i n a l  d e c i s i o n  r e d u c e s  c o n f l i c t  i n  
e a c h  m a r i t a l  p o w e r  s t r u c t u r e .  I t  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i m p o r t a n t  
t o  l i m i t i n g  c o n f l i c t  i n  h u s b a n d  d o m i n a n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .
I t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  e q a l i t a r i a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  i n  b l u e  
c o l l a r  m a r r i a g e s ,  w h i l e  s t i l l  h a v i n g  l e s s  c o n f l i c t  t h a n  
o t h e r  p o w e r  s t r u c t u r e s ,  may b e  m o r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  m a i n t a i n  
t h a n  i n  w h i t e  c o l l a r  m a r r i a g e s .  T h e r e  a r e  n o  o v e r a l l  c l a s s  
d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  e g a l i t a r i a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  b u t  c o n f l i c t  i n  
b l u e  c o l l a r  m a r r i a g e s  i s  h i g h e r  w h e n  t h e r e  i s  d i s a g r e e m e n t  
o v e r  t h e  p o w e r  s t r u c t u r e  t h a n  i n  w h i t e  c o l l a r  m a r r i a g e s  w i t h  
t h e  sam e l e v e l  o f  d i s a g r e e m e n t .  T h i s  may  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  
w o r k i n g  c l a s s  f a m i l i e s  t h a t  d o  s h a r e  i n  d e c i s i o n  m a k i n g  a r e  
a t  o d d s  w i t h  t h e  n o r m a t i v e  p r e s c r i p t i o n s  f o r  p o w e r  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  w i t h i n  t h e  w o r k i n g  c l a s s .  T a l l m a n  a n d  
M i l l e r  (197*0 s u g g e s t  t h a t  c o n s i s t e n c y  b e t w e e n  p o w e r
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s t r u c t u r e  n o r m s  a n d  a c t u a l  p o w e r ,  i n f l u e n c e  p r o b l e m  s o l v i n g  
e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  T h e y  p r e d i c t  t h a t  e g a l i t a r i a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
i n  w h i t e  c o l l a r  m a r r i a g e s  w i l l  h a v e  g r e a t e r  a b i l i t y  t o  s o l v e  
p r o b l e m s .  T h e  d a t a  i n  T a b l e  1 * . 10  s u p p o r t  t h i s  h y p o t h e s i s  i n  
t h e  c a s e  o f  e g a l i t a r i a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  b u t  n o t  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  
h u s b a n d  d o m i n a n t .  C o n f l i c t  i n  h u s b a n d  d o m i n a n t  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  i s  h i g h e r  i n  b l u e  c o l l a r  t h a n  i n  w h i t e  c o l l a r  
f a m i  1 i e s .
A l t h o u g h  e g a l i t a r i a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  h a v e  l e s s  c o n f l i c t ,  
i t  a l s o  a p p e a r s  t h a t  f o r  women  t o  g a i n  p o w e r  t h e y  m u s t  
c o n t r i b u t e  a s u b s t a n t i a l  p o r t i o n  o f  e a r n i n g s  t o  t h e  f a m i l y  
i n c o m e .  B o t h  e g a l i t a r i a n  a n d  f e m a l e  d o m i n a n t  r e l a t i o n s h h i p s  
a p p e a r  t o  b e  c o n t i n g e n t  u p o n  h e r  a b i l i t y  t o  e a r n  m o n e y .
Contrary  to the a s s e r t io n  by Blood and Wolfe ,  ( i 960) 
female dominant r e la t i o n s h i p s  do not appear to be w i f e  led  
by d e f a u l t  any more so than husband led '  are  by d e f a u l t .  
They occur in the popu la t ion  almost as o f t e n  as husband 
dominant. As w i th  e g a l i t a r i a n ,  the woman's power appears to 
depend on her a b i l i t y  to earn money. Female dominant 
r e la t i o n s h i p s  have less c o n f l i c t  than husband dominant,  a 
f i n d in g  which holds when c lass  and leve l  of  consensus are  
are included in the a n a ly s is .  P ar tners  in female dominant 
r e la t i o n s h i p s  a re  a lso  in g r e a t e r  agreement over how the  
power should be d i s t r i b u t e d  than in male dominant 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  In f a c t ,  when consensus is h igh ,  they have 
the lowest leve l  o f  c o n f l i c t  in w h i te  c o l l a r  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  
and one of  the lowest l e v e ls  in b lue  c o l l a r  f a m i l i e s .  Even
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when consensus is low, female dominant r e l a t i o n s h i p s  have 
20% less c o n f l i c t  than male dominant r e la t i o n s h i p s  in blue  
c o l l a r  marr iages ,  and i t  is w i t h i n  the  working c lass  th a t  
power norms s t ro n g ly  fav or  male dominance.
The evidence overwhelmingly in d ic a te s  th e re  is less  
consensus and g r e a t e r  c o n f l i c t  in  husband dominant 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  The leve l  of  c o n f l i c t  in t h i s  power 
s t r u c t u r e  appears to  be more dependent on consensus than in 
the other  power s t r u c t u r e  types.  To reduce c o n f l i c t  in male 
dominant r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  par tners  must agree t h a t  husbands 
should make the m a jo r i t y  of  d e c is io n s .
Cons idera t ion  o f  the f i r s t  th re e  v a r i a b l e s  in the  model 
th a t  l in k s  power, c o n f l i c t ,  and v io le n c e  has provided only  
l im i t e d  support  fo r  an a n a ly s is  of  marr iage  from a c o n f l i c t  
p e r s p e c t iv e .  S p e c i f i c  hypotheses regard ing leve l  o f  
consensus and leve l  of  c o n f l i c t  w i t h i n  v ary ing  power 
s t r u c t u r e  are  not supported by the d a ta .  However, the data  
s t ro n g ly  suggest t h a t  how the power is d i s t r i b u t e d  and the  
l e g i t im a c y  of  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  a re  important  sources of  
c o n f l i c t  in a l l  m ar r iag es .  Although Coser(1956) s t a te s  t h a t  
the c lo s e r  the r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  the more intense the c o n f l i c t ,  
he a ls o  notes th a t  " f re q u e n t  occasions fo r  c o n f l i c t  do not  
n e c e s s a r i l y  eventuate  in f re q u e n t  c o n f l i c t "  (1956:73)  
because the a f f e c t i v e  attachments of  p a r t i c i p a n t s  may lead 
to  the avoidance o f  c o n f l i c t .  Th is  chapter  has considered  
how the power s t r u c t u r e  arrangements themselves can a l t e r  
the le v e l  o f  c o n f l i c t  in m a r i t a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  The
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f o l lo w in g  chapter examines how c lose  r e la t i o n s h i p s  t h a t  vary  
in t h e i r  power s t r u c t u r e  can lead to m a r i t a l  v io le n c e .
C hapte r V
M A R IT AL  CO N FL IC T  AND VIOL ENCE
T h i s  c h a p t e r  e x a m i n e s  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  t h e  
l e v e l  o f  m a r i t a l  c o n f l i c t  a n d  " o r d i n a r y "  m a r i t a l  v i o l e n c e ,  
i . e . ,  a c t s  o f  p u s h i n g ,  s l a p p i n g  a n d  s h o v i n g  t h a t  o f t e n  o c c u r  
i n  i n t i m a t e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  V i o l e n c e  b y  h u s b a n d s ,  v i o l e n c e  
b y  w i v e s  a n d  v i o l e n c e  w h e r e  e a c h  p a r t i c i p a t e  a r e  e x a m i n e d  t o  
p r o v i d e  g r e a t e r  d e t a i l  o n  t h e  c o n f l i c t  a n d  v i o l e n c e  
c o n n e c t i o n .  T h e  p o w e r  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  m a r i t a l  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  i s  t h e n  i n t r o d u c e d  i n t o  t h e  a n a l y s i s  t o  
d e t e r m i n e  i f  d i f f e r e n t  m a r i t a l  p o w e r  s t r u c t u r e s  s u p p r e s s  o r  
p r o m o t e  t h e  r a t e  o f  v i o l e n c e .
T h e  s e c o n d  s e c t i o n  o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r  e x a m i n e s  h y p o t h e s e s  
t h a t  d e r i v e  f r o m  c o n f l i c t  t h e o r y  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  u s e  o f  
c o n s t r u c t i v e  n e g o t i a t i o n  t a c t i c s  i n  t h e  r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  
c o n f l i c t  a n d  v i o l e n c e .  O f  i n t e r e s t  i s  w h e t h e r  t h e  v i o l e n c e  
r a t e s  c h a n g e  w h e n  p r o g r e s s i v e l y  l e s s  c o n s t r u c t i v e  
n e g o t i a t i o n  t a c t i c s  a r e  u s e d  t o  s e t t l e  d i s p u t e s .  R e a s o n i n g ,  
w i t h d r a w a l ,  a n d  v e r b a l  a g g r e s s i o n  a r e  i n t r o d u c e d  i n t o  t h e  



















Level of Conflict 
Figure 5.1 Minor Violence by Level of Conflict
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Table  5 *1 *  Percent o f  Minor V io lence  and 
Socia l  Class
Level of Conf1 i c t by
Level o f  C o n f l i c t
Socia l  Class Low Med i um High x 2* d . f .
Husband to Wi fe Minor V io lence
Blue C o l l a r 5-1 13.0 23.8 44 .86 2
Whi te  C o l l a r 1-5 7 -6 16.0 32.95 2
N 18 95 123
Wife to  Husband Minor V io lence
Blue C o l l a r 5-1 11 .3 20.7 35-^3 2
Whi te  Col 1ar 3.1* 8 .6 15.0 19.45 2
N 22 91 110
Couple Minor Vi olence
Blue C o l l a r 7 -6 16.8 29.1 48 .45 2
Whi te  Col 1ar 3 -4 11 .4 21 .4 35-86 2
N 29 129 151*
*  A l l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  P< . 0 0 0 0
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F i n a l l y ,  the power s t r u c t u r e  o f  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  is 
included in the a n a ly s is  of  the r e l a t i o n  between c o n f l i c t ,  
n e g o t ia t io n  and v io le n c e  to  determine i f  the power s t r u c t u r e  
changes the nature  of  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  between c o n f l i c t ,  
n e g o t ia t io n  and v io le n c e .
MARITAL CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE: THE EMPIRICAL RELATIONSHIP
Figure  5*1 p lo ts  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the leve l  of  
c o n f l i c t  and the r a t e  o f  minor v io le n c e  fo r  husband to  w i f e  
v io le n c e ,  w i f e  to husband v io le n c e  and couple v io le n c e .  The 
data c l e a r l y  demonstrate a strong p o s i t i v e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between c o n f l i c t  and minor v io le n c e  fo r  each dyad and each 
is  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  the . 0 0 0  l e v e l .  The data  
a lso  i n d ic a t e  t h a t  the g r e a t e s t  increases in the amount of  
v io le n c e  occur when c o n f l i c t  increases from medium to high .  
For example,  the husband to w i f e  v io le n c e  r a t e  increases  
5 - 7% when c o n f l i c t  increases from low to medium, but 10 . 2% 
when c o n f l i c t  increases from medium to  h igh.
Tab le  5*1 presents data  to examine the e f f e c t s  of  
socia l  c lass  on the c o n f 1 i c t - v i o l e n c e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  fo r  each 
dyad. This data  i n d ic a t e  t h a t  although the v io le n c e  ra tes  
are  higher in b lue c o l l a r  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  the a s s o c ia t io n  
between c o n f l i c t  and v io le n c e  is the same fo r  both c lasses :  
the g r e a t e r  the c o n f l i c t ,  the g r e a t e r  the r a t e  of  v io le n c e .  
Again,  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  between c o n f l i c t  and v io le n c e  fo r  
both b lue  c o l l a r  and w h i te  c o l l a r  marriages is s t a t i s t i c a l l y  




























Figure 5.2 Husband to Wife Minor Violence











Figure 5.3 Wife to Husband Minor Violence
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Figure 5.4 Couple Minor Violence by Level
of Conflict and Marital Power Structure
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The E f f e c t  o f  Mar i t a l  Power S t r u c tu r e  on the 
Conf1i c t - V i o l e n c e  R e la t io n s h ip
When the power s t r u c t u r e  of  the m a r i t a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  is 
inc luded in the a n a ly s is  of  the a s s o c ia t io n  between c o n f l i c t  
and v io le n c e ,  important d i f f e r e n c e s  in the r a t e  of  v io le n c e  
are  apparent .  Figures  5 *2 ,  5 -3  and 5 .^  present data  on the  
leve l  o f  c o n f l i c t  and percent  of  minor v io le n c e .  Each 
f i g u r e  focuses on one of the a g g re s s o r -v ic t im  dyads,  i . e . ,  
husband to w i f e  v io le n c e ,  w i fe  to husband v io le n c e ,  e t c ,  and 
presents  data  on the c o n f1 i c t - v i o l e n c e  r e l a t i o n  fo r  each 
power s t r u c t u r e  t h i s  research c o n s id ers .  The data  in each 
f i g u r e  overwhelmingly demonstrate the impact of  power 
s t r u c t u r e  on the c o n f 1i c t - v i o l e n c e  r e l a t i o n .  While  Figure  
5 . 1. the b i v a r i a t e  r e l a t i o n  between c o n f l i c t  and v io le n c e ,  
appears s t ro n g ly  l i n e a r ,  examining t h i s  same r e l a t i o n  fo r  
e g a l i t a r i a n ,  male dominant, female dominant and d iv id e d  
power r e l a t i o n s  shows t h a t  by not inc lud ing  the power 
s t r u c t u r e  important d i f f e r e n c e s  in the r a t e  of  v io le n c e  one 
may experience a t  d i f f e r e n t  l e v e ls  o f  c o n f l i c t  are  hidden.
One of  the hidden d i f f e r e n c e s  is th a t  e g a l i t a r i a n  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  have less v io le n c e  than any of  the o ther  power 
s t r u c t u r e s ,  and more im p o r ta n t ly ,  th e re  is r e l a t i v e l y  1 i t t l e  
increase  in the v io le n c e  r a t e  when c o n f l i c t  increases from 
medium to  h igh .  Th is  is e s p e c i a l l y  t r u e  fo r  husband to w i f e  
and couple v io le n c e .  E g a l i t a r i a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  appear to  be 
q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  from both d iv ided  power and w i fe  dominant in 
t h i s  respect  because there  are  dramat ic  increases in the  
v io le n c e  r a t e  as c o n f l i c t  increases from medium to  high
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w i t h i n  these power s t r u c t u r e s .  Husband dominant, on the  
other  hand, more c lo s e ly  resemble the i n i t i a l  b i v a r i a t e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between c o n f l i c t  and v io le n c e ,  in t h a t  the re  
are  c o n s is te n t  increases in the v io le n c e  r a t e  as c o n f l i c t  
i ncreases .
The data  a lso  suggest th e re  may be a 'b re ak in g  p o i n t 1 
or a ' t o le r a n c e  l e v e l '  fo r  how much c o n f l i c t  some power 
s t r u c tu r e s  can i n t e g r a t e  b e fo re  events e s c a la t e  out of  
c o n t r o l .  Examination of  a l l  f i g u r e s  shows t h a t  the v io le n c e  
r a te s  f o r  w i f e  dominant and d iv id e d  r e la t i o n s h i p s  are  about  
the same a t  medium le v e ls  of  c o n f l i c t ,  but t h a t  a t  higher  
l e v e ls  o f  c o n f l i c t ,  v io le n c e  r a te s  increase s u b s t a n t i a l l y .  
Husband to  w i f e  v io le n c e  in w i f e  dominant r e la t io n s h ip s  
increases from about 9% to  30%, w h i le  d iv id e d  power 
r e la t i o n s h i p s  increase from about 9% to 20%. The increases  
are  even higher  when couple v io le n c e  is considered.  The 
data  suggest t h a t  e g a l i t a r i a n  r e la t i o n s h i p s  can t o l e r a t e  
higher  l e v e ls  of  c o n f l i c t  w i th o u t  a correspondingly  la rge  
increase in the v io le n c e  r a t e .  There are  several  poss ib le  
e xp lan a t io n s  fo r  t h i s  f i n d i n g .  I t  may be t h a t  there  are  low 
l e v e ls  of  c o n f l i c t  and thus v io le n c e  because of the nature  
of the power d i s t r i b u t i o n .  Since power is more e q u i ta b ly  
d i s t r i b u t e d ,  the re  are  fewer sources of  c o n f l i c t .  I t  is 
a ls o  p o s s ib le  th a t  the n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s  used in
>
e g a l i t a r i a n  r e la t i o n s h i p s  mediate  the r e l a t i o n  between 
c o n f l i c t  and v io le n c e .  Th is  hypothesis  is explored in the  
fo l lo w in g  s e c t io n .
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The data  i n d ic a t e  the importance of  in c lud ing  the power 
s t r u c t u r e  o f  in t im a te  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  in to  an a n a ly s is  of  the  
r e l a t i o n  between c o n f l i c t  and v io le n c e .  Although the  
b i v a r i a t e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between c o n f l i c t  and v io le n c e
provides  a c le a r  i n d i c a t i o n  of  a strong p o s i t i v e  a s s o c ia t io n  
between the  two v a r i a b l e s ,  the a d d i t io n  of  power provides  a 
more complete understand ing of which power r e la t i o n s h i p s  are  
a t  a g r e a t e r  r i s k  of  v io le n c e  and when t h a t  r i s k  is more 
1 i k e l y  to o c c u r .
MARITAL CONFLICT, NEGOTIATION AND VIOLENCE 
C r? t iq u e  of  the Straus  e t .  a l . (1980) Analys i s
E a r l i e r ,  Straus e t .  a 1 . 1s (1980) study t h a t  examines 
how the use of  reasoning is assoc ia ted  w i th  the r a t e  of  
v io le n c e  was reviewed because the f in d in g s  are  so 
unexpected,  and the oppos i te  o f  t h a t  p re d ic te d  from a
c o n f l i c t  p e r s p e c t i v e .  S traus e t .  a l . examined the leve l  
of c o n f l i c t ,  the amount of  reasoning used and the r e s u l t i n g  
r a t e  o f  v io le n c e .  I f  the te n e ts  o f  c o n f l i c t  theory  are  
c o r r e c t ,  th e re  should be less v io le n c e  in those 
r e la t i o n s h i p s  t h a t  use the  most reasoning to s e t t l e
c o n f l i c t s .  However, . t h e  data  from the Straus e t .  a l .  
study do not support t h i s .  The v io le n c e  r a t e  fo r  couples  
who have high l e v e ls  of  c o n f l i c t  and r a r e l y  or never use 
reasoning is about 13% w h i le  the v io le n c e  r a t e  fo r  couples  
with  the same high leve l  o f  c o n f l i c t  but who use reasoning  
the most o f t e n  is about 44%, or the exact oppos i te  of  what 
the ra te s  should be fo r  the data  to support the theory .
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Straus  e t .  a l .  f u r t h e r  examined those couples who re p o r t
l i t t l e  or no c o n f l i c t .  This group, according to  c o n f l i c t
th e o ry ,  should have h igher  ra te s  o f  v io le n c e  because the
suppression of c o n f l i c t  w i l l  lead to  such an accumulation of
h o s t i l i t i e s  and tensions t h a t  major d isputes  w i l l  occur.
However, when t h i s  low c o n f l i c t  group is considered ,  those
t h a t  use reasoning l e a s t  o f t e n  have v io le n c e  ra te s  of  less
than 1%. Again,  the data  do not support  the th e o ry .  Straus
e t .  a l . conclude:
No doubt even the above f a i r l y  compl icated  
a n a ly s is  does not r e a l l y  do j u s t i c e  to the  
s u b t l e t i e s  o f  c o n f l i c t  th e o ry .  We continue to  
b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h i s  theory descr ibes  an important  
aspect of  what goes on in a l l  groups, inc lud ing  
f a m i l i e s .  At the same t ime,  a theory cannot  
remain "promis ing" f o r e v e r .  At some p o i n t ,  
hypotheses based on the theory  w i 11 have to  be 
demonstrated or the theory  abandoned ( 1980: 166) .
There are  problems, however, in i n t e r p r e t i n g  the  
S traus ,  e t .  a l .  d a ta .  F i r s t ,  the da ta  are  c ro s s -s e c t io n a l  
and thus the causal o rder  can be quest ioned .  I t  may be,  for  
example,  t h a t  because th e re  is v i o le n c e ,  p a r tne rs  use a lo t  
of reasoning in an a t tem pt  to avoid  more v io le n c e .  A second 
d i f f i c u l t y  in i n t e r p r e t t i n g  the meaning of S t r a u s 1 
conclusion is t h a t  the focus of t h e i r  a n a ly s is  is on the  
v io le n c e  r a t e  when v a ry in g  amounts of  reasoning a re  used, 
ra th e r  than a comparison of the v io le n c e  ra te s  fo r  reasoning  
w ith  less c o n s t r u c t iv e  means of  s e t t l i n g  d is p u te s .  F i n a l l y ,  
the data  in t h e i r  study do not a c t u a l l y  address the- b e n e f i t s  
t h a t  the theory  p r e d i c t s  w i l l  occur .  The data  on ly  measure 
v io le n c e  in in t im a te  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  r a t h e r  than b e n e f i t s  such
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as group cohesion (Coser, 1956) or change in  socia l
o r g a n iz a t io n  (Dahrendorf ,  1959)*  However, d e s p i te  the  
l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  t h e i r  s tudy ,  the f in d in g s  suggest an 
i n t r i g u i n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t h a t  deserves f u r t h e r  a t t e n t i o n .
Th is  research f u r t h e r  exp lores  the idea t h a t  when 
c o n s t r u c t iv e  means are  used to s e t t l e  arguments v io le n c e  
w i l l  decrease by comparing the v io le n c e  ra te s  a t  d i f f e r e n t  
l e v e ls  o f  c o n f l i c t  and w i th  p ro g re s s iv e ly  less c o n s t ru c t iv e  
n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s .  The v io le n c e  ra te s  associated  w i th  the  
use o f  reasoning,  w ithdrawal and verbal  aggression at  
va ry in g  le v e ls  o f  c o n f l i c t  a re  compared.
Approach to Understandinq the Data
I t  is p o ss ib le  to  make several  types of  comparisons 
w i th  t h i s  data  t h a t  t e s t  the hypotheses of  c o n f l i c t  th e o ry .  
F i r s t ,  the v io le n c e  ra te s  w i t h i n  each type of  n e g o t ia t io n  
t a c t i c  can be examined. I f  the high c o n f l i c t  groups are  
considered,  the v io le n c e  r a t e  should be higher fo r  those who 
use less reasoning than fo r  those who use high l e v e ls  of  
reasoning.  For the measure of  w i th d ra w a l ,  again examining  
the high c o n f l i c t  group, those who wi thdraw less o f t e n  from 
s e t t l i n g  an argument should have lower v io le n c e  r a t e  than 
those who withdraw most o f t e n .  For the measure o f  verbal  
aggression,  s t i l l  focusing on the high c o n f l i c t  group, those  
who use verbal  aggression less o f t e n  should have v io le n c e  
ra te s  lower than those who f r e q u e n t ly  use verbal  aggression.
Page 102
A second a n a ly s is  o f  the data  and perhaps a more
accura te  t e s t  o f  how the use of  types of  n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s  
are assoc iated  w i th  the c o n f 1 i c t - v i o l e n c e  r e l a t i o n  compares 
the r a t e  o f  v io le n c e  a t  high le v e ls  of  c o n f l i c t  fo r  each 
n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c .  For the data  to support the hypotheses  
the r a t e  of  v io le n c e  should increase  as n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s  
become less c o n s t r u c t iv e .
The approach to  understanding the data  is based on the  
assumption t h a t  the causal  order of  the v a r i a b l e s  has been 
c o r r e c t l y  s p e c i f i e d .  As pointed ou t ,  t h i s  research,  l i k e  
the Straus  e t .  a l . {1980) study,  is based on a cross
s ec t io n a l  study of  American marr iages .  Although the model 
used in t h i s  research conceptu a l izes  c o n f l i c t  as an
independent v a r i a b l e ,  v io le n c e  as a dependent v a r i a b l e  and 
n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s  as an in te rv e n in g  v a r i a b l e ,  the causal  
order can be quest ioned because the research is based on 
data  c o l l e c t e d  a t  one p o in t  in t im e .
A l t e r n a t i v e  e xp la n a t io n s  of  the f in d in g s  are  p o s s ib le .  
When v io le n c e  occurs in  a r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  i t  may change the
n e g o t ia t io n  s k i l l s  used to  s e t t l e  c o n f l i c t .  In d iv id u a ls  may
o f t e n  use reasoning,  w ithdrawal and verba l  aggression  
because of the v io le n c e .  On the other  hand, the v iew of  
marr iage proposed here seems e q u a l ly  r e a l i s t i c ,  given the 
t h e o r e t i c a l  p e rs p e c t iv e  of  t h i s  research .  C o n f l i c t  is 
viewed as an i n e v i t a b l e  aspect of  a l l  soc ia l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  
Because i t  is i n e v i t a b l e ,  var ious  n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s  are  
requ ired  to re s o lv e  c o n f l i c t .  I f  c o n f l i c t  is not
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T ab le  5 * 2 :  H-W Minor V i o l e n c e  by Leve l  o f  C o n f l i c t  and Use o f
N e g o t i a t i o n  T a c t i c s
Negot i a t  ion 
Tact ics
V io le nce  Rate 
Conf1i c t




A1. Reason i ng by H 
Low 2 .8 9 .4 20.1
Reasoning = .0013  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 4 * * *
Med i um 3-6 9-7 17-8
High 3-8 11 .4 23-8
A2. Reasoning by W 
Low 2 .5 8 .9 20.4
Reasoni ng = .0015  
C o n f l i c t  = .0 4 * * f t
Med i um 5-3 10.7 18.5
High 3-7 11.1 23-1
B l .  Withdrawal by H 
Low 1 .4 4 .4 6.1
Wi thdrawal = . 098**ft  
C o n f l i c t  = .04 * f t *
Med i um 6 .1 12.0 19.2
High 19.1* 26.0 40 .9
B2. Withdrawal by W 
Low .4 2 .4 3 .7
W i thd rawa1 = . 08 * * *  
Conf1 i c t  = . 0 4 * * *
Med i um 4 .0 8 .9 17.8
High 13-2 22 .0 30.7
Cl .  Verbal  Agg. by H 
Low .6 2 .2 1.8
Verb.  Agg.= . 1 5 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 4 * * *
Med i um 2 .9 1 1 .2 11.8
High 21.7 25.8 41 .8
C2. Verbal  Agg. by W 
Low .6 3.1 5 -6
Verb.  A g g . = . l l * f t *  
C o n f l i c t  = .04 * f t *
Med i um 2 .8 12.8 12.8
High 19-4 20.9 39-2
*  p<.05
* *  pc.Ol  
ft**  p<.001
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T a b le  5 * 3 : W—H M inor  V i o l e n c e  by Leve l  o f  C o n f l i c t  and Use o f
N e g o t i a t i o n  T a c t i c s
N e g o t ia t io n
T a c t ic s
V io le nce  Rate  
Conf1 i c t




A l . Reasoni ng by H 
Low 3-3 8 .8 15-3
Reasoning = .0 0 3 *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 3 * * *
Med i um 5 -5 9-4 17.2
High 4 .3 11.5 22 .9
A2. Reasoning by W 
Low 2 .9 6 .8 16.2
Reasoning = . 0 0 4 * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 3 * * *
Med i um 6.1 11.8 16.5
High 4 .7 11.2 22.2
B1. Wi thdrawal by H 
Low 2 .5 4 .8 5.1
Wi thdrawal = . 0 8 5 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 3 * * *
Med i um 6 .0 10.4 17-3
High 18.8 26.1 37.3
B2. Withdrawal by W 
Low .8 1 .4 • 9
Wi thdrawal = . 0 9 4 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 3 * * *
Med i um 5.1 8 .6 12.3
High 1U.5 21.9 32.7
C l . Verbal  Agg. by H 
Low .9 1 .4 2 .4
Verb.  A g g .= .1 3 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 3 * * *
Med i um 6 .9 10.7 12.8
High 19.7 26 .3 34 .9
C2. Verbal Agg. by W 
Low .6 1 .4 2 .8
Verb.  Agg.= . 1 3 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 03 * * *
Med i um 8 .3 11.4 8 .8
High 16.4 24.2 39.0
*  p< .05
* *  p<.01
* * *  p<.001
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T a b le  5*^s  Couple M ino r  V io l e n c e  by Leve l  o f  C o n f l i c t  and Use o f
N e g o t i a t i o n  T a c t i c s
Vio le nce  Rate When 
Conf1i c t  Is:
N e g o t ia t io n  ---------------------------------------
T a c t ic s  Low Medium High Eta Squared
A1. Reasoning by Cpl 
Low
Med i um 
High
B l .  Withdrawal by Cpl 
Low
Med i um 
High
C l .  Verbal  Agg. by Cpl 
Low
Med i um 
High
4.1 11.3 22 .4
10.9 19.0 25.9
4 .9 13.8 32.2
.4 • 5 2 .6
6 .0 10.4 17.0
23 .8 32 .8 41 .9
1.0 1.7 .8
6 .8 11.5 11.4
21.4 31 .3 4 4 .0
Reasoning = . 0 0 8 * *  
C o n f l i c t  =5.045***
Wi th d r a w a l® .1 4 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 4 5 * * *
Verb.  A g g .= .1 7 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 4 5 * * *
*  p<.05
* *  p<.01
Mei: p<.001
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s u c c e s s fu l ly  re so lv ed ,  i t  may lead to  d e s t r u c t i v e  b ehav io rs .  
One d e s t r u c t i v e  behavior  t h a t  may r e s u l t  is v io le n c e ,  which
the data  in t h i s  research address.  However, the issue of
c a u s a l i t y  is an impor tant  one to  keep in mind, and a 
l i m i t a t i o n  of  the research .
NEGOTIATION AND THE CONFLICT-VIOLENCE RELATION 
The data  in T a b le s ,  5*2  to show the r e l a t i o n
between c o n f l i c t  and v io le n c e  when reasoning,  w ithdrawal and
verba l  aggression are  used as n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s .  Tab le  
5 . 2  considers  husband to  w i f e  v io le n c e  and husband's use of  
n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s ;  and w i f e ' s  use of  n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s .  
Table  5 *3  consider w i f e  to husband v io le n c e ,  by husband's 
use o f  n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s  and w i f e ' s  use of  t a c t i c s  
r e s p e c t i v e l y .  Tab le  5 -^  examines couple v io le n c e  and 
c o u p le 's  use of  n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s .
The Use of Reasoni ng
Turn ing f i r s t  to the use of  reasoning in the r e l a t i o n  
between c o n f l i c t  and v io le n c e  f o r  husband to w i f e ,  w i f e  to  
husband and couple v i o le n c e ,  Par t  A of  Tables 5*2  to  
the f in d in g s  suggest t h a t  the use of  reasoning is not an 
important  fa c t o r  in the r e l a t i o n  between c o n f l i c t  and 
v io le n c e .  In g e n e r a l ,  the v io le n c e  ra te s  increase when the  
leve l  o f  c o n f l i c t  and the use o f  reasoning incre ase .  
Although the data  i n d ic a t e  t h a t  in some l im i t e d  s i t u a t i o n s  
such as couple v io le n c e ,  Table  5 * ^ .  increases in the use of  
reasoning are assoc iated  w i th  less v io le n c e ,  the data  more
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s t r o n g ly  suggest a l i n e a r  increase  in the r a t e  of  v io le n c e  
as both c o n f l i c t  and the use of  reasoning increase .  This is  
e s p e c i a l l y  t r u e  when c o n f l i c t  is high.
The e ta  squared c o e f f i c i e n t s  show t h a t  i t  is the leve l  
of  c o n f l i c t  t h a t  exp la ins  more of  the v a r ia n ce  in the  
v io le n c e  r a t e  than the use of  reasoning.  The s i z e  of  the  
e ta  squared c o e f f i c i e n t s  fo r  reasoning are  q u i t e  small as 
compared to  the s i z e  o f  the same c o e f f i c i e n t  fo r  c o n f l i c t .  
The f in d in g s  suggest th a t  reasoning is an i n s u f f i c i e n t  
n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c  to use to prevent  v io le n c e .  Regardless  
of  how much or how l i t t l e  reasoning is used, when c o n f l i c t  
is  h igh,  v io le n c e  is more l i k e l y  to occur .
The Use of Wi thdrawal and Verbal Aggress ion
When the less c o n s t r u c t iv e  t a c t i c s  are  considered -  
withdrawal and verba l  aggression -  a very  d i f f e r e n t  p ic t u r e  
is  e v id e n t .  The ra te s  of  v io le n c e  reported  f o r  those who 
withdraw from an argument, in e f f e c t  re fu s in g  to deal w i th  
the  issue ,  a re  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  higher when withdrawal is used 
f r e q u e n t ly  compared to  when i t  is used less o f t e n  as
in d ica ted  by the data  in P ar t  B of  Tables 5 -2  to 5 -^ *
Regardless of  the leve l  of  c o n f l i c t ,  v io le n c e  increases as 
the leve l  o f  withdrawal increases .  The v io le n c e  ra te s  are  
remarkably high when withdrawal is used most o f t e n .
A s i m i l a r  p a t te r n  is ev id en t  when verba l  aggression is 
considered,  P ar t  C of  Tables  5 -2  to 5***- The data  in d ic a te  
the re  are  s i g n i f i c a n t  increases in the ra tes  of  v io le n c e  as
the  use of  verba l  aggression increases a t  each leve l  of
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c o n f 1 i c t .
E x a m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  e t a  s q u a r e d  c o e f f i c i e n t s  f o r  b o t h  
w i t h d r a w a l  a n d  v e r b a l  a g g r e s s i o n  s u g g e s t s  a v e r y  d i f f e r e n t  
p a t t e r n  t h a n  w a s  f o u n d  w h e n  t h e  u s e  o f  r e a s o n i n g  w a s  
c o n s i d e r e d .  T h e  e t a  s q u a r e d  c o e f f i c i e n t s  s h o w  t h a t  m o r e  o f  
t h e  v a r i a n c e  i n  t h e  v i o l e n c e  r a t e  i s  e x p l a i n e d  b y  t h e  
n e g o t i a t i o n  t a c t i c  t h a n  b y  t h e  l e v e l  o f  c o n f l i c t .  F o r  
h u s b a n d  t o  w i f e ,  w i f e  t o  h u s b a n d  a n d  c o u p l e  v i o l e n c e ,  
w i t h d r a w a l  a n d  v e r b a l  a g g r e s s i o n  a c c o u n t  f o r  m o r e  o f  t h e  
v a r i a n c e  i n  t h e  v i o l e n c e  r a t e  t h a n  d o e s  t h e  l e v e l  o f  
c o n f l i c t .  T h i s  i s  t h e  r e v e r s e  o f  t h e  p a t t e r n  f o u n d  f o r  t h e  
u s e  o f  r e a s o n i n g  w h e r e  i t  w a s  t h e  l e v e l  o f  c o n f l i c t  t h a t  
a c c o u n t e d  f o r  i n c r e a s e s  i n  t h e  v i o l e n c e  r a t e .  T h e  d a t a  h e r e  
s u g g e s t  t h a t  w h i l e  c o n f l i c t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  a n d  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  
r a t e  o f  v i o l e n c e ,  t h e  u s e  o f  d e s t r u c t i v e  n e g o t i a t i o n  t a c t i c s  
a c c o u n t s  f o r  g r e a t e r  i n c r e a s e s  i n  t h e  v i o l e n c e  r a t e  t h a n  
d o e s  t h e  l e v e l  o f  c o n f l i c t .
T h e  U s e f u l  n e s s  o f  C o n s t r u c t i v e  T a c t  i c s
A n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  d a t a  w i t h i n  e a c h  n e g o t i a t i o n  t a c t i c  h a s  
d e m o n s t r a t e d  t h a t  v i o l e n c e  r a t e s  d o  i n c r e a s e  w h e n  t h e  u s e  o f  
w i t h d r a w a l  a n d  v e r b a l  a g g r e s s i o n  i n c r e a s e .  H o w e v e r ,  t h i s  
a n a l y s i s  d o e s  n o t  f u l l y  a n s w e r  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  how u s e f u l  
c o n s t r u c t i v e  m e a n s  a r e  t o  r e d u c e  t h e  f r e q u e n c y  o f  v i o l e n c e .  
T o  a d d r e s s  t h i s  i s s u e  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  c o m p a r e  v i o l e n c e  
r a t e s  f o r  r e a s o n i n g ,  w i t h d r a w a l  a n d  v e r b a l  a g g r e s s i o n .  
A l t h o u g h  c o n f l i c t  t h e o r y  d o e s  n o t  s t a t e  t h a t  h i g h  c o n f l i c t  
i s  n e c e s s a r i l y  b e n e f i c i a l ,  i t  se e m s  a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  f o c u s  o n
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the v io le n c e  ra te s  of  the  high c o n f l i c t / h i g h  use of  s p e c i f i c  
n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c  as a powerful  t e s t  o f  the hypothesis .
Examining the da ta  f o r  each of these c e l l s  fo r  husband 
to  w i f e  v io le n c e ,  Table  5*2  , w i f e  to  husband v io le n c e ,
Table  5 *3 t  and couple v io le n c e ,  Tab le  5***> c l e a r l y  in d ica te s  
s u b s t a n t ia l  increases in the v io le n c e  ra te s  as less  
c o n s t r u c t iv e  means are  used to s e t t l e  d is p u te s .  The la r g e s t  
increases in the v io le n c e  ra te s  occur when withdrawal and 
verba l  aggression a re  used, compared to the use of  
reasoning.  For example,  when husband's use of  t a c t i c s  in 
husband to w i f e  v io le n c e  are  considered,  the v io le n c e  r a t e  
is 2 3 . 8% for  reasoning,  40.9% f o r  withdrawal and 41.8% fo r  
verba l  aggress ion .
Whi le  the data  c l e a r l y  in d ic a te  t h a t  v io le n c e  increases  
when withdrawal and verba l  aggression are  used to s e t t l e  
d is p u te s ,  i t  seems important to consider whether t h is  
prov ides  support  fo r  the hypothesis  t h a t  when c o n s t r u c t iv e  
means are  used to s e t t l e  d is p u te s ,  v io le n c e  w i l l  decrease  
given t h a t  reasoning appears to have a l im i t e d  a s s o c ia t io n  
to c o n f l i c t  and v io le n c e .
In one sense it. does support the hypothesis because 
v io le n c e  r a te s  increase  when less c o n s t ru c t iv e  t a c t i c s  are  
used. On the o ther  hand, the data  suggest a somewhat 
cur ious p i c t u r e  of  how to deal  w i th  c o n f l i c t .  While  i t  
c l e a r l y  shows t h a t  w i thdrawal  and verbal  aggression are  
i n a p p r o p r ia te ,  i t  a ls o  in d ica te s  t h a t  reasoning w i l l  not  
help  reduce the r a t e  of  v io le n c e  when there  is c o n f l i c t .
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The im p l ic a t io n  seems to  be t h a t  reducing the r a t e  of  
v io le n c e  is con t ingent  on the leve l  o f  c o n f l i c t  and not 
using d e s t r u c t i v e  t a c t i c s  except in the l im i t e d  
circumstances of  w i f e  to husband and couple v io le n c e  where 
both p a r tn e rs  use reasoning and only where c o n f l i c t  is low 
or medium, as in d ica te d  in Par t  A o f  Tables 5*3  and 5 - 1*,  and 
Table  A . 1 in Appendix A.
The f in d in g s  appear to e x p la in  how to  increase the r a te  
of v io le n c e ,  by arguing f r e q u e n t l y  and using poor 
n e g o t ia t io n  s k i l l s ,  but do not prov ide  any evidence on what 
n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c  to  use to avoid v io le n c e .
MARITAL POWER, CONFLICT, NEGOTIATION AND VIOLENCE
However, be fore  any f u r t h e r  im p l ic a t io n s  of  these  
f in d in g s  can be exp lo red ,  i t  is  necessary to in c orpora te  the  
power s t r u c t u r e  of  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  in to  the a n a ly s is  o f  the  
a s s o c ia t io n  between c o n f l i c t  and v io le n c e  when d i f f e r i n g  
t a c t i c s  are  used. The importance of  inc lud ing  power became 
ev id e n t  when the r e l a t i o n  between c o n f l i c t  and v io le n c e  was 
reanalyzed fo r  the four  m a r i t a l  power types.  Clear  
d i f f e r e n c e s  in the r a t e  o f  v io le n c e  and l ike lyh o o d  of  
v io le n c e  a t  d i f f e r e n t  l e v e ls  of  c o n f l i c t  were obvious.  Thus 
i t  may be e q u a l ly  impor tant  to  examine the r e l a t i o n  between 
c o n f l i c t ,  n e g o t ia t io n ,  and v io le n c e  w i t h i n  husband dominant,  
w i f e  dominant, d iv id e d  and e g a l i t a r i a n  power s t r u c t u r e s .
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T h e  C e l  I S i z e  P r o b l e m
This  is e a s ie r  sa id  than done. When the r e l a t i o n  
between c o n f l i c t ,  n e g o t ia t io n  and v io le n c e  was analyzed ,  the  
problem of expected c e l l  f requencies  decreasing to less than 
5 arose .  That problem was c e r t a i n  to increase when the  
r e l a t i o n  was analyzed w i t h i n  each m a r i t a l  power type because 
of the sm al le r  subsample s iz e  fo r  each power type .  In 
a n t i c i p a t i o n  of  t h i s  problem, the low and medium use of  each 
t a c t i c  was co l lapsed in to  one ca tegory .  The high use o f  the  
t a c t i c  was unchanged. An a l t e r n a t i v e  s t r a te g y  one could use 
when the reduct io n  of  v a r i a b l e  c a teg o r ies  is necessary is to 
dichotomize  the v a r i a b l e  a t  the median, so t h a t  scores  
f a l l i n g  below the median take  on one v a lu e  and scores  
f a l l i n g  above the median take on a nother .  The advantage of  
t h i s  s t r a t e g y  is t h a t  i t  r e s u l t s  in equal cases f o r  each 
v a lu e .  The d isadvantage  is t h a t  the re  is not always  
t h e o r e t i c a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  d ichotomiz ing  a v a r i a b l e  a t  
the median.  In t h i s  research ,  the opt ion  was taken to  
c o l la p s e  only  the low and medium c a te g o r ie s  in to  one,  and 
m ain ta in  the o r i g i n a l  high group because i t  would be more 
t h e o r e t i c a l l y  meaningful  to  compare the high group to  the  
newly c rea ted  lower group.
I n i t i a l  a n a ly s is  of  the data  under these co n d i t io n s  
in d ica te d  th e re  was not a s u b s t a n t ia l  improvement in the  
expected c e l l  frequency problem. Expected c e l l  frequenc ies  
were less than 5 and the percentage of  c e l l s  involved was 
too l a r g e .  The remaining opt ion  was to a lso  c o l la p s e  the
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T a b le  5 - 5 :  H -  W M inor  V i o l e n c e  by Leve l  o f  C o n f l i c t  and Use o f
N e g o t i a t i o n  T a c t i c s  in  Female Dominant  M a r r i a g e s
N e g o t ia t io n  
Ta ct i  cs
V io lence  Rate When 
Conf1i c t  Is :
Lower High Eta Squared
A1. Reasoni ng by H 
Lower 6 .2 35-3
Reasoning =.01  
C o n f l i c t  = . 08 * *
High 13.2 23 .5
A2. Reasoning by W 
Lower 8 .5 37-5
Reasoning = .005  
C o n f l i c t  = . 08* * *
High 9-5 21.1
B1. Wi thdrawal by H 
Lower 2 . A 2 2 .9
Wi thdrawal = . 1 6 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 08 * *
H i gh 3 8 .9 5 0 .0
B2. Withdrawal by W 
Lower 3 .8 2 8 .6
Wi thdrawal = . 06 * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 08 * * *
High 2 5 .0 3^.8
C l .  Verbal  Agg. by H 
Lower 2 . It l i t . 8
Verb.  Agg.= . 2 2 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 8 * *
High 3 1 .8 5 0 .0
C2. Verbal  Agg. by W 
Lower A. 1 2 5 .O
Verb.  Agg.= . 0 8 * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 8 * *
High 20 .7 39-1
*  p< .05
* *  p<.01
* * *  p < .001
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T a b le  5 * 6 :  W-H M ino r  V i o l e n c e  by Leve l  o f  C o n f l i c t  and Use o f
N e g o t i a t i o n  T a c t i c s  in  Female Dominant M a r r i a g e s
Negoti  a t  i on 
T a c t i  cs
V io lenc e  Rate  





A1. Reasoni ng by H 
Lower 6 .3 23-5
Reasoning = .02  
C o n f l i c t  = . 1 0 * * *
H i gh 10.5 47-1
A2. Reasoning by W 
Lower 6 . 8 25 .0
Reasoning = .007  
C o n f l i c t  = . 1 0 * * *
High 9 -5 A2.1
B1. Wi thdrawal by H 
Lower 2 . it lJt-3
Wi thdrawal = . 2 6 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 1 0 * * *
High 3 3 .3 68 .8
B2. Withdrawal by W 
Lower 2 .6 l i t . 8
Wi thdrawal = . 1 6 * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 1 0 * * *
High 2 5 .0 5 0 .0
C l .  Verbal  Agg. by H 
Lower 3 .7 7 * 1*
Verb.  Agg.= . 2 3 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 1 0 * * *
High 22 .7 5 8 .A
C2. Verbal  Agg. by W 
Lower 2 .7 7 - *
Verb.  Agg.= . 2 1 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 1 0 * * *
High 2 0 .7 5 8 .3
*  p< .05
* *  p<.01
* * *  p<.001
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T a b le  5 - 7 s Couple  M in o r  V io l e n c e  by Leve l  o f  C o n f l i c t  and Use o f
N e g o t i a t i o n  T a c t i c s  i n  Female Dominant  M a r r i a g e s
Violence Rate When 
C o n f I i c t  Is:
N e g o t ia t io n  ---------------------------------------
T a c t ic s  Low High Eta Squared
A l .  Reasoning by Cpl
Lower 8 .8
High 18.8
B1. Withdrawal by Cpl
Lower 2 .7
High 37-0
C l .  Verbal Agg. by Cpl
Lower 2 .8
High 32.3
Reasoning = .02  
37-5  C o n f l i c t  = . 13* * *
70 .0
Wi thdrawa1 = . 2 4 * * *
23.1 C o n f l i c t  = . 13* * *  
66 .7
Verb.  Agg. = . 2 l t * * *  
15-8 C o n f l i c t  = . 13* * *  
6 1 .3
*  p<.05
* *  pc.Ol
* * *  p<.001
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T a b le  5 * 8 :  H-W Minor V i o l e n c e  by Leve l  o f  C o n f l i c t  and Use o f
N e g o t i a t i o n  T a c t i c s  in  D i v i d e d  Power M a r r i a g e s
N e g o t ia t io n  
Tact  i cs




i c t  Is :
High Eta Squared
A1. Reasoni ng by H 
Lower 6 .4 17.1
Reasoning = .0 0 7 *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 4 * *
High 9-9 27.6
A2. Reasoning by W 
Lower 6 .9 17.5
Reasoning = .0 0 6 *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 4 * * *
High 9-1 2 6 . A
B1. Wi thdrawal by H 
Lower 6 .0 14.0
W? thdrawal = . 0 9 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 4 * * *
High 20.2 42 .2
B2. Withdrawal by W 
Lower 4 .2 13.4
Wi thdrawal = . 0 8 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 4 * * *
H i gh 20.  A 32.6
C l . Verbal  Agg. by H 
Lower 3-7 6 .9
Verb . Agg. = . 1 6 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 4 * * *
H i gh 23-6 42 .4
C2. Verbal  Agg. by W 
Lower 4 .6 7-9
Verb.  Agg.= . 1 2 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 4 * * *
High 19-6 40 .8
*  p< .05
* *  p<.01
f t * *  p < .001
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T a b le  5 • 9 s W-H M in o r  V i o l e n c e  by Leve l  o f  C o n f l i c t  and Use o f
N e g o t i a t i o n  T a c t i c s  in  D i v i d e d  Power M a r r i a g e s
V io len c e  Rate When 
Conf1i c t  Is :
N e g o t ia t io n  ---------------------------------------
T a c t ic s  Lower High Eta Squared
A1. Reasoni ng by H
Lower 7 .6
High 9 -2
A2. Reason i ng by W
Lower 8 .1
High 8 .3
B1. Wi thdrawal by H
Lower 5 .7
High 25-9
B2. Wi thdrawal by W
Lower A. 2
High 2 2 .0
C l . Verbal  Agg. by H
Lower 3*7
High 25-5




2 1 . 9
Reasoning = .00A 
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 2 * * *
14.6
22. 1
Reasoning = .0 0 7 *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 2 * * *
1 2 . A 
3UA
Wi th draw a l® .0 8 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 2 * * *
8 .7
32.2
Wi thdrawal = . 1 0 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 03* * *
9 .2
31.0
Verb.  Agg.= . 1 1 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 2 * * *
6 .2
35 .6
Verb.  Agg.= . 1 4 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 03 * * *
*  p< .05
* *  p<.01
* * *  p < .001
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T a b le  5 .1 0 :  Couple M in o r  V i o l e n c e  by Leve l  o f  C o n f l i c t  and Use o f
N e g o t i a t i o n  T a c t i c s  in  D i v i d e d  M a r r i a g e s
N e g o t ia t io n
T a c t ic s
V io lence  Rate  
Conf1 i c t  Is
Lower
When 
H i gh Eta Squared
A l .  Reasoning by Cpl 
Lower 11.5 2 2 . 4
Reasoning = .0 0 7 *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 4 * * *
High 10.6 33-0
B1. Withdrawal by Cpl Wi thdrawal = . 13* * *
Lower 5-5 11* .3 C o n f l i c t  ss. 0 4 * * *
H i gh 30.9 41 .6
C l .  Verbal  Agg. by Cpl 
Lower 4-5 6 .8
Verb.  Agg.= . 1 7 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  s = . o 4 * * *
High 28.8 42 .3
*  p<-05
* *  pc.Ol
**s'e p<,001
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T a b le  5*1 Is H-W M inor  V io l e n c e  by Leve l  o f  C o n f l i c t  and Use o f
N e g o t i a t i o n  T a c t i c s  in  E g a l i t a r i a n  M a r r i a g e s
Negot i a t  i on 
T a c t i  cs
Vio lence  Rate When 
Conf1 i c t  Is:
Lower H i gh Eta Squared
A l .  Reasoning by H 
Lower 7-9 11.3
Reasoning = .002  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 2 * *
Hi gh 5-3 13.3
A2. Reasoning by W 
Lower 7 .8 13.7
Reasoning = .003  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 2 * *
High 5-3 8 .9
81.  Withdrawal by H 
Lower 5-1 7-2
Wi thdrawal = . 0 8 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 2 * *
High 27-0 29 .2
B2. Withdrawal by W 
Lower It.A 7-7
Wi thdrawal = . 0 5 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 2 * *
High 18.3 19-0
C l . Verbal  Agg. by H 
Lower b . 5 5 .3
Verb.  Agg.= . 1 0 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 2 * *
Hi gh 22.7 3A.6
C2. Verbal  Agg. by W 
Lower k . l 6.1
Verb.  Agg.= . 0 6 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  =.01
High 19.0 3A .8
*  p< .05
* *  p<.01
* * *  pc.001
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T a b le  5 - 1 2 :  W-H M ino r  V i o l e n c e  by Leve l  o f  C o n f l i c t  and Use o f
N e g o t i a t i o n  T a c t i c s  in  E g a l i t a r i a n  M a r r i a g e s
N e g o t ia t io n
T a c t ic s
V io len c e  Rate When 
Conf1 i c t  Is:
Lower High Eta Squared
A1. Reasoni ng by H 
Lower 7-2 11.3
Reasoning = .004  
Conf1 i c t  = . 0 1 *
High 7 .0 18.2
A2. Reasoning by W 
Lower 7-1 12.3
Reasoning = .009  
Conf1 i c t  =.01 *
H i gh 7 .0 15-9
B1. Wi thdrawal by H 
Lower 5 .8 10.3
Wi thdrawa1 = . 0 6 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 1 *
High 21 .6 26.1
B2. Wi thdrawa1 by W 
Lower 5 .2 7 .7
Wi thdrawa1 = . 0 6 * * *  
Conf1i c t  = . 0 1 *
High 15.9 2 k . k
C l . Verbal  Agg. by H 
Lower k . 5 l . k
Verb.  Agg.= . 1 1 * * *  
Conf1i c t  = . 0 1 *
High 22.7 3 k .  6
C2. Verbal  Agg. by W 
Lower J*.3 6 .2
Verb.  Agg.= . 1 1 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 1 *
High 20 .3 1*1.7
*  p < .0 5
* *  p c .O l
* * *  p<.001
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T a b le  5 - 13s Couple M ino r  V io l e n c e  by Level  o f  C o n f l i c t  and Use o f
N e g o t i a t i o n  T a c t i c s  i n  E g a l i t a r i a n  M a r r i a g e s
N e g o t ia t io n  
T a c t i  cs
Vio lence  Rate  




Hi gh Eta Squared
A1. Reasoning by Cpl 
Lower 11.6 13.0
Reasoning = . 0 2 * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 2 * *
H i gh 6 .3 22 .9
B l .  Withdrawal by Cpl 
Lower 5 -7 8 .2
Wi thdrawa1 = . 1 1 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 2 * *
High 2 8 . it 26.7
C l .  Verbal  Agg. by Cpl Verb.  Agg.= . 1 2 * * *
Lower 5-2 5.1 C o n f l i c t  = . 0 2 * *
High 25.2 35.0
*  p<.05
* *  p<.01
rtrtrt p< .001
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T a b le  5 *14 :  H-W Minor V i o l e n c e  by Leve l  o f  C o n f l i c t  and Use o f
N e g o t i a t i o n  T a c t i c s  i n  Male Dominant  M a r r i a g e s
N e g o t ia t io n  
Tact i cs




i c t  Is :
High Eta Squared
A l .  Reasoning by H 
Lower 13-2 27 .8
Reasoning = .003  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 5 *
High 12.8 23 .8
A2. Reasoning by W 
Lower 10.8 23 .5
Reasoni ng = .007  
C o n f l i c t  = .0 4 *
High 17-6 3 6 . 4
B1. Wi thdrawal by H 
Lower 12.3 16.7
Wi thdrawal = . 0 9 * * *  
Conf1i c t  = . 0 4 *
High 27-3 44 .4
B2. Withdrawal by W 
Lower 9 -3 16.2
Wi thdrawal = . 08 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 5 *
H i gh 19-5 36 .8
C l . Verbal Agg. by H 
Lower 9 .6 12.1
Verb .  Agg.= . 1 2 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 4 *
High 3 1 .8 39.0
C2. Verbal Agg. by W 
Lower 8 .6 l8 . i t
Verb.  Agg.= . 1 0 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 4 *
High 33.3 36.1
*  p< .05
* *  p c .O l
* * *  p<.001
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T a b le  5 * 1 5 : W-H M ino r  V i o l e n c e  by Leve l  o f  C o n f l i c t  and Use o f
N e g o t i a t i o n  T a c t i c s  in  Male  Dominant  M a r r i a g e s
Negot i a t  ion 
Tact  ics
V io le nce  Rate When 
Conf1 i c t  Is :
Lower High Eta Squared
A1. Reasoni ng by H 
Lower 7 . ft 23-6
Reasoning = .02  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 5 * *
Hi gh 1A.9 19.0
A2. Reasoning by W 
Lower ft .5 23.1
Reasoning = .0 3  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 4 *
Hi gh 19-6 22 .7
B l .  Withdrawal by H 
Lower 11.3 12.2
Wi thdrawal = . 0 5 * *  
C o n f l i c t  = .0A*
High 9.1 ft0.7
B2. Withdrawal by W 
Lower 5 .3 8.1
Wi thdrawal = . 1 0 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 5 * *
High 19-5 35 .9
C l . Verbal  Agg. by H 
Lower 7 . ft 5 .9
Verb.  Agg.= . 1 3 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 3 *
High 27-3 3 f t . 1
C2. Verbal  Agg. by W 
Lower 8 .5 5-1
Verb.  Agg.= . 1 0 * * *  
Conf1 i c t  = .0 f t *
Hi gh 20 .8 3.8.9
*  p< .05
* *  p<.01
* * *  p < .001
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T a b le  5 *1 6 :  Couple  M in o r  V io l e n c e  by Leve l  o f  C o n f l i c t  and Use o f
N e g o t i a t i o n  T a c t i c s  in  Male Dominant  M a r r i a g e s
Negoti  a t io n  
Tact i cs




i c t  Is :
High Eta Squared
A1. Reasoning by Cpl 
Lower 13-7 36.8
Reasoning =.01  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 7 * *
High 21 .!» 31 .3
B l .  Withdrawal by Cpl 
Lower 7-9 13.3
Wi thdrawa1 = . 1 6 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 7 * *
High 32.5 1*8.9
C l .  Verbal  Agg. by Cpl Verb.  Agg.= . 2 0 * * *
Lower 6 .3 7-7 C o n f l i c t  = . 0 5 * *
High 1*0 . 5 1*7-9
*  p<.05
* *  p<.01  
fcftrt pc.001
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low and medium c o n f l i c t  c a t e g o r i e s  i n t o  one,  and le ave  th e
high c o n f l i c t  group as i s .  Thus the  f o l lo w in g  a n a ly s is  t h a t
compares c o n f l i c t ,  n e g o t i a t i o n  and v io le n c e  fo r  each m a r i t a l  
power s t r u c t u r e  is more e x p lo r a to r y  than d e f i n i t i v e .  The 
problem of expected c e l l  f requenc ie s  and the percent  of  
c e l l s  involved is problemmatic fo r  some m a r i t a l  power types,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  female and male dominant,  which had small 
sample s i z e s .  However, what is o f  i n t e r e s t  in t h i s  a n a ly s is  
of  how or i f  the power s t r u c t u r e  changes the r e l a t i o n  
between c o n f l i c t ,  n e g o t ia t io n  and v io le n c e  are  the general  
p a t te rn s  t h a t  the da ta  i n d i c a t e .
T a b le  5 *5  to  5 *16  present the data  on c o n f l i c t ,  
n e g o t i a t i o n  and v io le n c e  f o r  each m a r i t a l  power s t r u c t u r e .  
Table  S- 5  to  5 *7  consider  t h i s  r e l a t i o n  in female dominant  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s ;  Tables  5 -8  to 5*10  in  d iv id e d  power, Tables  
5-11 to  5 -1 3  fo r  egal.i t a r  ian ,  and Tables 5 -1^  to 5 .1 6  fo r
male dominant.  As in p r i o r  analyses ,  the v io le n c e  r a te s  fo r
husband to w i f e  minor v io le n c e  f o r  husband's use of  
n e g o t i a t i o n  t a c t i c s  and fo r  w i f e ' s  use of  n e g o t ia t io n  
t a c t i c s ,  v io le n c e  ra te s  fo r  w i f e  to  husband minor v io le n c e  
fo r  husband's use of  t a c t i c s  and w i f e ' s  use of  t a c t i c s ,  and 
couple minor v io le n c e  f o r  couples '  use o f  t a c t i c s  are  
presented fo r  each m a r i t a l  power t y p e . .
V io le n c e  Rates
Examination of  the data  in Table  5 . 5  to  5 .16 in general  
suggests th a t  the power s t r u c t u r e  o f  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  does 
not a l t e r  the r e l a t i o n  between c o n f l i c t ,  n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s
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and v io le n c e .  O v e r a l l ,  the f in d in g s  are  q u i t e  co n s is te n t
w i th  the p r i o r  a n a l y s is .  When the data  on reasoning are
examined, P ar t  A o f  Table  5*5  to  5 *1 6 ,  i t  is  e v id e n t  th a t  
the  lev e l  o f  c o n f l i c t  e xp la in s  more of  the v a r ia n c e  in the  
v io le n c e  r a t e  than does the use of  reasoning,  regard less  of  
the m a r i t a l  power s t r u c t u r e .  This is c le a r  when the e ta  
squared c o e f f i c i e n t s  are  examined. The c o e f f i c i e n t  fo r  
leve l  of  c o n f l i c t  is much l a r g e r  than the same c o e f f i c i e n t  
f o r  reasoning and always s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  w h i le
the s ig n i f i c a n c e  level  of  the c o e f f i c i e n t  fo r  reasoning is 
in c o n s is te n t .  When t h i s  r e l a t i o n  is examined using the  
m utua l ly  e x c lu s iv e  measure o f  couple v io le n c e ,  P a r t  A of  
Table  A .2 to A.5 in Appendix A, the same r e s u l t s  are  
e v id e n t .
On the o ther  hand, the data  in Par t  B and P a r t  C of  
Table  5 -5  to  5 *1 6 ,  which address the use of  w ithdrawal and 
verba l  aggression,  show t h a t  i t  is the n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c  
t h a t  ex p la in s  more of  the v a r ia n c e  in the v io le n c e  r a t e  than  
the leve l  of  c o n f l i c t .  The e ta  squared c o e f f i c i e n t s  fo r  
withdrawal and verba l  aggression a re  much la rg e r  than the  
same c o e f f i c i e n t  fo r  lev e l  of  c o n f l i c t .  This  is co n s is te n t  
w i th  the p r i o r  a n a l y s is .
In a d d i t i o n ,  when the v io le n c e  ra te s  are  considered,  
the data  in d ic a te  t h a t  the lower ra tes  of  v io le n c e  are
assoc iated  w i th  the use of  reasoning and t h a t  the  v io le n c e  
r a t e  increases when withdrawal and verba l  aggression are  
used. This  is a lso  c o n s is te n t  w i th  the p r i o r  a n a ly s is .
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Div ided Power Marr i ages
There a re ,  however, some important except ions  to  t h i s  
o v e r a l l  p a t te r n  w i t h i n  each m a r i t a l  power s t r u c t u r e .  W i th in  
the d iv id e d  power m arr iages ,  reasoning appears to  be r e la t e d  
to  the v io le n c e  r a t e  but only  under c e r t a i n  c o n d i t io n s .  The 
data  i n d ic a t e  th a t  on ly  fo r  husband to w i f e ,  Table  5 - 8 ,  and 
couple v io le n c e ,  Table  5 *1 0 ,  when both par tners  use 
reasoning,  there  are  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  
in the v io le n c e  r a t e .  But again ,  c o n tra ry  to  the  
ex pe c ta t ions  of  c o n f l i c t  theory ,  the v io le n c e  r a t e  increases  
when higher  le v e ls  o f  reasoning a re  used. Previous analyses  
suggested t h a t  reasoning played no r o l e  in the suppression  
of  v io le n c e ,  t h a t  i f  c o n f l i c t  was high v io le n c e  would a lso  
inc rea se .  The data  on the d iv id e d  power marriages show t h a t  
a t  least '  under some c ircumstances,  most notab ly  high 
c o n f l i c t ,  the use of  reasoning is associated  w i th  increases  
in the p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  v io le n c e .  This  f in d in g  a lso  holds  
when the m utua l ly  e x c lu s iv e  measure of  couple v io le n c e  is 
used, Table  A . 3 in Appendix A, however the e ta  squared  
s t a t i s t i c  is not s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t .
I t  is only  w i t h i n  the d iv id e d  power group t h a t  the re  is
any c o n s is te n t  evidence to in d ic a te  t h a t  reasoning has any
impact on the v io le n c e  r a t e ,  and even then,  the data




Maie Oomi nant Marr i ages
Male dominant r e la t i o n s h i p s  present  a cur ious p i c t u r e  
of  how n e g o t ia t io n  a f f e c t s  v io le n c e  ra tes  a t  d i f f e r e n t  
l e v e ls  of  c o n f l i c t .  In g e n e ra l ,  the da ta  support previous
f in d in g s  t h a t  the more d e s t r u c t i v e  the t a c t i c  and the
g r e a t e r  the c o n f l i c t ,  the g re a te r  the p r o b a b i l i t y  of  
v io le n c e .  However, th e r  are c e r t a i n  inc ons is te nc ies  in male 
dominant r e l a t i o n s h i p s  t h a t  are  more e x p la in a b le  than
o th e r s .  I f  we consider  husband to  w i f e  v io le n c e  and w i f e ' s
use of  n e g o t ia t io n  the data  very  s t r o n g ly  suggest t h a t  no 
m atte r  what t a c t i c  she uses to  n e g o t ia te  c o n f l i c t ,  i f  
c o n f l i c t  is  h igh ,  v io le n c e  is l i k e l y .  In f a c t ,  i f  the  
v io le n c e  ra te s  f o r  high c o n f l i c t  a re  examined, i t  is c le a r  
t h a t  even when withdrawal  and verbal  aggression are  o f te n  
used the is no change in the r a t e  o f  v io le n c e .  A l l  ra te s  
are  36% regard less  o f  what t a c t i c  is under c o n s id e r a t io n .
Other o d d i t i e s  in the data  occur fo r  w i f e  to  husband 
v io le n c e  in male dominant r e l a t i o n s h i p s  but the sex of  the
t a c t i c  user and the type of  t a c t i c  vary  too o f t e n  fo r  any 
rea l  e xp la n a t io n  to be o f f e r e d .  At high c o n f l i c t ,  the  
p a t t e r n  i d e n t i f i e d  throughout t h i s  research  holds: reasoning  
is not assoc ia ted  w i th  the v io le n c e  r a t e ,  w h i le  withdrawal  
and verba l  aggression are  associated  w i th  higher f requencies  
of v io le n c e .
Page 128
T h e  D i r e c t  i o n  o f  V i o l e n c e  a n d  t h e  A g g r e s s o r  a n d  V i c t i m  U se  
o f  N e g o t i a t i o n
T h i s  r e s e a r c h  e x a m i n e s  how  a g g r e s s o r s  ( e . g .  t h e
h u s b a n d ' s  u s e  o f  n e g o t i a t i o n  i n  h u s b a n d  t o  w i f e  v i o l e n c e )
a n d  v i c t i m s  ( e . g .  w i f e ' s  u s e  o f  n e g o t i a t i o n  i n  h u s b a n d  t o  
w i f e  v i o l e n c e )  u s e  n e g o t i a t i o n  t a c t i c s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  c o u p l e  
v i o l e n c e  a n d  t h e  c o u p l e s  c o m b i n e d  u s e  o f  n e g o t i a t i o n  t a c t i c s  
a r e  e x a m i n e d .
T h e  d e c i s i o n  t o  e x a m i n e  t h e  d a t a  i n  t h i s  w a y  w a s  mad e 
f o r  s e v e r a l  r e a s o n s .  F i r s t ,  b o t h  h u s b a n d  t o  w i f e  a n d  w i f e  
t o  h u s b a n d  v i o l e n c e  a r e  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  a n a l y s i s  b e c a u s e  t o  
a d e q u a t e l y  a s s e s s  how t h e  p o w e r  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  a f f e c t s  t h e  l e v e l  o f  c o n f l i c t  a n d  t h e  r a t e  o f  
v i o l e n c e ,  v i o l e n c e  b y  b o t h  p a r t i e s  n e e d s  t o  b e  c o n s i d e r e d .  
T h e  i n c l u s i o n  o f  b o t h  t y p e s  o f  v i o l e n c e  a l l o w s  t h e  d a t a  t o  
b e  u s e d  t o  e x p l a i n  c o u p l e  v i o l e n c e  r a t h e r  t h a n  i n d i v i d u a l  
v i o l e n c e .  When b o t h  p a r t n e r s  a r e  v i o l e n t ,  i t  may r e p r e s e n t
d i s t i n c t l y  d i f f e r e n t  m a r i t a l  d y n a m i c s  t h a n  w h e n  t h e r e  i s  a 
s i n g l e  a g g r e s s o r  a n d  v i c t i m .
S e c o n d ,  t h e  i n c l u s i o n  o f  h u s b a n d s  a n d  w i v e s  u s e  o f  
n e g o t i a t i o n  t a c t i c s  p r o v i d e s  a m e a n s  t o  e x a m i n e  ho w  t h e  u s e  
o f  p r o g r e s s i v e l y  l e s s  c o n s t r u c t i v e  t a c t i c s  i s  a s s o c i a t e d  
w i t h  t h e  r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  c o n f l i c t  a n d  v i o l e n c e .  I t  i s
p o s s i b l e ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h a t  v e r y  d i f f e r e n t  a s s o c i a t i o n s  
b e t w e e n  t h e  v a r i a b l e s  c a n  e m e r g e  w h e n  a v i c t i m  u s e s  a 
c e r t a i n  t a c t i c  c o m p a r e d  t o  t h e  a g g r e s s o r ' s  u s e  o f  t h e  same  
















Figure 5.5a Percent of Husband to Wife 
Minor Violence when Conflict is High, 
Aggressor's Use of Negotiation Tactic 




Figure 5.5b Percent of Husband to Wife 
Minor Violence when Conflict is High, 
Victim's Use of Negotiation Tactic is 
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Figure 5.6a Percent of Wife to Husband 
Minor Violence when Conflict is High, 
Aggressor's Use of Negotiation Tactic 





Figure 5.6b Percent of Wife to Husband 
Minor Violence when Conflict is High, 
Victim's Use of Negotiation Tactic is 
High for each Power Structure
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Figures  5*5  and 5*6  i l l u s t r a t e  the changes in the  
v io le n c e  r a t e  when the aggressor uses the n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c  
and when the v ic t i m  uses the same t a c t i c .  These f ig u r e s  
provide  a means to compare the v io le n c e  ra te s  by who is the  
aggressor and who is the v i c t i m .  Figure  5 -5 shows th is  
r e l a t i o n  w i t h i n  each power s t r u c t u r e  in husband to w i fe  
v io le n c e  where the le v e l  of  c o n f l i c t  and use of  n e g o t ia t io n  
t a c t i c  are  h igh .  F igure  5 *6  presents  the same data  fo r  w i fe  
to husband v io le n c e .
The r e l a t i o n s h i p  shown in Figure  5*5 suggests a f a i r l y  
co n s is te n t  p a t te rn  fo r  husband to w i f e  v io le n c e .  The 
v io le n c e  ra te s  increase  as the less c o n s t r u c t iv e  t a c t i c s  are  
used, and the v io le n c e  ra te s  are  somewhat lower when women, 
the v io le n c e  v ic t i m s ,  use reasoning,  w ithdrawal and verbal  
aggression compared to when men, the aggressors,  use the  
same t a c t i c .  This  f i n d i n g  holds fo r  each power s t r u c t u r e .
The data  in F igure  5 *6  in d ic a te  a d i f f e r e n t  p a t t e r n  fo r  
w i f e  to  husband v i o le n c e ,  where men are  the v i c t i m s .  I t  
suggests t h a t ,  fo r  a l l  but the e g a l i t a r i a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  
withdrawal is assoc ia ted  w i th  more v io le n c e  than verba l  
aggression.  There a re  dramat ic  increases in the v io le n c e  
r a t e  when men use wi thdrawal  as a n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c  in 
female dominant,  male dominant and d iv id e d  power s t r u c t u r e s .  
The f in d in g s  suggest t h a t  th e re  are  gender d i f f e r e n c e s  in 
the type of  n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c  th a t  is assoc iated  w i th  
increases in the v io le n c e  r a t e .  I t  appears to in d ic a te  th a t  
women w i l l  r e s o r t  to v io le n c e  more o f t e n  when men re fuse  to
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d e a l  w i  t h  c o n f 1 i c t .
T h e r e  a r e  s e v e r a l  p l a u s i b l e  e x p l a n a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  
f i n d i n g  i f  t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  w i t h d r a w a l  i s  c o n s i d e r e d  i n  t h e
c o n t e x t  o f  m a r i t a l  c o n f l i c t .  W i t h d r a w a l  may  i m p l y  t h a t  t h e  
p a r t n e r  d i s c o u n t s  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  t h e  i s s u e  t o  t h e  s p o u s e ,  
t h a t  t h e  i s s u e  i s  n o t  c o n s i d e r e d  w o r t h y  o f  d i s c u s s i o n .  T h e  
f i n d i n g s  b y  F i s h m a n  ( 1 9 7 7 . 1 9 7 8 )  s u g g e s t  t h a t  men u s e
s i l e n c e  a n d  n o n  r e s p o n s e  t o  c o n t r o l  c o n v e r s a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e i r  
w i v e s .  T h e  d a t a  i n  t h i s  s t u d y  s u g g e s t  t h a t  v i o l e n c e  may b e  
u s e d  b y  w om en  i n  r e a c t i o n  t o  t h e i r  h u s b a n d ' s  w i t h d r a w a l ,  
p e r h a p s  a s  a w a y  t o  d r a w  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  t h e  
i s s u e  t o  t h e m ,  o r  t o  j u s t  g e t  t h e i r  h u s b a n d ' s  a t t e n t i o n .
T h i s  e x p l a n a t i o n  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  d a t a  i n  F i g u r e  
5 . 6  t h a t  s h o w s  a d e c r e a s e  i n  t h e  v i o l e n c e  r a t e  w h e n  v e r b a l  
a g g r e s s i o n  i s  u s e d  b y  t h e  h u s b a n d .  E v e n  t h o u g h  v e r b a l  
a g g r e s s i o n  i s  n o t  a c o n s t r u c t i v e  n e g o t i a t i o n  t a c t i c ,  i t  a t  
l e a s t  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  h u s b a n d  i s  r e s p o n d i n g  i n  some 
f a s h i o n  t o  t h e  c o n f l i c t .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t
w i t h d r a w a l  b y  men i n  e g a l i t a r i a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  d o e s  n o t  
a p p e a r  t o  b e  a s  h i g h l y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  v i o l e n c e  c o m p a r e d  t o  
o t h e r  p o w e r  s t r u c t u r e s .  T h e  d a t a  i n  t h e s e  F i g u r e s  r e p o r t
o n l y  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  a t  h i g h  l e v e l s  o f  c o n f l i c t .  I t  i s
i m p o r t a n t  t o  k e e p  i n  m i n d  how l e v e l  o f  c o n f l i c t  i s  
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Reasorung With. Verbal Agg.
Negotiation Tactics
Figure 5.7 Couple Minor Violence when 
Conflict is High & Use of Negotiation 





Reasoning With. Verial Agg. 
Negotiation Tactice
Figure 5.8 Couple Minor Violence when 
Conflict is Low & Use of Negotiation 






The Im por tance  o f  C o n f 1 i c t  t o  Mar i t a l  V i o l e n c e
Figures 5 -7  and 5 *8  suggests the importance t h a t  the  
leve l  o f  c o n f l i c t  plays in the  a s s o c ia t io n  between 
n e g o t ia t io n  and v io le n c e  fo r  each power s t r u c t u r e .  Figure  
5-7  shows the r a t e  of  couple minor v io le n c e  fo r  each power 
s t r u c t u r e  when c o n f l i c t  is high and when the use o f  each 
n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c  is h igh .  F igure  5*8  shows the dramat ic  
decrease in the v io le n c e  r a t e  under the same co n d i t io n s  
except t h a t  the leve l  o f  c o n f l i c t  is low.
The f in d in g s  summarized in Figures  5*7  and 5 -8  suggest  
t h a t  the leve l  of  c o n f l i c t  and the power s t r u c t u r e  of  the  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  are  both important  in e x p la in in g  m a r i t a l  
v io le n c e .  The f in d in g s  suggest t h a t  reducing the lev e l  of  
c o n f l i c t  w i l l  r e s u l t  in less v i o le n c e ,  but t h a t  e g a l i t a r i a n  
r e la t i o n s h i p s  have the lowest r a t e  of  m a r i t a l  v io le n c e  
regard less  of  the leve l  of  c o n f l i c t .
SUMMARY
This  chapter has focused • on examining the r e l a t i o n  
between c o n f l i c t ,  n e g o t ia t io n  and v io le n c e ,  and how the  
power s t r u c t u r e  of  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  a f f e c t s  th a t  
a s s o c ia t io n .  Perhaps the most important  f i n d i n g  is the  
ne ces s i ty  of  in c o rp o ra t in g  the power r e l a t i o n s  between 
in t im a tes  in to  any a n a ly s is  of  m a r i t a l  i n t e r a c t i o n .  The 
power s t r u c t u r e  o f  the r e l a t i o n  has a s i g n i f i c a n t  impact on 
the r e l a t i o n  between c o n f l i c t  and v io le n c e .  E g a l i t a r i a n  
r e la t i o n s h i p s  not on ly  have the le a s t  amount of  v io le n c e  but  
t h i s  low r a t e  of  v io le n c e  remains even when c o n f l i c t  is
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high.  Other m a r i t a l  power s t r u c t u r e  do not have t h i s  
p ro p e r ty .  For a l l  but the e g a l i t a r i a n s ,  th e re  are  large  
increases in the v io le n c e  r a t e  when c o n f l i c t  increases from 
medium to h igh .  One p rope r ty  o f  e g a l i t a r i a n  marriages t h a t  
t h i s  research i d e n t i f i e s ,  and t h a t  is c r i t i c a l  given the  
n ature  of  m arr iage  and the f a m i l y ,  is t h a t  when power is  
e q u i t a b ly  d i s t r i b u t e d  the s t r u c t u r e  can t o l e r a t e  c o n f l i c t  
w ith o u t  e s p e c i a l l y  la rge  increases in v io le n c e .
Second, the r e l a t i o n  between c o n f l i c t ,  n e g o t ia t io n  and 
v io le n c e  was reexamined to  consider how p ro g re s s iv e ly  less  
c o n s t r u c t iv e  means o f  s e t t l i n g  d isputes  a f f e c t  the r a t e  of  
v io le n c e .  P r io r  work by Straus  e t .  a l .  (1980 ) was
extended to  inc lude wi thdrawal  and verba l  aggression as 
n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s  so t h a t  the r a t e  of  v io le n c e  when those 
t a c t i c s  are  used could be compared to  the v io le n c e  r a t e  when 
reasoning is used. The in c lu s io n  of these t a c t i c s  prov ides  
a s tronger  a n a ly s is  of  how n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s  are  
assoc iated  w i th  c o n f l i c t  and v io le n c e .  Th is  research  
c l e a r l y  demonstrated t h a t  the ra te s  when withdrawal and 
verba l  aggression a re  used a re  much higher  than when
reasoning is  used.
Although v io le n c e  ra te s  p ro g re s s iv e ly  increase as less  
constructuve  n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s  are  used, f o r  the most 
p a r t ,  the use of  reasoning does not reduce the r e l a t i o n  
between c o n f l i c t  and v io le n c e ,  which is c o n s is te n t  w i th  the
work by Straus e t .  a l . .  T h e i r  work and t h i s  research show
t h a t  no m atte r  how much reasoning is used, i f  th e re  is high
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c o n f l i c t  the frequency of  v io le n c e  increases .  This  suggests  
t h a t  many of the c o n f l i c t  r e s o l u t i o n  s k i l l s  taught by 
m a r i t a l  t h e r a p is t s  t h a t  r e l y  on reasoning may be 
problemmatic .  Th is  research suggests th a t  w h i le  teaching  
c o n f l i c t  r e s o lu t io n  s k i l l s  is im por tant ,  a more f r u i t f u l  
means of  reducing c o n f l i c t  and thus v io le n c e  is to  a l t e r  the  
power s t r u c t u r e  of  the r e l a t i o n s h i p .
In f a c t ,  when the power s t r u c t u r e  o f  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  
is included in the  a n a ly s is  o f  the r e l a t i o n  between 
c o n f l i c t ,  n e g o t ia t io n  and v io le n c e ,  two po in ts  are  c le a r :  
the r e l a t i o n  is f a i r l y  c o n s is te n t  fo r  a l l  m a r i t a l  power 
s t r u c t u r e s  and even when th e re  is d e v i a t i o n  from th is  
p a t t e r n ,  the data  i n d ic a t e  t h a t  regard less  of  the t a c t i c  
used, i f  th e re  is high c o n f l i c t  th e r e  w i l l  be increases in 
v io le n c e .  This  is  even s t ronger  evidence to support  the  
suggest ion t h a t  to  reduce v io le n c e ,  i t  is  the power 
s t r u c t u r e  of  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  t h a t  must change, and not only  
the means used to s e t t l e  arguments.
Chapte r  VI
CONCLUSIONS
T h i s  r e s e a r c h  b e g a n  w i t h  t h r e e  m a j o r  g o a l s :  t o
i n t e g r a t e  p r i o r  r e s e a r c h  o n  p o w e r ,  c o n f l i c t  a n d  v i o l e n c e ,  t o  
f o c u s  o n  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  p a r t n e r s  
r a t h e r  t h a n  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  a n y  o n e  i n d i v i d u a l ,  a n d  t o  
i n c l u d e  v i o l e n c e  b y  w o m e n .  I t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  r e c o g n i z e  how  
i n t e r r e l a t e d  t h e s e  g o a l s  a r e  d e s p i t e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  e a c h  i s  
s t a t e d  s e p a r a t e l y .
T o  i n t e g r a t e  r e s e a r c h  a n d  t h e o r y  o n  p o w e r ,  c o n f l i c t  a n d  
v i o l e n c e  n e c e s s i t a t e d  t h e  m e a s u r e m e n t  o f  c o n c e p t s  a t  t h e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  l e v e l  o f  a n a l y s i s  n o t  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  l e v e l  o f  
a n a l y s i s .  T h e  f o c u s  o f  r e s e a r c h  w a s  n o t  o n  t h e  h u s b a n d ' s  
r e s o u r c e s  t h a t  e n a b l e  h i m  t o  h o l d  p o w e r ,  b u t  o n  w h o  m a k e s  
t h e  f i n a l  d e c i s i o n s  o n  a n u m b e r  o f  i t e m s  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  
o t h e r  p a r t n e r .  I n  t h a t  s e n s e  p o w e r  a s  u s e d  i n  t h i s  r e s e a r c h  
i s  a m e a s u r e  o f  r e l a t i o n s h i p  p o w e r .
T h e  m e a s u r e  o f  c o n f l i c t  i s  s i m i l a r l y  a m e a s u r e  o f  t h o s e  
a r e a s  o f  t h e  i n t i m a t e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t h a t  c a u s e  p r o b l e m s  f o r  
b o t h  p a r t n e r s .  A l t h o u g h  t h e  m e a s u r e s  o f  v i o l e n c e  d e s i g n a t e  
d i f f e r e n t  a g g r e s s o r - v i c t i m  d y a d s ,  a s  i n  h u s b a n d  t o  w i f e  
v i o l e n c e  o r  w i f e  t o  h u s b a n d  v i o l e n c e ,  i t  i s  a m e a s u r e  o f  a
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p r o p e r t y  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e c a u s e  i t  r e q u i r e s  t h e
p r e s e n c e  o f  b o t h  p a r t n e r s .  T h i s  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  i n t e r p r e t e d
a s  s u g g e s t i n g  t h a t  t h e  v i c t i m  o f  v i o l e n c e  i s  a n  a c t i v e  
p a r t i c i p a n t  i n  t h e  v i o l e n c e ,  b u t  t h a t  f o r  a v i o l e n t  a c t  t o  
o c c u r  b o t h  p a r t i e s  m u s t  b e  p h y s i c a l l y  p r e s e n t .  V i o l e n c e  
b e c o m e s  a p r o p e r t y  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  i n t i m a t e s  
b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  t h a t  v i o l e n c e  h a s  o n  t h e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p .  L i k e  p o w e r ,  i t  s h a p e s  a n d  d e f i n e s  t h e
b o u n d a r i e s  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p .
T o  u n d e r s t a n d  how p o w e r ,  c o n f l i c t  a n d  v i o l e n c e  a r e  
r e l a t e d  d e m a n d e d  t h e  i n c l u s i o n  o f  w o m e n s '  v i o l e n c e  i n  t h e  
a n a l y s i s .  T o  r e s t r i c t  t h e  r e s e a r c h  t o  o n l y  h u s b a n d  t o  w i f e  
v i o l e n c e  w o u l d  n o t  h a v e  p r o v i d e d  a n  a p p r o p r i a t e  t e s t  o f  t h e  
h y p o t h e s e s .  T h e  c o n c l u s i o n s  w o u l d  h a v e  n e c e s s a r i l y  b e e n  
l i m i t e d  t o  e x p l a i n i n g  h u s b a n d  t o  w i f e  v i o l e n c e  w h e n  i n  f a c t  
t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  t h e  r e s e a r c h  w a s  t o  a n a l y z e  m a r i t a l  v i o l e n c e .
H o w e v e r ,  t h e  m o s t  s i g n i f i c a n t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  o f  t h i s  
r e s e a r c h  e v o l v e d  f r o m  t h e  g o a l  o f  i n t e g r a t i n g  p r i o r  r e s e a r c h  
o n  p o w e r ,  c o n f l i c t  a n d  v i o l e n c e .  T h e  m o d e l  t h a t  h a s  g u i d e d  
t h i s  r e s e a r c h  f r o m  b o t h  a t h e o r e t i c a l  a n d  m e t h o d o l o g i c a l  
p e r s p e c t i v e  f i r s t  e x a m i n e d  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  p o w e r  
a n d  c o n f l i c t  a n d  ho w  t h a t  a s s o c i a t i o n  w as  m e d i a t e d  b y  t h e  
l e g i t i m a t i o n  o f  t h e  p o w e r  s t r u c t u r e .  T h e  s e c o n d  p h a s e  o f  
t h e  a n a l y s i s  e x a m i n e d  t h e  r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  c o n f l i c t ,  
n e g o t i a t i o n  a n d  v i o l e n c e  a n d  w h e t h e r  t h e  p o w e r  s t r u c t u r e  
a l t e r e d  t h a t  r e l a t i o n .  T h e  n e e d  t o  i n t e g r a t e  t h e s e  c o n c e p t s  
i n t o  o n e  e x p l a n a t o r y  m o d e l  w a s  e v i d e n t  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e
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c o n t r a d ic t io n s  in e m p ir ic a l  research and t h e o r e t i c a l  
pred i c t  i ons .
A re c u r r in g  c r i t i q u e  of  the m a r i t a l  power l i t e r a t u r e  
has been the use of  power as a dependent v a r i a b l e ,  prompting  
Sprey (1972) to ask what t h e o r e t i c a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n  is made by 
knowing who w ie lds  the power. MacDonald (1980) has asked
what a re  the costs o f  power, both fo r  the person in power
and the t a r g e t  of  t h a t  power. Th is  study used the m a r i t a l  
power s t r u c t u r e  as the s t a r t i n g  p o in t  from which a n a ly s is  
proceeds and i d e n t i f i e s  the t h e o r e t i c a l  c o n t r ib u t io n s  t h a t  
are  made by knowing who w ie lds  the power, and the cost of  
t h a t  power.
LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH
I t  is important ,  however, to keep in mind the 
l i m i t a t i o n s  of  t h i s  rese arch .  The major l i m i t a t i o n  is th a t  
the data  come from a sample of  in d iv id u a ls  t h a t  were
in terv iewed a t  one p o in t  in t im e .  Statements of  causal
in fe renc e  need to be made w i th  c au t io n  when data  are  
c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l .
Th is  is a p a r t i c u l a r  problem in the a n a ly s is  of  the  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between c o n f l i c t ,  n e g o t ia t io n  and v io le n c e .  As 
suggested p r e v io u s ly ,  th e re  is good reason to base the 
a n a ly s is  on the causal  order  t h i s  research s p e c i f i e s ,  
because c o n f l i c t  is viewed as i n e v i t a b l e  in socia l  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  The i n e v i t a b i l i t y  o f  c o n f l i c t  e s t a b l is h es  
i t s  causal  r e l a t i o n  to  n e g o t ia t io n  and v io le n c e .
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I t  i s  m o r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  c a u s a l  o r d e r  f o r  
n e g o t i a t i o n  t a c t i c s  a n d  v i o l e n c e .  I t  c o u l d  b e ,  a s  w a s  n o t e d  
b e f o r e ,  t h a t  t h e  u s e  o f  r e a s o n i n g ,  w i t h d r a w a l  a n d  v e r b a l  
a g g r e s s i o n  i s  a r e s p o n s e  t o  t h e  v i o l e n c e .  On t h e  o t h e r  
h a n d ,  i t  i s  a l s o  p l a u s i b l e  t o  s u g g e s t  t h a t  w h e n  c o n f l i c t  
a r i s e s ,  i n d i v i d u a l s  u s e  n e g o t i a t i o n  t a c t i c s  t o  a d d r e s s  t h a t  
c o n f l i c t .  I n  some c a s e s  t h e  t a c t i c s  s u c c e s s f u l l y  r e s o l v e  
t h e  c o n f l i c t .  I n  o t h e r  c a s e s ,  t h e r e  i s  n o  r e s o l u t i o n  a n d  
v i o l e n c e  o c c u r s .
T h e  l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  r e s e a r c h  a l s o  s u g g e s t  f u t u r e  
d i r e c t i o n s  f o r  r e s e a r c h .  One o f  t h e  m a j o r  f i n d i n g s  
d i s c u s s e d  b e l o w  c o n c e r n s  t h e  u s e  o f  r e a s o n i n g  a s  a t a c t i c .  
T h e  f i n d i n g s  s u g g e s t  t h a t  r e a s o n i n g  i s  a n  i n s u f f i c i e n t  
n e g o t i a t i o n  t a c t i c  t o  u s e  t o  p r e v e n t  v i o l e n c e .  F u t u r e  
r e s e a r c h  may  w a n t  t o  f o c u s  o n  t h i s  c u r i o u s  p i c t u r e  o f  how t o  
d e a l  w i t h  c o n f l i c t .  T h e  n e e d  f o r  a d d i t i o n a l  r e s e a r c h  i n  
t h i s  a r e a  i s  a p p a r e n t  i f  we  c o n s i d e r  t h a t  m a r i t a l  t h e r a p y  
o f t e n  f o c u s e s  o n  t e a c h i n g  c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  s k i l l s  t o  c l i e n t s  
e x p e r i e n c i n g  m a r i t a l  c o n f l i c t .  T h e  f i n d i n g s  f r o m  t h i s  
r e s e a r c h  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h i s  f o c u s  may b e  i n a p p r o p r i a t e .  
T h e r a p i e s  t h a t  t a k e  a m o r e  f e m i n i s t  p e r s p e c t i v e  a n d  t e a c h  
a s s e r t i v e n e s s  a n d  e m p o w e r m e n t  s k i l l s  may p r o v i d e  a m o r e  
u s e f u l  a p p r o a c h  b e c a u s e  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  t h e  p o w e r  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  i s  r e c o g n i z e d .
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MAJOR FINDINGS 
The Power S t r u c tu r e  o f  Amer i can Marr i ages
The f in d in g s  from t h i s  research confi rm the d i v e r s i t y  
in the power s t r u c t u r e  of  American m arr iages ,  as measured by 
who has the  f i n a l  say in d e c is io n  making.  Th is  study found 
t h a t  53.5% of the sample had a power s t r u c t u r e  th a t  
r e f l e c t e d  a d i v i s i o n  of  d e c is io n  making such t h a t  one 
p a r tn e r  makes the dec is ions  on some issues,  and the other  
p a r tn e r  makes the de c is ions  on another  set  of  issues.  Only 
2 8 . 7% of the sample can be descr ibed  as e g a l i t a r i a n ,  where 
both p a r tn e rs  p a r t i c i p a t e  in d e c is io n  making on the same 
issues a t  l e a s t  t w o - t h i r d s  of  the t im e .  On the o ther  hand, 
the percentages of  female and male dominant marriages are  
f a i r l y  s i m i l a r .  7*5% are  female dominant and 9*3% are  male 
domi nant .
Blood and Wolfe ( i 960) , Komaravsky (19&2) and Scanzoni 
( 1981) suggest th e r e  are  so c ia l  c lass  d i f f e r e n c e s  in power 
s t r u c t u r e .  Except a t  the lowest s ta tus  l e v e l s ,  the  
husband's power g e n e r a l l y  increases w i th  so c ia l  s t a t u s .  
This  study found t h a t  the only c las s  d i f f e r e n c e s  were in 
male dominant marr iages ,  which tend to occur more o f te n  
among b lue  c o l l a r  m arr iages .
Although fo r  d i f f e r e n t  reasons, Blood and Wolfe (1960) 
and G i l l e s p i e  (1971) suggest t h a t  the  stage of  the fa m i ly  
l i f e  c y c le  is r e la t e d  to women's power in m a rr iage .  That  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  was not found in t h i s  research .  The stage of  
the f a m i ly  l i f e  c y c le ,  measured by number of  years married
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or to g e th e r ,  was examined fo r  each m a r i t a l  power type and no 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  were found. The 
f in d in g s  suggest t h a t  the power s t r u c t u r e  remains s ta b le  
over the course of  the l i f e  c y c le .
The r e l a t i o n  between w i f e  employment and power was 
examined. Cons is tent  w i th  the work by Brown ( 1980) ,  the  
data suggest t h a t  a woman's a b i l i t y  to  exerc is e  power in the  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  is c lo s e ly  t i e d  to  her a b i l i t y  to earn a 
s u b s t a n t ia l  p o r t io n  of  the fa m i ly  income. E g a l i t a r i a n  and 
female dominant r e l a t i o n s h i p s  occur more o f t e n  when the w i fe  
c o n t r ib u te s  a la rg e  percentage of  earnings to the fa m i ly  
income. In t h i s  s tudy,  the e x e r c is e  of  male power does not  
appear to be as c lo s e ly  t i e d  to e a rn in g s .  Male dominant 
r e l a t i o n s  occured more o f t e n  when the man earned 0% of the  
fa m i ly  inome than when he earned 100% of  the fa m i ly  income. 
This  is c o n s is te n t  w i th  the f e m i n i s t  c r i t i q u e  of  the fa m i ly  
l i t e r a t u r e  t h a t  i d e n t i f i e s  s o c ia l  s t r u c t u r a l  p r o p e r t ie s  th a t  
prevent  women from e x e r c is in g  more m a r i t a l  power because of  
t h e i r  l i m i t e d  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in the  workplace and the lack of  
socia l  s ta tu s  a t ta ched  to  the jo b  of  housewife .  ( G i l l e s p i e ,  
1971; Oakley,  1972; Acker,  1973; Thorne,  1982) .
Mar i t a 1 Power and Conf1i c t
A major concern of  t h i s  research was to examine the  
r e l a t i o n  between the m a r i t a l  power s t r u c t u r e  and the  leve l  
of c o n f l i c t .  Th is  was the f i r s t  s tep  to  understanding the  
seeming c o n t r a d ic t io n s  between th e o r ie s  which s t a t e  th a t  
e g a l i t a r i a n  marriages have more c o n f l i c t ,  and th e o r ie s  (and
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a lso  research f in d in g s )  which i n d ic a t e  th a t  e g a l i t a r i a n  
f a m i l i e s  are  less v i o l e n t .  How can such f a m i l i e s  have both  
a higher  level  of  c o n f l i c t  (which is known to  be assoc iated  
w ith  v io le n ce )  and a lower leve l  o f  v io lence?  Two 
e xp la na t ions  were o f f e r e d :  1. e g a l i t a r i a n  r e la t i o n s h i p s  do 
not have more c o n f l i c t ,  or 2.  e g a l i t a r i a n  r e la t i o n s h i p s  
have g r e a t e r  c o n f l i c t  but reso lve  c o n f l i c t  more 
c o n s t r u c t i v e l y  and thus avoid v io le n c e .
More c o n f l i c t  in e g a l i t a r i a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  is p re d ic te d  
because of the nece ss i ty  o f  n e g o t ia t in g  the power 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  (Scanzoni,  1978; W h i te h u rs t ,  197*0 because of  
g r e a t e r  int imacy in e g a l i t a r i a n  marriages due to  increased  
shar ing  (Blood and Wolfe ,  I960; Brown, 1980) and because men 
are u n l i k e l y  to  w i l l i n g l y  give  up the power t h a t  has been 
ascr ibed to  them (Toby, 197**; S traus ,  1980; and Y l l o ,  1982)
Contrary  to  these v iews,  the r e s u l t s  of  t h i s  study  
c l e a r l y  demonstrates t h a t  e g a l i t a r i a n  r e la t i o n s h i p s  have the  
1 east amount of  c o n f l i c t  and male dominant r e la t i o n s h i p s  
have the h ighest  l e v e ls  of  c o n f l i c t .
One reason the re  may be lower l e v e ls  of  c o n f l i c t  in 
e g a l i t a r i a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  is simply  because the power is 
e q u i t a b ly  d i s t r i b u t e d .  As pointed out p r e v io u s ly ,  c o n f l i c t  
a r is e s  i f  subordinants  are  d i s s a t i s f i e d  w i th  the balance of  
power, e s p e c i a l l y  i f  the balance is perce ived as 
i l l e g i t i m a t e .  In e g a l i t a r i a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  n e i th e r  pa r tne r  
is subordinant to  the o t h e r ,  and as the f o l lo w in g  d iscussion  
in d ic a t e s ,  e g a l i t a r i a n  r e la t io n s h ip s  have the h ighest  leve l
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of  agreement over how the power is d i s t r i b u t e d .  Two sources 
of  c o n f l i c t  in in t im a te  r e la t i o n s h i p s  — in e q u i t a b le  power 
d i s t r i b u t i o n s  and the perce ived leg i t im a c y  of the power 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  — are  minimized in e g a l i t a r i a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .
The Legi timacy of Power and Conf1 i c t
An importa t  c r i t i c i s m  of much of the m a r i t a l  power 
l i t e r a t u r e  is the v a r i e t y  of  d e f i n i t i o n s  of  m a r i t a l  power 
and the confusion of power w i th  a u t h o r i t y  ( S a f i l i o s  
R o th sc h i ld ,  1970; Cromwell and Olson (1975) MacDonald 
(19 80 ) .  Tal lman and M i l l e r  (1979) s t a t e  t h a t  i t  is not the  
power s t r u c t u r e  but the inconsistency between actua l  power 
and power norms t h a t  e f f e c t  the a b i l i t y  to reso lv e  c o n f l i c t .  
I t  is important to  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  the two concepts because i f  
the use of  power by one person in the dyad is l e g i t im a te d  by 
the o t h e r ,  t h a t  person is viewed as having a u t h o r i t y ,  or the  
r i g h t  to make d e c is io n s .  A decrease in c o n f l i c t  is 
p re d ic te d  when the power s t r u c t u r e  of  "a r e l a t i o n s h i p  is 
viewed as l e g i t i m a t e  (Scanzoni and Scanzoni,  1981; Brown, 
1980; Scanzoni,  1970; Sprey,  1971; Raven and K rug lansk i ,  
1970; V erh o f f  and F i e l d s ,  1970).
Th is  study examined how the power s t r u c t u r e  was 
associated  w i th  the consensus over the power d i s t r i b u t i o n .  
The Index of  Power Norm Consensus showed t h a t  1*7-8% of the  
e g a l i t a r i a n  couples had high agreement on how the power was 
d i s t r i b u t e d  but on ly  22.1% of the male dominant couples  
agreed to t h a t  d i s t r i b u t i o n .
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When the a s s o c ia t io n  between m a r i t a l  power s t r u c t u r e ,  
power norm consensus, and lev e l  o f  c o n f l i c t  was examined,  
the f in d in g s  suggest th a t  consensus is an important f a c t o r  
in reducing the level  of  c o n f l i c t  fo r  a l l  m a r i t a l  power 
s t r u c t u r e s .  However, the f in d in g s  a lso  showed th a t  
regard less  of  the leve l  of  consensus, e g a l i t a r i a n  
r e la t i o n s h i p s  cont inue  to have the lowest l e v e ls  of  
c o n f l i c t .  Consensus had the l a r g e s t  e f f e c t  on reducing the  
leve l  of  c o n f l i c t  in male dominant r e la t i o n s h i p s  and to a 
l esser  e x t e n t  on female dominant r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  The 
f in d in g s  from t h i s  study confi rm the importance t h a t  
l eg i t im a c y  of power, or a u t h o r i t y ,  has on reducing the leve l  
of c o n f l i c t ,  but a ls o  p o in t  out t h a t  i t  is not consensus 
over the power d i s t r i b u t i o n  t h a t  e x p la ins  the low lev e l  of  
c o n f l i c t  in e g a l i t a r i a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  This  suggests th a t  
f o r  e g a l i t a r i a n  r e la t i o n s h i p s  i t  is the p r o p e r t ie s  of  th a t  
power s t r u c t u r e ,  the  shar ing in d e c is io n  making,  t h a t  is 
assoc iated  w i th  the low l e v e ls  of  c o n f l i c t .  The f in d in g s  
suggest t h a t  the lev e l  of  c o n f l i c t  is more c ont inge nt  on the  
bas ic  power s t r u c t u r e  than on the l e g i t i m a t i o n  of  any 
e x i s t i n g  s t r u c t u r e .
Mar i t a 1 Power. Conf1 i c t  and Vi o lence
Although the data  in d ic a te  a strong l in e a r  a s s o c ia t io n  
between c o n f l i c t  and v io le n c e ,  the power s t r u c t u r e  o f  the  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  was shown to have a s u b s t a n t ia l  impact on th a t  
r e l a t i o n .  When the r e l a t i o n  between c o n f l i c t  and v io le n c e  
is examined f o r  each power type ,  i t  is  c le a r  t h a t  c o n f l i c t
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in some power s t r u c tu r e s  produces a g r e a t e r  r i s k  of  v io le n c e  
than in o th e r s .  The f in d in g s  suggest t h a t  fo r  a l l  power 
s t ru c tu r e s  but the male dominant, the re  may be a to le ra n c e  
leve l  f o r  c o n f l i c t :  i t  is on ly  when c o n f l i c t  is a t  i t s  
highest  l e v e ls  t h a t  dramat ic  increases in the v io le n c e  r a t e  
occur .  Th is  is e s p e c i a l l y  t r u e  fo r  the d iv id e d  power 
s t r u c t u r e  and the female dominant.  I t  a lso  appears t h a t  
e g a l i t a r i a n  r e la t io n s h ip s  can t o l e r a t e  more c o n f l i c t  be fo re  
v io le n c e  occurs than o th e r  power s t r u c t u r e s .  Although the  
data in t h i s  research only  consider the impact of  c o n f l i c t  
on the r a t e  of  v io le n c e ,  i t  seems reasonable  to suggest t h a t  
since e g a l i t a r i a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  can t o l e r a t e  higher le v e ls  
of c o n f l i c t  w i th o u t  a s u b s t a n t ia l  increase  in the r a t e  of  
v io le n c e ,  they may a ls o  be capable of  avo id ing o ther  
d e s t r u c t i v e  behaviors t h a t  e f f e c t  the s t re n g th  of  the  
m a r i t a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  when th e re  is  c o n f l i c t .
I t  has been suggested (S traus ,  1980; Goode, 197**; 
W h itehurs t ,  197*0 t h a t  one way to reduce the r a t e  of  
v io le n c e  is to change the power r e l a t i o n s  between men and 
women so they are  more e q u i t a b l e .  However, the same authors  
a lso  s t a t e  t h a t  e q u i t a b le  power r e l a t i o n s  may have, the short  
term e f f e c t  of  increas ing  v io le n c e  because the re  may be 
g re a te r  c o n f l i c t  when power is e q u i t a b ly  d i s t r i b u t e d .  The 
f in d in g s  from t h i s  research suggest t h i s  cau t io n  may be 
unnecessary. The lowest ra te s  of  c o n f l i c t  and v io le n c e  are  
found in those r e l a t i o n s h i p s  where the re  is an e q u i t a b le  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  power, and these r e la t i o n s h i p s  a lso  have the
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h ighest  l e v e ls  o f  consensus.
The Use of Neqot i a t  i on Tact  ics
Measures of th re e  n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s  are  developed to  
e xp lo re  the e f f e c t  of  d i f f e r e n t  n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s  on the  
a s s o c ia t io n  between c o n f l i c t  and v io le n c e .  Ind ices  t h a t  
measure the use of  reasoning,  withdrawal and verbal  
aggression were computed from the C o n f l i c t  T a c t ic s  Scale  
(S traus ,  1978) fo r  the husband, the w i f e ,  and the couple .
The f in d in g s  suggest t h a t  n e g o t ia t io n  t a c t i c s  are  
r e l a t e d  to the leve l  o f  m a r i t a l  v io le n c e .  The v io le n c e  r a t e  
is lowest when reasoning is used compared to the v io le n c e  
ra te s  when withdrawal  and verbal  aggression are  used.  
Although the v io le n c e  ra te s  increase  when withdrawal and 
verba l  aggression are  used, the use of  reasoning as a 
n e g o t i a t i o n  t a c t i c  to  avoid,  v io le n c e  appears to  be 
i n s u f f i c i e n t .  The analyses very  s t ro n g ly  suggest t h a t  i t  is  
the  leve l  of  c o n f l i c t ,  not the amount of  reasoning used,  
t h a t  e xp la in s  increases in the v io le n c e  r a t e .  When 
w ithdrawal  and v erb a l  aggression are  considered,  the  
f in d in g s  demonstrate t h a t  al though v io le n c e  is very  l i k e l y  
to  increase ,  the lev e l  of  c o n f l i c t  continues to  be an 
important  fa c to r ,  r e l a t e d  to increases in the v io le n c e  r a t e .
When the r e l a t i o n  between c o n f l i c t ,  n e g o t ia t io n  and 
v io le n c e  was examined fo r  each m a r i t a l  power type ,  the data  
i n d ic a t e  t h a t  the bas ic  r e l a t i o n  does not change. For each 
m a r i t a l  power s t r u c t u r e ,  the v io le n c e  ra te s  are  lower when 
reasoning is used and higher when withdrawal and verbal
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aggression are  used. However, even though v io le n c e  ra te s  
are  lower when reasoning is used, the  basic r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between c o n f l i c t  and v io le n c e  remains: the g r e a t e r  the leve l  
of c o n f l i c t ,  the h igher  the r a t e  o f  v io le n c e ,  regard le ss  of  
how much or how l i t t l e  reasoning is used.
O v e r a l l ,  the f in d in g s  fo r  the analyses t h a t  examine the  
r e l a t i o n  between c o n f l i c t ,  n e g o t i a t i o n  and v io le n c e  and the  
analyses t h a t  examine t h i s  same r e l a t i o n  fo r  each m a r i t a l  
power type suggest t h a t  the use of  d e s t r u c t i v e  t a c t i c s ,  such 
as wi thdrawal  and verba l  aggress ion ,  and high l e v e ls  of 
c o n f l i c t  a re  important  e xp la n a t io n s  of  the increase  in the  
r a t e  o f  m a r i t a l  v io le n c e .  On the o ther  hand, since  
reasoning does not appear to decrease  the v io le n c e  r a t e ,  the  
f in d in g s  a lso  suggest t h a t  i f  v io le n c e  is to be l i m i t e d ,  i t  
is the lev e l  of  c o n f l i c t  t h a t  must decrease .  The f in d in g s  
in t h i s  research suggest t h a t  such a reduct ion  in c o n f l i c t  
is most l i k e l y  to be achieved i f  the percentage of  
e g a l i t a r i a n  f a m i l i e s  were to  increase  from the 29% found 
among t h i s  sample.  That i s ,  the im p l ic a t io n  appears to be 
t h a t  changing the power s t r u c t u r e  o f  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  so 
t h a t  power is more e q u i t a b ly  d i s t r i b u t e d  w i l l  l i m i t  c o n f l i c t  
and thus v io le n c e .  This  conclus ion is supported by Scanzoni 
and Scanzoni (19 8 1 : i*67) * who s t a t e  t h a t  " c le a r  communication 
in i t s e l f  is no guarantee  t h a t  c o n f l i c t  w i l l  c e a s e . . . t w o  
p a r t i e s  have to work a t  changing the s i t u a t i o n  so th a t  
gr ievances  and in e q u i t i e s  are  removed".
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IMPLICATION OF THE RESEARCH 
MacDonald, (1980) in rev iewing a decade of the fa m i ly  
power l i t e r a t u r e  suggests several  areas f o r  fu t u r e  research.  
He s ta te s  t h a t  "one of the primary tasks is to  
s y s t e m a t ic a l l y  in v e s t i g a t e  the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p  between 
power and c o n f l i c t ,  e s p e c i a l l y  how c o n f l i c t  is handled in 
terms of the power d i f f e r e n t i a l s "  (1980:850) and th a t  
"although the p o t e n t i a l  o f  c o n f l i c t  theory  has o f t e n  been 
argued, i t  is now necessary to  in co rp o ra te  i t  in to  fa m i ly  
power research"  ( 1980: 851 ) .
Th is  study has taken i n i t i a l  steps in those d i r e c t i o n s .  
I t  has demonstrated t h a t  al though power and c o n f l i c t  are  
inherent in any so c ia l  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  the amount of  c o n f l i c t  
and a t  l e a s t  one way t h a t  c o n f l i c t  may be handled,  t h a t  of  
v io le n c e ,  are  r e l a t e d  to  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  m a r i t a l  power.
In terms of c o n f l i c t  theory ,  the r e s u l t s  o f  t h i s  
research suggest support  fo r  the genera l  o r i e n t a t i o n  of  the  
th eory ,  but not f o r  severa l  o f  the more s p e c i f i c  hypotheses.  
The f in d in g s  do not support  the hypothesis t h a t  the g re a te r  
the in t im acy ,  the g r e a t e r  the c o n f l i c t ,  as tes te d  in t h is  
study.  I t  has been suggested th a t  e g a l i t a r i a n  r e la t io n s h ip s  
are more in t im a te  and thus g re a te r  c o n f l i c t  is p r e d ic te d .  
The r e s u l t s  of  t h i s  research do not support t h i s .
A second hypothesis  suggests t h a t  c o n f l i c t  w i l l  be 
b e n e f i c i a l  i f  c o n s t r u c t iv e  means are  used to  s e t t l e  
d is p u te s .  The data  in t h i s  research does not d i r e c t l y  
address t h i s  hypothesis  because th e re  are  no measures of  the
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b e n e f i t s  of  c o n f l i c t .  However, i t  does show t h a t  the use of  
d e s t r u c t i v e  t a c t i c s  increases the frequency of v io le n c e ,  
which can be in t e r p r e t e d  as c o n s is te n t  w i th  a general  
c o n f l i c t  p e r s p e c t iv e .  On the o ther  hand, the r e s u l t s  
suggest t h a t  the use of  reasoning does not help reduce the  
frequency of v io le n c e .  Since reasoning is a c o n s t r u c t iv e  
t a c t i c  to use,  some decrease in the v io le n c e  r a t e  is 
expected .
A more genera l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  c o n f l i c t  theory  
focuses on how in e q u a l i t y  leads to  c o n f l i c t .  The f in d in g s  
in t h i s  research c l e a r l y  demonstrate the r e l a t i o n  between 
m a r i t a l  i n e q u a l i t y  and c o n f l i c t ,  and thus supports the  
o v e r a l l  p e rs p e c t iv e  o f  the theory .
The more important  f i n d i n g ,  however, is the r e l a t i o n  
between power, c o n f l i c t  and v io le n c e .  The im p l ic a t io n  fo r  
socia l  p o l i c y  dec is ions  concerns the fe a r  t h a t  abandoning 
the idea of  the husband as the 'h e a d 1 of the fa m i ly  w i l l  
produce chaos and c o n f l i c t ,  and s e r v ic e s ,  programs and 
ideo log ies  t h a t  increase the socia l  power of  women w i l l  have 
a d e t r im en ta l  e f f e c t  on the f a m i ly .  In f a c t ,  the r e s u l t s  of  
th is  research suggest the oppos i te :  the empowerment o f  women 
leads to s u b s t a n t i a l l y  less c o n f l i c t  and v io le n c e  in the  
fami 1y .
This conclusion is c o n s is te n t  w i th  f e m i n i s t  soc ia l  
theory which sets the e x p la n a t io n  of  m a r i t a l  v io le n c e  in the  
p a t r i a r c h a l  soc ia l  s t r u c t u r e  t h a t  condones v io le n c e  towards 
women. This  research has focused on the m a r i t a l  power
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s t r u c t u r e  o f  in t im a te  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  Although i t  seeks an 
ex p la n a t io n  fo r  v io le n c e  from a micro r a th e r  than macro 
p e r s p e c t iv e ,  the conclusion is the same. A major  
e xp la n a t io n  of  the level  of  c o n f l i c t  and v io le n c e  is rooted  
in power d i f f e r e n t i a l s  between men and women.
Appendix
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T a b le  A . l :  Couple  M ino r  V i o l e n c e  by Leve l  o f  C o n f l i c t  and Use o f
N e g o t i a t i o n  T a c t i c s
N e g o t ia t io n
T a c t ic s
V io le nce  Rate  
Conf1 i c t




A l . Reasoning by Cpl 
Low 1.3 4 .8 10.2
Reasoning = . 0 1 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 3 * * *
Med i um 4.7 10.9 18.2
High 1.9 5 .8 18.1
B l .  Withdrawal by Cpl 
Low
Wi t h d r a w a l = . 1 0 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 3 * * *
Med i um 2 .6 4 .3 7 .4
High 9-4 19-0 28 .5
C l .  Verbal  Agg. by Cpl 
Low • 3
Verb.  Agg.= . 1 2 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 3 * * *
Med i um 1.8 5 .2 . 3-7
High 12.0 17.5 29-5
*  p< .05
* *  p< .01
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T a b le  A . 2:  Couple M ino r  V io l e n c e  by Leve l  o f  C o n f l i c t  and Use o f
N e g o t i a t i o n  T a c t i c s  i n  Female Dominant M a r r i a g e s
N e g o t ia t io n  
Tact  i cs




 c t  Is:
High Eta Squared
A l .  Reasoning by Cpl Reasoning =.0001
Lower A . 6 2A.2 C o n f l i c t  = . 0 9 * * *
Hi gh 7.1 AO.O
B l .  Withdrawal by Cpl Wi thdrawal = . 13* * *
Lower 1 .A 13-0 C o n f l i c t  = . 0 9 * * *
H i gh 19.0 A6.7
C l .  Verbal  Agg. by Cpl1 Verb.  Agg.= . 1 9 * * *




* * * p<.001
>
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T a b le  A . 3 : Couple  M ino r  V io l e n c e  by Leve l  o f  C o n f l i c t  and Use o f
N e g o t i a t i o n  T a c t i c s  in  D i v i d e d  M a r r i a g e s
N e g o t ia t io n  
Tact  i cs
Vio lence Rate  





A l .  Reasoning by Cpl Reasoning =.0001
Lower 5 -5 12.8 C o n f l i c t  = . 0 3 * * *
High 3-6 19.8
B l .  Withdrawal by Cpl Wi th d ra w a l® .11* * *
Lower 2 .0 5.1 C o n f l i c t  = . 0 3 * * *
High 17.0 29.7
C l .  Verbal  Agg. by Cpl Verb.  Agg.= . 1 2 * * *
Lower 1.3 1.8 C o n f l i c t  = . 0 3 * * *
H i gh 16.1 28.2
*  p< .05
* *  pc .O l
* * *  p<.001
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T a b le  A.A : Couple  M ino r  V i o l e n c e  by Leve l  o f  C o n f l i c t  and Use o f
N e g o t i a t i o n  T a c t i c s  i n  E g a l i t a r i a n  M a r r i a g e s
N e g o t ia t io n  
Tact i cs
V io le n c e  Rate When 
Conf1 i c t  Is:
Lower High Eta Squared
A l .  Reasoning by Cpl Reasoning = .0008
Lower 5 .3 9 .5 C o n f l i c t  = . 0 1 * *
High 3 .2 12.9
B l .  Withdrawal by Cpl Wi t h d r a w a l = . 0 6 * * *
Lower 2 .7 ^•3 C o n f l i c t  = . 0 1 * *
H i gh 1^.7 19.5
C l .  Verbal Agg. by Cpl Verb.  Agg.= . 0 5 * * *
Lower 2 .5 3 .8 C o n f l i c t  = .0 0 8 *
High 12.5 23-5
*  p< .05
* *  p c . o i
p<.001
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T a b le  A . 5 : Couple M inor  V io l e n c e  by Leve l  o f  C o n f l i c t  and Use o f
N e g o t i a t i o n  T a c t i c s  in  Male Dominant  M a r r i a g e s
N e g o t ia t io n  
Tact i cs
V io lence  Rate  





A l .  Reasoning by Cp1 
Lower 6 .0 20 .0
Reasoning = .0000  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 3 * *
High 10.8 15 - h
B l .  Withdrawal by Cpl 
Lower 1 .A 3-7
Wi thdrawal = . 1 2 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  = . 0 3 * *
High 20.6 30 .3
C l .  Verbal  Agg. by Cpl 
Lower
Verb.  Agg.= . 2 0 * * *  
C o n f l i c t  = .02
High 29-0 30 .6
*  p< .05
* *  p<.01
p < . 001
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Q65 & Q66 Power Norm Consensus Index 
067 Marital Power Index
14
Every fam ily has decisions to make — such as where to l iv e ,  whether or not to buy. 
a c a r, and so on. We would lik e  to find  out how you and your (w ife /p artn er) make t  . 
some o f these kinds o f decisions.
HAND RESPONDENT CARD C
65. Let's  s ta r t  w ith buying a car. Who do you th ink should have the f in a l say on 
buying a car? — —
   Q. 65 Q. 66 Q. 67
RESPONDENT WIFE/PARTNER
OPINION _ ___OPINION WHO HAS FINAL SAY
». Ul * 9  £  O  If_j oc atae g g 9 9 2
5  *  3  Sc 3  »-
u j u i oa a  tu  •
1 4  u , tn  in  y i Z
Buying a car
Having children
What house or 
apartment to take
What job you 
should take
Whether your w ife  
should go to  work 
or q u it work
1 2 3 4 5 X
1 2 3 4 5 X
1
How much money to spend 
on food per week 1
1 2 3 4 5 X
1 2 3 4 5 X
1 2 3 4 5 X
1 '2  3 4 5 X
2  uj -  I  3  |
§ 2 1 I I I
HI Lti ffl ffl CO •
Ik  U» V * ^  sc
3  3  3  £  3  S
1 2 3 4 5 X
1 2 3 4 5 X
1 2 3 4 5 X
1 2 3 4 5 X
1 2 3 4 5 X
1 2 3 4 5 X1
66. How about your (w ife /partner)?  Who does
she think should have the fin a l say on buying 
a car?-------------------------------------------------------------------
67. Now, in your fam ily , who actua lly  does have 
the f in a l say? " --------------------
TAKE BACK CARD C
P age 160
Q68 Marital Conflict Index
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HAND RESPONDENT CARD D
68. I  am going to read a l i s t  o f things that couples do not always agree on. For 
each of them, please t e l l  me how often you and your (w ife /partner) agreed 
during the past year. F ir s t ,  take managing the money. Did you and your 
(w ife /partner) always agree, almost always agree, usually agree, sometimes 
agree, or never agree about managing the money?
ALMOST DON'T
ALWAYS ALWAYS USUALLY SOMETIMES NEVER KNOV
a. Managing the money 1 2 3 4 ' 5 X
b. Cooking, cleaning, or 
repairing the house 1 2 3 4 5 X
c. Social a c tiv it ie s  and 
entertaining 1 2 3 4 5 X
d. Affection and sex re lations 1 2 3 4 5 X
IF RESPONDENT HAS CHILDREN AT HOME OR NOT AT HOME, ASK:
e. Things about the children 1 2 3 4 5 X
TAKE BACK CARD D •
69. Every couple has th e ir  ups and downs, and surveys 1 YES
lik e  th is  have shown that a t some time or o ther, 2 NO
most people wonder about whether they should X NO ANSWER
continue th e ir  (m arriage/re lationship). What 
about in your case? Have you ever thought 
about this?
IF  "YES1' ON Q. 69,~~ASK:
70. How much have you thought about it?  1 ONCE
Was i t  once, a few times, or a lot? 2 A FEW TIMES
3 A LOT 
X NO ANSWER
71. When you thought about i t ,  did you 
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C o n f l i c t  T a c t i c s  S c a le
18 •
HAND RESPONDENT CARD A
78. No matter how well a couple gets along, there are times when they disagree on major decisions, get annoyed 
about something the other person does, o r ju s t  have spats o r f ig h ts  because they 're  1n a bad mood o r t ire d  
o r fo r  some other reason. They also u s e  many d if fe re n t ways o f try in g  to s e tt le  th e ir  d iffe rences. I'm  
going to  read a 11st o f some things th a t you and your (w ife /partner) might have done when you had a dispute, 
and would f i r s t  11he you to t e l l  m  fo r  each one how often you did I t  In  the past year.
0. 78
RESPOHOEHT-IN PAST YEAR
i  I  -  I s  i  
I 8 I  i  3 I  I I  I
a. Discussed the Issue calmly
b. Got Information to back up 
(your/her) side o f things
c. Brought In  o r tr ie d  to  bring
In  someone to  help s e tt le  things












J . 1  
2
e. Sulked and/or refused to 
ta lk  about I t
f .  Stomped out o f the room or 
house (o r yard)
g. Cried
h. Did o r said something to 










0 1 2 
0 1 2
0 1 2
4 5 6 X
4 5 S X
4 S S X
4 5 6 X
1. Threatened to h i t  o r throw
something a t the other one 0
J. Threw o r smashed or h i t  o r
kicked something 0
k. Threw something a t the
other one 0
1. Pushed, grabbed, o r shoved
the other one 0
2 3 4 S S X
2 3 4 5 6 X
2 3 4 5 S X





4 5 6 X
4  5 6 X
4 5 6 X
4 5 6 X
m. Slapped the other one
n. Kicked, b i t ,  o r h i t  w ith 
a f i s t
o. H it o r tr ie d  to  h i t  w ith 
something









0 1 2 
0 1 2
4 S 6 X
4 5 6 X
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 X
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 X
Threatened w ith  a kn ife  
o r gun








0 1 2 3 4 5 6 X
0 1 . 2  3 4 S 6 X
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 X
79. And what about your (w ife /partner)?  T e ll me how often she (ITEM) in  the past year.
FOR EACH ITEM CIRCLED EITHER "NEVER" OR “DON'T KNOW FOR BOTH RESPONDENT AND PARTNER. ASK: 
[SO. Did you o r your (w ife /partner) ever (ITEM)? —----------------------------------------------------------------
IF ANY BRACKETED ITEMS HAPPENED IN PAST TEAR. GO TO NEXT PAGE. IF NO BRACKETED ITEMS IN PAST YEAR, SKIP TO q. 82. 
TAKE BACK CARD A
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